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Abstract 
 
    This thesis examines the implementation of cultural diplomacy through the perspective 
of cultural policy in Taiwan (Republic of China). It elaborates how the policy-making and 
practice have progressed in response to the changes of Taiwan’s domestic cultural politics 
and foreign affairs, including its relations with China (People’s Republic of China). As an 
empirical study, the research focuses on Taiwan’s cultural policy in the timeframe of 
1990-2014 and more specifically on the promotion of the performing arts.  
 
    The research identifies three crucial elements of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. It 
complements traditional diplomacy, acts as an outlet in the process of cultural identity 
formation, and showcases cultural and creative industries. Each element is prioritised at 
different phases of policy practice. However, a long-term and continuous strategy is absent. 
The research reveals that Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy emphasises more on its 
self-presentation than creating mutuality. The unsettled issues of cultural identity have its 
profound influence on cultural diplomacy. 
 
    Meanwhile, the projection of soft power is not necessarily reinforced by the 
market-driven policy orientation and the quantifiable policy objectives. The research also 
illustrates the interaction among the government, artists, and other actors from the private 
sector. The key finding indicates that the government is constrained by bureaucracy and its 
own contested political status. Civil society at the individual level participates in cultural 
diplomacy with a sense of enthusiasm, while corporations in general are less motivated.  
 
    The research provides empirical evidence on communicating soft power through cultural 
diplomacy without much hard power. In this case, the promotion of soft power is limited and 
does not necessarily compensate for the deficiency of hard power.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. Research topic 
This thesis explores how in Taiwan (Republic of China, ROC) the spheres of cultural 
diplomacy and cultural policy are linked in the pursuit of an international presence for the 
country. It investigates the external promotion of Taiwanese culture since the 1990s with a 
focus on the performing arts. The work is theoretically situated in the fields of enquiry of 
public and cultural diplomacy and also makes use of Joseph Nye’s (2004) concept of soft 
power, whilst remaining critical of it. The recognition of the importance of culture in 
international relations predates the popularisation of the soft power concept, which includes 
culture as one of its sources, and has intensified with the growing importance of public 
diplomacy as part of the foreign policy toolkit of many countries. As Mitchell (1986) 
indicated, culture is an expression of national identity and, therefore, a factor in international 
affairs. No external cultural policy is conceivable without recourse to the products of internal 
cultural policy (ibid.). In other words, culture can be representative of a country in its global 
presence as an expression of national identity and cannot be separated from internal cultural 
policy. Through relevant programmes and activities, cultural diplomacy and cultural relations 
can facilitate conventional diplomacy and serve as a vehicle for international understanding.  
While cultural diplomacy gains recognition in a country’s foreign affairs, its 
connection to cultural policy is also worth investigation. As noted by Figueira (forthcoming), 
cultural diplomacy is often understood as the use of culture by governments to achieve their 
foreign policy goals and a prime activity for achieving ‘soft power’ as a relational outcome. 
In this thesis, the connection between foreign and cultural policies is examined through the 
case of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy.  
The research adopts a two-dimensional approach, specifically focusing on public 
policy areas pertaining to cultural diplomacy. While one strand analyses policy formation, the 
other stresses its implementation. In terms of the Taiwanese government’s policies, this thesis 
looks at major transitions of discourses of cultural policies. In what concerns the practice of 
cultural policy and cultural diplomacy, the research focuses on its operation in the Ministry of 
Culture (MOC, formerly Council for Cultural Affairs, CCA) in Taiwan, as the main 
government department in charge of cultural policy and relevant affairs of cultural diplomacy, 
including the budget and policy implementation. The analysis of this governmental 
department considers the ways in which the authorities attempt to achieve their mission, 
especially through the development of policy plans, their implementation and evaluation.  
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From the different perspectives of Taiwanese cultural diplomacy, the promotion of 
the performing arts and artistic companies’ engagement was selected as the main strand for 
investigation in this thesis. This was chosen because the author identified clear and 
continuous governmental support of performing arts within the remit of cultural diplomacy 
programmes since the 1990s. In the case explored in this thesis, the justification of subsidies 
for artistic companies’ overseas tours is connected to rationales that clearly indicate a link 
between cultural policy and cultural diplomacy and between the internal and external public 
policy environments. The government’s support has been particularly visible after it set up 
grant schemes such as the Scheme to Foster International Performing Groups and the 
activities ensuing from the establishment of overseas cultural centres, both taking place in 
and after 1991. The influences of foreign policy and trade strategy are also included as 
contextual information. 
The bilateral relation between Taiwan and China (the People’s Republic of China, 
PRC) provides a crucial context for the analysis of Taiwan’s cultural policy and cultural 
diplomacy. Despite disputes over sovereignty, the countries’ historical links and 
contemporary interactions are defining elements for Taiwan, both in the way it can establish 
relations and operate in the international sphere and set policy objectives internally. In fact, 
Taiwan is a political entity of contested sovereign status, with which few states maintain 
formal diplomatic relations. It is a country excluded from membership of the United Nations 
since 1971, while maintaining formal diplomatic relationship with a mere 20 countries (as of 
June 2017) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). At internal level, the concern with the 
development of a distinguishable Taiwanese cultural identity has been an important policy 
that connects intrinsically with the process of nation building. Both externally and internally, 
China has a major impact on Taiwan at various levels, including those of cultural policy and 
cultural diplomacy. 
Fundamentally, the research aims to address the following question: how do Taiwan’s 
(the Republic of China) cultural diplomacy and cultural policy operate to fulfil the political 
objective of making the country internationally visible through policy implementation? 
Additional questions are developed to capture complementary aspects. First, why is cultural 
diplomacy considered important in Taiwan’s foreign affairs? Secondly, how do cultural 
diplomacy and cultural policy link in Taiwan? Thirdly, what are the crucial challenges faced 
by the government when implementing cultural diplomacy? And what are the potential 
solutions? Finally, does the existing policy practice serve the intended policy objectives?  
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    This research is a longitudinal case study on Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy through the 
analysis of government-supported programmes, particularly the examples of performing arts. 
The case study method enables detailed examination of how the government develops its 
aims and objectives leading to the formulation of policies and implementation strategies. It is 
also considered Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy that correlates to its particular international 
status. The empirical data for this study were collected through qualitative methods from 
multiple sources of evidence that reflect the changes in Taiwan’s cultural policy. 
The thesis addresses the period 1990 to 2014. As the main theme of analysis is 
cultural diplomacy in relation to cultural policy, this research started by investigating relevant 
policy initiatives of the Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA). The CCA was established in 
1981 and was responsible for ‘cultural affairs’, which included cultural heritage, literature, 
cultural citizenship, cultural exchange and visual and performing arts. The government 
division responsible for cultural exchange was then set up in the CCA (now the Department 
of Cultural Exchanges in MOC).  The establishment of the CCA in Taiwan in 1981 marked 
the beginning of centralised policymaking for cultural affairs at the ministry-level in the 
Executive Yuan, the central government executive branch, in Taiwan. Before the CCA was 
established in 1981, the administration and cultural policies and cultural diplomacy had 
transitioned through several departments, and some of them ceased to exist. These 
departments included the Ministry of Education (MOE), Government Information Office 
(GIO, 1947-2012), Bureau of Cultural Affairs (under the MOE, 1967-1973) and the Chinese 
Cultural Renaissance Movement Committee (established in 1966); none of them was in 
charge of the formulation of cultural policies. The so-called cultural policy was under the 
control of Kuomintang (KMT) (Hsia, Ling, & Chen, 2012). However, during the 
administration of Chen Chi-lu (1981-1988), the first Chairperson of the CCA, no concrete 
orientation on cultural policy was proposed (C.-y. Su, 2001). The framework of a cultural 
diplomacy strategy started to be realised following the first National Cultural Conference 
(Quanguowenhuahuiyi) in 1990, and the opening of two cultural centres in 1991 and 1994. 
Related policies prior to the establishment of the CCA are also covered for contextual 
background. Although some earlier research considered the Bureau of Cultural Affairs in the 
Ministry of Education as the first government institution responsible for nationwide cultural 
affairs (Rau, 2008), this unit only served for six years and was not at the ministry level. These 
transitions and discontinuations of policy also increased the inaccessibility of information and 
difficulties for data collection, which I discuss in Chapter 3.  
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 The course of this research (2010-2015) coincided with some important transitions of 
government institutions responsible for cultural diplomacy in Taiwan. In 2010, the 
government launched a series of projects to expand its cultural network, such as the 
establishment of the new cultural institute, the Taiwan Academies. This study examines the 
framing of these activities in relation to the changes in Taiwan’s foreign policy, and whether 
its implementation delivers the policy objectives. Furthermore, it is investigated how policies 
on the development of cultural and creative industries in Taiwan influence the development 
of cultural diplomacy; this is discussed in Chapter 5. In 2012, the CCA was upgraded to the 
MOC, and combined with some departments of the former Government Information Office 
(GIO). The influence of reorganisation and upgrade of the CCA and its impact on cultural 
diplomacy practice, including the expansion of overseas cultural outposts and integration 
between government departments, are also discussed in this thesis. The data collection 
concluded in 2014 and incorporated the policy plan proposed by the first Minister of Culture, 
Lung Ying-tai, despite the fact she stepped down prematurely in that year. In 2016, Taiwan 
elected Tsai Ing-wen from the DPP as its first female president. Further developments on 
cultural diplomacy in Tsai’s administration are not included in this research. 
As the scope of this research mainly considers the cultural affairs of Taiwan, the 
analysis focuses on the policy implementation of CCA and MOC. Relevant policies in other 
government ministries, such as educational programmes in the Ministry of Education, are 
also part of cultural diplomacy. The support of Taiwan studies and academic exchange are 
also part of the cultural diplomacy activities that the Taiwanese government promotes 
internationally under the MOE, but are not the main focus of this research. However, 
significant cases of Taiwan’s educational exchange, such as those involving Mainland 
Chinese students, are included as part of the cross-Strait relations in the research findings in 
Chapter 4.  
In addition to the political action of government officials, another strand of analysis 
explored in this thesis is the private actors’ motivation to engage in cultural diplomacy, 
especially in relation to identity building. For this purpose, the research also explores the 
parallel processes of nation building and nation branding affecting the construction and 
projection of a positive image of Taiwan (by means of the implementation of cultural 
diplomacy). In this thesis, I argue that the process of promoting an international image is 
crucial for cultural identity building and shaping in Taiwan. However, it is also essential to 
question what image is being portrayed and who decides and engages in this process. 
Relevant policies encouraging various participants to engage in cultural diplomacy, 
 12 
especially artists and corporations, are explored. The rich experience of the performing arts 
companies’ is particularly analysed. The notion of ‘make Taiwan visible’ is evident in the 
advertisements of private actors (Chapter 6). I am particularly interested in examining their 
motivation and attitude in participating in cultural diplomacy, and analysing the challenges 
they face from the perspective of arts administration. The relations between government and 
private actors, including artists, non-government organisations, corporate sponsors and 
philanthropists, are discussed. In this context, I also explore how government policy 
influences these actors’ motivations and contributions to cultural diplomacy. 
 It is important to stress that this study places great importance on the dynamics 
between cultural diplomacy and cultural identity. This is visible when observing Taiwan 
building its own cultural identity as an imagined community, as Anderson (1991) illustrated. 
Through this process, cultural diplomacy represents a reiteration between ‘seeing oneself’ 
and ‘being seen.’ The research provides an insight into this process, which is ultimately 
viewed as helping to shape and strengthen Taiwan’s cultural identity and nationalism.  
    
1.2 Main themes of analysis  
This study examines Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy in a cultural policy framework, and 
explores three dimensions in detail. First, it is important to understand how Taiwan’s 
disadvantages in foreign affairs (i.e. the issue with international recognition of its political 
status) influence the discourse of cultural diplomacy. As it is difficult for Taiwan to maintain 
formal diplomatic relations with most countries, cultural activities provide opportunities for 
government to present the country to the international community. The research traces how 
changes in Taiwan’s foreign affairs have influenced cultural diplomacy. It also examines how 
the image of Taiwan has transformed from being part of the government’s informal 
diplomacy and propaganda to being incorporated within a structured promotion of cultural 
products overseas. This reflects the change in Taiwan’s cultural policy, which is examined in 
detail in the following chapters. The emphasis on the transition in Taiwan’s cultural policy is 
particularly important, as I subscribe to the theory that external cultural policy cannot be 
separated from internal cultural policy (Mitchell, 1986). Thus, this thesis belongs to the field 
of cultural policy research, as it is heavily influenced by the contextual considerations of the 
chosen case study. In Taiwan, the official ‘national culture’ and the cultural products selected 
are heavily correlated with changes in cultural policy, which I further discuss in Chapter 5. 
 Secondly, the research explores how Taiwan’s cultural identity has changed and how 
it correlates with the national image the government wishes to project as part of a nation 
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building process (Chang, 2006). The complexity of Taiwan’s cultural identity can be 
attributed to its history (Hsiau, 2012). These issues are not only the consequence of the 
Japanese colonisation of Taiwan from 1895 to 1945, but also long-term political disputes 
with China over regime legitimacy and territory since 1949. While China and Taiwan have 
highly similar cultures in terms of language, customs and values, the complicated historical 
background and political developments have resulted in controversies over the promotion of 
Taiwanese culture and its uniqueness. An analysis of the historical background is presented 
in Chapter 4. The cultural diplomacy strategy thus reflects heavily the issues underlying 
Taiwan’s bilateral affairs.  
Thirdly, the bilateral relation with China plays a unique role in Taiwan’s cultural 
diplomacy. Despite the complicated political issues mentioned above, Taiwan and China 
have close ties as regards trade, business and tourism. Through frequent communication at 
individual and organisational level, there are cultural exchanges through education and 
tourism. The similarity in language provides great benefits for, among others, trade in 
cultural products, and the relevant policies regarding the latter are also examined in this study 
to understand their impact. In addition to the bilateral relations, another issue addressed is the 
impact of China’s ambition to project ‘Chinese’ culture by setting up overseas cultural 
institutions, the Confucius Institutes, and Taiwan’s response to it. 
Whereas these three aspects constitute the overall strategy of Taiwan’s cultural 
diplomacy, the actual practices include the structure of the government, the involvement of 
cultural organisations and the engagement of non-state actors. I investigate how external 
cultural policy has been positioned in overall policymaking, and how internal cultural policy 
influences the cultural diplomacy strategy. In this analysis, I include policy-makers, 
government officials and cultural professionals and practitioners, who actively participate in 
the cultural diplomacy projects. Within this strand of analysis, I consider the interaction 
between government and non-state actors, such as artists, non-government organisations and 
the private sector. This choice is based on observing private actors engaging enthusiastically 
in cultural diplomacy programmes. In addition, this discussion sheds light on how cultural 
identity formation and cultural diplomacy influence each other.  
 
1.3 Literature review and theoretical framework  
In this section, I briefly outline the theoretical framework of the study – which is further 
detailed in Chapter 2 – and explore the literature on the cultural diplomacy of Taiwan 
demonstrating need for the research. 
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In the field of public and cultural diplomacy, the concept of ‘soft power’ plays an 
important role in the discourses of political players and analysts. Taiwan is not immune to 
this trend. Considering Taiwan’s particular status internationally, examination of its use of 
soft power to create influence is particularly appealing. American scholar Joseph Nye (2004) 
originally coined the term ‘soft power’ to indicate the ability to ‘shape the preference of 
others’ and ‘getting others to want the outcomes that you want.’ Nye also identified that a 
country’s soft power rests on three elements: culture, political values and foreign policies. He 
emphasised that the use of soft power depends on the context, especially when converting the 
resources into behaviour power (ibid). In the case of Taiwan, I am interested in analysing 
how the concept of ‘soft power’ is used in government documents on cultural diplomacy, 
such as the vision of the Ministry of Culture. It is important to make sense of what Taiwan’s 
soft power actually means to the government, especially when culture is heavily emphasised. 
This is examined in detail in Chapter 5 when discussing policy implementation.  
Whilst Nye (2004) focused on the foreign policy of the United States, other studies 
provide a regional perspective on East Asia (e.g. Lee & Melissen, 2011), or focus on 
bi-lateral relations, such as Japan-China (Vyas, 2011) and Taiwan-China (Y.-h. Chu, 2011; 
deLisle, 2010; Rawnsley, 2012; C. Su, 2009). However, there is limited research on how the 
idea of soft power is translated into policymaking and practice. Detailed analyses of China’s 
soft power, including its weaknesses, also provide background knowledge of Taiwan-China 
bilateral relations. This is the bigger picture of soft power in the region. As far as Taiwan’s 
soft power is concerned, Taiwanese scholar Yun-Han Chu (2011) provided a domestic 
perspective on the cross-Strait relationship with China. In addition, the studies of Chu (2011) 
and Rawnsley (2000) are helpful in understanding Taiwan’s soft power and international 
communication. However, the practical issues of cultural exchange between Taiwan and 
China were not discussed by Chu (2011). Rawnsley (2000) provided a detailed analysis of 
Taiwanese informal diplomacy and propaganda. Later, Rawnsley (2014) further explored 
Taiwan’s public diplomacy and soft power. I agree with some of his observations on 
Taiwan’s informal diplomacy, such as the advantages that unofficial organisations have over 
their official counterparts. While his research covered the GIO’s overseas activities, his 
research did not consider the work of the CCA. Further, in this research, I examine how ‘soft 
power’ is interpreted by the Taiwan government and realised in its cultural policy 
implementation to translate the idea of soft power into actual policy practice. This research 
develops another strand of Taiwan’s informal diplomacy and its relation to cultural policy.    
 15 
In this research, I examine the implementation of cultural diplomacy from the 
perspective of cultural policy. Although Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy, such as the 
establishment of the Taiwan Academies, is mentioned in the literature, the studies are mostly 
from the perspective of international relations and not from a cultural policy perspective. In 
order to explore further the link between cultural diplomacy and cultural policy and to 
determine how the concept of soft power was interpreted in Taiwan, I situate the present 
study in the research realm of cultural policy, which concerns, according to Schuster (2003) 
‘the ways that the state assists, supports, or even hinders the cultural life of its citizens’; 
furthermore, ‘a state’s cultural policy can be usefully thought of as the sum of its activities 
with respect to the arts (including the for-profit cultural industries), the humanities, and the 
heritage’ (p. 1). This is a broad field of research, as I do not subscribe to the narrow definition 
of cultural policy as, for example, the administration of ‘the arts’ (McGuigan, 2004). Cultural 
policy in Taiwan has extended beyond the administration of arts and heritage, and it has 
evolved to include the development of cultural and creative industries, and the policy 
objectives of cultural diplomacy have reflected the developments. 
Increasingly, a government’s external cultural policy cannot be separated from its 
internal cultural policy (Mitchell, 1986). However, the links between external cultural policy 
and internal cultural policy are commonly obscured by the formal division of power in 
government, as the former often falls into the competence of foreign ministries and the latter 
within a domestic remit governed by a ministry of culture or a similar department (ibid). 
When tracing the development of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy, one can establish a clear 
connection with the promotion of performing arts and visual arts dating from the early days 
of the CCA. It was also the MOC (formerly CCA) that set up the division designated to deal 
with external cultural affairs instead of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I return to this topic 
in Chapter 5 to discuss how government structures influence the development of the idea of 
cultural diplomacy in Taiwan. 
The representation of a particular national culture to other nations can be clearly an 
important aspect of cultural policy as well as of foreign policy, as Williams (1984/2014) 
observed. He related cultural exchange to cultural and foreign policies, and pointed to the 
benefit of ‘equal sharing’ of cultural experiences which all peoples need. Thus, in 
establishing the connection between cultural policy and cultural diplomacy, the present study 
focuses on the idea of soft power in government structures, how it has been institutionalised 
and how this rationale has influenced policymaking and implementation. 
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While stressing the links of cultural diplomacy and cultural policy, it is worth noting 
that the scope of cultural diplomacy is wider than the promotion of arts internationally. In this 
respect, the study does subscribe to a broad understanding of cultural diplomacy in line with 
the oft-cited definition by Cummings (2003) as ‘the exchange of ideas, information, art, 
lifestyles, value systems, traditions, beliefs and other aspects of culture among nations and 
their peoples to foster mutual understanding’ (p. 1). This definition includes various aspects 
of culture, regardless of its tangibility or forms of presentation. It also includes different 
actors in the process of cultural diplomacy, whether it is initiated by the state or the people. 
However, the terminology of ‘cultural diplomacy’ has multiple usages under different 
contexts and is hence difficult to define, as detailed in Chapter 2.  
For the purpose of this study, it is also important to consider cultural diplomacy as 
part of public diplomacy, which Sharp (2005) defined as ‘the process by which direct 
relations are pursued with a country’s people to advance the interests and extend the values of 
those being represented’ (p. 106). Cultural diplomacy can have similar objectives, as the term 
was ‘used to refer to the processes when diplomats serving national governments took 
recourse to cultural exchanges and flows or sought to channel them for the advancement of 
their perceived national interests’ (Isar et al., 2014, p. 19). Although these terms may refer to 
comparable policy initiatives and cultural programmes, they differ depending on whether the 
cultural activities are undertaken with policy objectives or supported by the government, and 
whether reciprocity is established.  
  
For the scope of this research, I use the term ‘cultural diplomacy’ to refer to 
government-supported policy initiatives. In the official cultural policy documents published 
in Chinese in Taiwan, the term ‘cultural diplomacy’ can be directly translated into wenhua 
(culture) waijiao (diplomacy). The term ‘cultural exchange’ (translated into wenhuajiaoliu) is 
also used while naming the department that is in charge of related cultural affairs in the MOC. 
‘Cultural diplomacy’ and ‘cultural exchange’ are often used interchangeably in government 
documents.  
It is worth noting that ‘cultural relations’ is seldom translated into Chinese and its 
literal meaning used in Taiwan. I would suggest that this is because of the multiple and 
complicated meaning of ‘relations’ (guanxi) in Chinese. However, as Mitchell (1986) pointed 
out, ‘cultural relations’ has a broad reference beyond the actions of governments and 
agencies. He also suggested that ‘cultural relations’ can be conducted on the initiative of 
either private or public institutions. In comparison, the term ‘cultural diplomacy’ is 
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essentially the business of governments. Therefore, in this research, I refer to the activities of 
cultural diplomacy carried out by the government and public cultural institutions through 
policy plans irrespective of the varied terms used in government documents.  
Furthermore, when it comes to the cultural policies in China-Taiwan relations, 
‘cultural exchange’ (wenhuajiaoliu) is used rather than cultural diplomacy. I argue that the 
choice of terminology reflects the sensitivity in bilateral relations. Whilst the ROC and PRC 
claim to be the legitimate representative of China and do not recognise each other’s 
sovereignty, it would be problematic to place the cultural exchange in the context of 
diplomacy. The term ‘exchange’ also downplays the authority and politics that may be 
implied in the term ‘diplomacy’, especially when the Taiwanese government supports various 
cultural exchange programmes between Taiwan and China. The use of ‘cultural exchange’ 
reflects the history and practice in which private foundations and actors are actively engaged 
and commissioned by the Taiwanese government in cross-Strait relations. In this research, I 
use ‘cultural relations’ as an umbrella term that also covers the communication that develops 
organically without government intervention in China-Taiwan relations. In addition, as the 
Taiwanese government seeks to project a positive image abroad and promote its brand, food 
and tourism, the concept of ‘place-branding’ can be identified in policy documents. Place 
branding and nation branding are also discussed in terms of government strategy and its 
weakness (section 5.7). 
In addition, non-government actors can play a vital role in the process of cultural 
diplomacy. For instance, citizens can be considered stakeholders in their national brand, as 
they present a country’s values to the rest of the world (Jaffe & Nebenzahl, 2006). Besides 
professional diplomatic agents, diplomacy is also carried out through different channels 
(Berridge, 2010), which leads to considerable change. La Porte (2012) noted that the 
engagement of non-state actors in public diplomacy highlighted the importance of 
‘legitimacy as factual support’ by the citizenry. A new understanding of ‘legitimacy’ means 
that political actors are required to gain support from the general public through transparency 
and dialogue. It is important to know how the non-government actors are motivated to 
participate in cultural diplomacy. How does the government maintain its relations with civil 
society organisations? I explore particularly whether there are challenges when engaging 
non-government actors in this process. The participation of arts organisations in Taiwan’s 
cultural diplomacy has been significant. However, according to Nisbett (2015), there has 
been little exploration of the meaning of cultural diplomacy, particularly in reference to arts 
organisations, managers, artists and audiences. These actors might be able to present 
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Taiwanese culture in countries with which the government does not have much diplomatic 
relations. By presenting their work overseas, the artists can potentially have profound 
influence. In this research, I analyse what cultural diplomacy means to the Taiwanese arts 
companies and the challenges they have. From a policymaking perspective, I also discuss 
how the government can help to build their capacity. Relevant analysis is presented in 
Chapter 6. 
 
1.4 Research contribution 
This research offers a case study of cultural diplomacy and soft power. Soft power, despite 
the controversy surrounding it, is an important concept to understand and evaluate in relation 
to various issues examined in this dissertation. A review of the literature indicates that much 
soft power studies focus on global superpowers. However, Taiwan is an under-recognised 
country attempting to project its soft power through cultural diplomacy. It is significant that 
this thesis contributes to eliminate such a gap in knowledge and the development of cultural 
diplomacy studies focusing on less powerful actors in international relations. Thus, I seek to 
understand how Taiwan, which lacks powerful relations with international organisations and 
allies, constructs meaningful strategies of cultural diplomacy.  
This thesis provides additional evidence of existing practices in the area of cultural 
diplomacy. Additionally, as primary data were collected from policymakers, cultural attachés 
and artists, the dissertation provides an insight into actual policy implementation and reflects 
the changes in Taiwan’s cultural policy. The strength of the case study method employed 
enables investigation of how government formulates policies and plans and delivers 
implementation (see Chapter 3 for the methodology and a detailed analysis of the advantages 
of case studies).  
The empirical findings illustrate the implementation of cultural diplomacy initiatives. 
I examine the feasibility of the practice to fulfil policy objectives. Additionally, the study 
points out the limitations of policymaking and practice. In so doing, it identifies the problems 
and provides potential solutions from the government’s perspective. Furthermore, the 
findings could benefit future policymaking. The nature of cultural diplomacy research is 
trans-disciplinary, and the aim is to contribute to the theoretical framework of cultural policy 
studies and international relations. Finally, the point of departure of this thesis is my reflexive 
research interest in cultural identity and the promotion of arts overseas. Combined with my 
career in the National Theatre and Concert Hall (NTCH) and the CCA, two important 
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institutions in Taiwan, it is my objective to find out whether cultural diplomacy is a feasible 
solution to promote Taiwan’s presence internationally. 
This research aims to understand how cultural diplomacy is practised by the 
government, and further examines what has been achieved and reasons behind any perceived 
instances of under-achievement or lack of success. It critically evaluates the rationales behind 
cultural diplomacy and the limitations of current practices in Taiwan. Thus, the study not 
only extends the assessment of soft power in a country that does not enjoy much diplomatic 
strength, but also provides an insight into cultural policymaking and arts management. 
Furthermore, it explores the promotion of Taiwanese culture overseas. This research is 
beneficial for cultural professionals who wish to engage in cultural diplomacy programmes, 
and provides a reference for further understanding and preparation.   
               
1.5 Overview of the chapters 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. This first chapter introduces the subject. Chapter 2 
presents the relevant concepts in the areas of cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy and nation 
branding, which constitute the theoretical orientation of this research. There is also a review 
of the literature on the concept of soft power. The research design and chosen methodology 
are presented in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 provides a general understanding of Taiwan’s foreign 
affairs, and cultural relations with China. There is also discussion of the historical 
background of Taiwan and a selection of studies on Taiwan-China relations. In Chapters 5 
and Chapter 6, I present the research findings on the Taiwan government’s implementation of 
policies, and the engagement of non-state actors in cultural diplomacy. This is followed by an 
in-depth discussion and the conclusions in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Background 
 
This research focuses on Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy and cultural policy. Cultural 
diplomacy, the primary theoretical field of concern, is often examined from the perspective of 
international relations and associated with public diplomacy. Cultural policy is examined to a 
lesser extent, with focus on theoretical insights into how the Taiwanese government develops 
its cultural diplomacy.  
In this chapter, several key concepts of cultural diplomacy are examined to build the 
theoretical framework of analysis. It is organised in five sections. In the first section, I 
discuss the concept of soft power in international relations, in terms of public and cultural 
diplomacy. The ideas of public and cultural diplomacy are analysed in the second section. In 
the third section, I review the literature on cultural diplomacy, and nation and place branding 
promotion in Taiwan. Furthermore, this provides understanding of the policy objectives and 
questions that may rise in the process.     
   
2.1 Soft power in international relations 
Soft power is a key concept in this study as it plays an important role in the official discourse 
of the Taiwanese government, which seeks to present and justify policy developments and to 
enhance the image of the country internationally. The concept was first coined by the 
American political scholar Joseph Nye in the 1990s. Nye (2004) illustrated ‘the second face 
of power’ as ‘the indirect way to get what you want’ (p. 5). Rather than coercing others as 
hard power does, he suggested soft power could convince people to want the outcomes that 
you want. Soft power is thus the ability to shape the preferences of others. In short, soft 
power is the ability to attract, and the attraction often leads to acquiescence.  
To understand further the concept of power, I present a discussion of theories of 
international relations. Despite the assertion that power is the currency of world politics, its 
definition remains contentious (Mattern, 2007). Different versions of realism (classical, 
structural, neoclassical) share the view that states continuously compete for power, but they 
disagree on the factors that account for this perpetual struggle. In a realist conception, power 
also means ‘the ability of states to use material resources to get others to do what they 
otherwise would not’ (Barnett & Duvall, 2005, pp. 39-40). This reflects the realist’s view on 
international relations that the state is the main actor. Rather than define the power of a 
certain state based on its ability to influence or control the action of another state, the realist 
prefers to consider the possession of material resources (Schmidt, 2007). Schmidt (ibid.) also 
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pointed out that realists have not reached a consensus on the appropriate criteria for 
measuring power. The constructivist’s view offers another understanding of the concept of 
power. Guzzini (2005), for instance, highlighted that constructivist analysis questions what 
the concept of power ‘does.’ Guzzini (ibid.) illustrated three characteristics of constructivism. 
The first is the epistemological claim that meaning, hence knowledge, is socially constructed. 
Secondly, the constructivist claims ontologically that the social world is constructed. Thirdly, 
it is stressed the reflexive relationship between the social construction of knowledge and the 
construction of social reality.  
Given the commitment of meta-theory, there is not one conception of power that 
would be shared by all approaches. Therefore, how do countries possess the material 
resources first? And how they employ them? Nye (2004) identified three sources of a 
country’s soft power: culture, political values and foreign policies. They are intangible and 
are not the same as material resources. Although these resources can be identifiable, it is 
important to determine how they can be employed influentially.  
What Nye conceived as soft power is far from new. For example, in 1974, Lukes 
(2005) proposed a three dimensional view of power. The one-dimensional view of power 
focuses on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues with an observable conflict of 
interests. These behaviours can be seen as express policy preferences, revealed by political 
participation. Furthermore, Luke’s two-dimensional view of power involves a qualified 
critique of the behavioural focus of the first view. The second view allows consideration of 
the ways in which decisions are prevented from being taken on potential issues where 
conflict can be observed (ibid). To a certain degree, Nye’s conception of ‘soft power’ could 
be considered as similar to Lukes’s third dimension of power, which is to shape, influence or 
determine others’ beliefs and desires, thus further securing their compliance (2005; 2007). 
Moreover, Nye made no distinction between modes of persuasion or ways of ‘shaping 
preferences’ (Lukes, 2007). Alternatively, the third dimension of power can be considered as 
a form of hegemony, especially the purpose of securing compliance by shaping and 
influencing others’ beliefs and desires. Hegemony can exist internationally; as Gramsci (1971) 
stated, ‘[e]very relationship of “hegemony” is necessarily an educational relationship and 
occurs not only within a nation, between the various forces of which nation is composed, but 
in the international and world-wide field, between complexes of national and continental 
civilisations’ (p. 350). Hegemony in international relations was later elaborated using 
Gramsci’s approach. It is understood not in terms of coercion, but consent, shared beliefs and 
common-sense without diminishing the importance of material power and dominance over 
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material resources (Antoniades, 2008). As Antoniades (ibid.) pointed out, hegemony is equal 
to common-sense – the establishment within the sphere of universally accepted values. Thus, 
the process of ‘shaping and influencing others’ beliefs and desires,’ and possibly further 
establishing universally accepted values, can also be challenged as a form of hegemony.  
Furthermore, Foucault’s view on power can provide an insight into international 
relations. For instance, Foucault advocated a nominalist’s view of power. Instead of 
something concrete, power is everywhere and spread throughout the social system. Foucault 
rejected the state-centric view on power, and observed that it is exercised, but never 
possessed (Paolini, 1993). Paolini (ibid.) considered Foucault’s ideas as not easy to explain. 
The relations of power internationally are not as the realist discourse holds invested with 
coherence, totality and logic. Furthermore, in the study of international politics, Foucault’s 
observation helped shift focus from a mono-power and allowed other issues such as culture, 
discourse, identity and self/other constructions to move to centre stage. 
Given the different perspectives of power, several questions can be posed. First, can 
soft power be possessed, or can it only be practised?  What if a government wishes to invest 
in its culture as part of its soft power sources, but lack opportunities to present it to others? 
As mentioned above, the relations of power are not as coherent and logical as the realists 
suggest. Hypothetically, if a country has the resources of soft power, as Nye (2004) suggested, 
but does not have the opportunity to exercise it, then it may not be effectively received. From 
the constructivist’s point of view, the definition of soft power itself is also an exercise of 
power. Furthermore, it would be problematic to consider soft power as a tangible asset that 
can be possessed. The way Nye (2004) conceived of this idea is often criticised, that is, in 
much the same way as hard power, it is a tangible tool that can be deployed through 
concerted effort (Mattern, 2007). As a result, attempts to ‘stockpile soft power’ or ‘wielding 
soft power’ suggest that it is an tangible weapon (Rawnsley, 2012). In terms of Taiwan, I 
argue that intangibility is a characteristic of soft power, which is often overlooked by the 
government in its policymaking. In addition, the sources of a country’s soft power may be 
enriched by government policy, but it is more important for the government to create 
opportunities to practise it. That is to say, the Taiwanese government has a realist view of 
soft power, but there is little discussion of how relational it can be. Also, the constructed 
aspect of the concept of power is missing.   
Nye is aware of this problem of attempting to stockpile soft power as a tangible asset. 
There is further indication of the confusion between behaviour and the resources that produce 
it (Nye, 2010). Even though soft power rests primarily, but not entirely, on a country’s 
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culture, political value and foreign policies, it also depends on relationships in different 
contexts to convert the resources into behaviour power. It can be further asserted that soft 
power is not practised according to a formula. The context in which the resources are 
converted can be complicated depending on the relationship, which can never be static. In 
other words, there are multiple elements that determine how a country can translate the 
resources into power. This statement provides a reference point for examining the case of 
Taiwan, which lacks formal diplomatic recognition and access to international organisations. 
How, under the circumstances, does the government wish to influence others? This requires a 
detailed discussion.  
It could be argued that soft power has become an all-encompassing concept. The 
problem is its vague definition. Nevertheless, the notion is hugely attractive to governments 
of all kinds (Hocking, Melissen, Riordan, & Sharp, 2012). The vagueness may also provide 
flexibility for practitioners to ‘get what they want’ (Hayden, 2012). Although Nye (2004) 
identified three sources of a country’s soft power – culture, political values and foreign 
policies – it is necessary to specify the elements of each source to provide more concrete 
understanding. When it comes to culture, Nye (2004) defined culture as ‘the set of values and 
practices that create meaning for a society’; he broadly distinguished between ‘high culture’ 
and ‘popular culture’ (p. 11). However, this may be only partially representative of a 
society’s set of values and practice. As Nye (ibid.) pointed out, it is a mistake to equate soft 
power behaviour with the cultural resources that sometimes help produce it. In other words, it 
is unrealistic simply to export either high culture or popular culture to other countries and 
expect the reward of soft power behaviour in return. For instance, what is considered a 
country’s culture? Bennett (2013) argued that given the complexity of the idea of ‘culture,’ it 
may be better to break it down into its component parts, such as beliefs, ideas, art and 
traditions. How can these components be presented? And how does the international audience 
receive these assets of a country’s soft power? These are crucial questions for 
strategy-making. Hall (2010) argued that actors should focus on the types of international 
reactions to their soft power strategies that provide positive feedback, whilst rationalising 
evidence that does not support their strategies. In the case of Taiwan, with its special political 
and international status, I would suggest that the government’s soft power strategy might 
have more real influence in internal affairs. That is to say, through the process of projecting 
the values that are approved of domestically, it contributes to the formation of collective 
identity. However, whether the audience appreciates the projected values or images is a 
question seldom investigated. 
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Further limitations of the implementation of soft power have been highlighted in 
research. First, soft power is difficult to implement as an effective instrument of foreign 
policy, as Lee (2011) cautioned. Secondly, when analysing related practices of soft power, it 
is better to understand how presupposed resources are put to use or are imagined to be of 
certain value in strategic discourse and policy initiatives (Hayden, 2012). Thirdly, the 
limitations of soft power implementation result from the mismatch between what a country 
believes to be an effective projection of soft power and what is actually perceived by the 
audience in other nations (McClory, 2011). McClory (ibid.) also underlined two relevant 
challenges to soft power’s intellectual integrity. One is the overuse of this term, which has 
seen its meaning develop over time; and the other is policymakers trying to use soft power 
before fully understanding its constituent parts. The problems highlighted reveal the hastiness 
commonly seen in the policymaking process. If policymakers attempt to use soft power 
before fully understanding it, they may risk the time, budget and effort for an illusionary 
target. Also, it would be too easy to set up false targets for soft power projection without 
knowing the reasons. The difficulty of measuring soft power in terms of returns on 
investment was also noted by Rawnsley (2013). He pointed out that the accumulation and 
exercise of soft power capital is a long-term process and a business model cannot be used as a 
soft power strategy. Governments, as Rawnsley (2013) argued, cannot expect immediate or 
short-term returns.  In my view, these arguments represent a blind spot, which occurs when 
governments attempt to employ soft power. The illusionary and false targets may never be 
achieved, and the government might cease to invest in relevant policy programmes before 
any actual returns take place. I argue that a blind spot might more easily be seen in 
parliamentary politics and time-limited administrations. This correlates with my observation 
on policymaking in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. Long-term returns are difficult to justify in 
the design of annual budget review by legislators and short-term government administrations. 
Thus, a quantifiable and measurable index is often applied when setting targets, such as the 
number of audience members. Even if the problem mentioned above might arise during the 
policymaking process, the question concerns what the government can do to change it.    
To gain a clear understanding of the influence of soft power requires observation and 
assessment over a period of time. Given there may be no instant outcome, governments could 
find it difficult to incorporate soft power in their strategy when politicians and the public 
become impatient for results (Nye, 2011). In addition, the assessment can be difficult and 
complicated. Indeed, a measure for the performance of a country’s soft power is yet to be 
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developed. Even if a standard scale exists, the huge cost of collecting feedback would 
probably also constrain any follow-up surveys.  
Despite the difficulty in measuring a country’s soft power resources and reception, 
understanding them better remains an objective. The Elcano Global Presence Index (Olivié & 
Molina, 2011), in particular, takes exports of audio-visual services as its measurement (Olivié, 
Gracia, & García-Calvo, 2014). In other words, the measurement focuses on cultural products 
that can be massively reproduced. However, McClory (2010) considered that mass 
production does not necessarily link to mass influence. For the policymakers, they must be 
aware not to make the mistake of equating soft power behaviour with the cultural resources 
that it sometimes helps to produce (Nye, 2004). The export of culture is arguably the easiest 
way to quantify a country’s soft power assets. However, the numbers need to be treated with 
caution, as they do not necessarily translate into soft power behaviour. Simply to link them 
together or to pursue higher numbers of cultural exports could be paradoxical. Although 
Taiwan is not listed in either of the rankings, the arguments and index provided in these two 
studies help to shed light on relevant policies of exporting cultural products as part of soft 
power strategy.  
From an East Asia perspective, soft power is increasingly perceived as possessing 
strategic value. Jhee and Lee (2011) noted the tendency to emphasise normative soft power 
rather than affective soft power in East Asian countries. Jhee and Lee (ibid) further argued 
that citizens in these countries have communal or collectivist orientations and prioritise 
community and social cohesion more than individualism compared with their counterparts in 
Western countries. The normative dimension of soft power corresponds to its origins, namely, 
legitimacy (ibid.). The authors illustrated how the differences in social values and orientation 
influence perception of other countries’ soft power. Furthermore, the construction of soft 
power resources and national identity are particularly important for countries that were once 
colonised, such as Japan’s former colonies South Korea and Taiwan. As regards correlation 
between postcoloniality and cultural politics and policymaking, postcolonial societies seek to 
create their own cultural distinctiveness and to reclaim a voice in telling their own stories 
(Mulcahy, 2010). This is particularly important in relation to Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy 
programmes and the building of cultural identity. It is relevant to the promotion of Taiwan’s 
image internationally, as emphasised in the policy statement of President Ma Ying-jeou’s 
White Paper for Culture in his 2008 election campaign. 
The regional dimension of soft power in East Asia has developed more in 
policymaking in recent years. As Hall and Smith (2013) argued, the logic of appropriateness 
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was the motivation for some Asian governments to pursue public diplomacy, as they saw 
other states doing so as well. It is evident the cultural export strategy of South Korea, such as 
drama and food, in government documents, for example, the Flagship Project on Television 
Contents, Film, and Popular Music (Government Information Office, 2009). Hall and Smith 
(2013) also pointed out that states might invest in public diplomacy because the associated 
norms are considered increasingly appropriate. Also, states might invest because this could 
be interpreted as consistent with their identity or role within the international system. Similar 
logic of appropriateness can be found in official documents in Taiwan, such as the Global 
Outreach Plan published by the MOC in 2013 (Ministry of Culture, 2013a). This stressed the 
importance of participating internationally through cultural activities and following in the 
steps of the United States and the European Union. The development of Taiwan’s soft power 
strategy matches the characteristics of East Asian countries discussed in the literature. 
 
2.2 Current understandings in public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy  
Further to discussion of soft power, I present and review the literature on public diplomacy 
and cultural diplomacy in this section, as they represent fundamental fields of enquiry for the 
thesis. Public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy are two related concepts. ‘Public diplomacy’ 
was first applied to the process of international information and cultural relations in 1965 by 
Edmund Gullion (Cull, 2009). It is broadly considered as a country’s engagement and 
communication with foreign publics, and further establishing long-term relationships and 
trust (d'Hooghe, 2011a). Public diplomacy is based on the premise that the image and 
reputation of a country are public goods (Leonard et al., 2002). This can create either an 
enabling or a disabling environment for individual transactions. While traditional diplomacy 
is about relationships between the representatives of states or other international actors, 
public diplomacy targets the general public in foreign countries, such as non-official groups, 
organisations and individuals (Melissen, 2005). Although the general public has been clearly 
defined as the target of public diplomacy, the role of the states and other actors that may be 
involved in the practice has not.  Although public diplomacy is generally accepted to be an 
instrument of governance, it is not exclusive to governments. 
In Cull’s (2008) taxonomy of public diplomacy, the involvement of government also 
influences different elements. Depending on each element’s nature and its source of 
credibility, the connection to the government does not necessarily help. For instance, there 
may be occasions when keeping a distance from government is an advantage. The relation 
between government and public diplomacy, as Gregory (2008) illustrated, is as follows:  
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an instrument used by states, associations of states, non-governmental organisations, 
and individuals to understand attitudes, cultures, ideas and media frames of events and 
issues; engage in dialogue between people and institutions; advise political leaders, 
policy-makers and practitioners on public opinion and communication implications of 
policy choices; influence opinions, behaviour and social practices through 
communication strategies, actions, narratives with message authority; and evaluate the 
impact of activities over time and adapt. (p.243) 
 
Gregory (2008) emphasised the interaction between states and other groups engaged in the 
process of communication, and further provided details on strategic communication. 
Furthermore, this definition includes an evaluation of the impact of activities over time. As 
an instrument to enhance a country’s soft power, governments cannot gain full control of the 
use of public diplomacy. First, non-governmental actors’ interests may not fully match that of 
governments. Secondly, from the perspective of receivers, there is guaranteed neither positive 
feedback nor instant results (Leonard et al., 2002; Gregory, 2008). As Gregory (ibid.) 
indicated, disagreements or conflicts of interest may not be overcome by shared 
understanding. Moreover, flawed policies and weak political leadership will not be trumped 
by public diplomacy. In other words, public diplomacy is not a remedy of the existing 
problems of a country’s governance, nor can it disguise the problems in its domestic politics. 
In an era when communication technology is rapidly evolving, public diplomacy can be 
beyond the government’s control.  
The concept of ‘new public diplomacy’ has also emerged with the development of 
information and communication technology. According to Melissen (2005):  
 
the new public diplomacy is no longer confined to messaging, promotion campaigns, or 
even direct governmental contacts with foreign publics serving foreign policy purposes. 
It is also about building relationships with civil society actors in other countries and 
about facilitating networks between non-governmental parties at home and abroad. (p. 
22)   
 
With the advent of the Internet and the development of social media, the creative use of 
technology challenges how officials frame their communication strategies. Gregory (2008) 
suggested that it is important to recognise especially that the Internet forum has structured a 
virtual public sphere in which ‘boundary spanners’ and ‘boundary maintainers’ contest ideas. 
Other than the Internet forum, the emergence of social media has become a powerful tool to 
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mobilise ‘netizens,’ not only to post their opinion online, but also to demonstrate on the 
streets. Despite most of the world’s authoritarian governments’ attempts to limit the use of 
social media, it has become a tool coordinating nearly all political movements (Shirky, 2011). 
One such example is the #Occupy movement initiated in 2011. In the case of Taiwan, the use 
of technology in the Sunflower Movement in 2014 provided real-time broadcasts from 
students who participated and further contributed to connect overseas Taiwanese students 
hosting related events and showing their support. Combined with the emergence of citizen 
journalism through extended platforms on traditional media, such as the iReport on CNN and 
the Guardian witness, social media can amplify the voice of the public. These examples show 
that in a time when traditional mass media is no longer as significant, leaders and 
governments need to reconsider methods to engage with their target public. It also raises 
questions in this research: how do Taiwanese government officials recognise the use of social 
media? And is it a feasible way for the government to communicate with the public in the 
home and host countries?  
Culture is essential when a country tries to engage and communicate with another. It 
intersects almost every juncture of public diplomacy, from vision to policy and practice. In 
the process of engaging with the public in foreign countries, culture can link people and 
further increase communication. Although ‘culture’ is arguably the most complicated word to 
define in English (Williams, 1983), Nye (2008, p. 96) suggested that ‘culture is the set of 
practices that create meaning for a society.’ This definition covers, for example, information, 
art, lifestyles, value systems, traditions and beliefs (Cummings, 2003). The goal of cultural 
diplomacy is to enhance mutual understanding. Through position and explanation, dialogue 
and debate, culture provides meeting points for people to understand each other and further 
generate mutual understanding (Bound, Briggs, Holden, & Jones, 2007). In the progress 
towards mutual understanding, culture can serve as a medium to link up people, which reates 
opportunities for contact and engagement.   
In international relations, culture’s role in conflict resolution, security studies and 
traditional diplomacy first emerged in the 1990s (Zaharna, 2012). Both public diplomacy and 
cultural diplomacy are key instruments of soft power and have historically associated with 
propaganda. The concepts of propaganda, cultural diplomacy and cultural relations can be 
seen to occupy different places in the international relations spectrum on affairs relating to 
the engagement of governments with foreign audiences (Fisher & Bröckerhoff, 2008). On the 
spectrum of available approaches to exerting influence, as suggested by Fisher and 
Bröckerhoff (2008), ‘listening’ is on one end, whilst ‘direct messaging (telling)’ on the other. 
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Cultural diplomacy is situated between these points and its emphasis shifts from listening 
increasingly towards the promotion of a particular perspective. It is, in fact, ‘the act of 
presenting cultural goods to an audience with the attempt to engage them in the ideas the 
producer perceives to be represented by them’ (ibid, p. 28). In other words, the process 
includes both activities of telling and listening.  
In academic study, concept and structure are two areas of significance for 
understanding cultural diplomacy. The conceptual approach focuses on motivations, while 
the structural approach addresses the establishment of cultural diplomacy. The former 
focuses on what nations, rules, governments and citizens desire to achieve by familiarising 
others with their culture and the content of their programmes, and the latter seeks the 
responsible agents of cultural diplomacy, and how they correlate with state interest 
(Gienow-Hecht & Donfried, 2010). The two approaches are applied in this research. I 
examine the programmes and policies pertinent to Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy and discuss 
how responsible agents act in relation to the government’s interests. Through these two 
approaches different countries’ motivations and cultural diplomacy can be analysed. For 
instance, according to Gienow-Hecht and Donfried (2010), France was the first nation to 
develop an official organ of cultural diplomacy and the motivation was to improve its image 
abroad. This provided some conceptual illustration of France’s cultural diplomacy. Details of 
its structure are available through tracing the Alliance Française’s history, mission, 
programming and funding resources. Through consideration of conceptual and structural 
variables suggested by Gienow-Hecht and Donfried (ibid.), it helps to create a framework to 
analyse each country’s cultural diplomacy approach. Although the programmes are similar 
(e.g. artistic exchanges, setting up cultural centres, exhibitions), significant differences in 
each country’s emphasis can be found. Countries, therefore, may have specific consideration 
in their strategy of cultural diplomacy, which could be based on its political and historical 
background. 
Different manifestations of culture are employed in the process of cultural diplomacy, 
as Nye (2008) suggested. For example, he distinguished between high culture, which appeals 
to the elite, such as literature, art and education, and popular culture focused on mass 
entertainment. The export of high culture has been fostered especially in diplomatic circle. As 
Mitchell (1986) argued, diplomatic staff seek to impress and present a favourable image. In 
his (ibid) illustration, typical activities include government dispatch of its national opera 
company or presentation of image-building lectures that are followed by lavish diplomatic 
receptions to serve political or economic purposes.  Similar example can be found from my 
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interviewee’s account that Taiwan’s cultural centres host receptions after performances to 
create opportunities for diplomats to interact with each other. That is to say, the choice of 
exhibited culture is in favour of the elite, which has direct benefit to the work of conventional 
diplomacy. As Taylor (1997) noted, government activities of cultural and educational 
exchanges, such as participation in international exhibitions and sponsorship of cultural tours, 
are an attempt to increase international understanding and appreciation. In spite of the 
potential aid in foreign policy in the long-term, Taylor (1997, p.80) argued that cultural 
diplomacy is very much ‘an adjunct of conventional diplomacy,’ and further stated that ‘if the 
latter fails, the former suffers.’ Although cultural diplomacy could hardly thrive if 
conventional diplomacy is under threat, this does not mean the former is entirely dependent 
on the latter. Taylor (ibid.) suggested that cultural diplomacy is important to facilitate the 
workings of conventional diplomacy. This statement provides a reference for Taiwan’s 
cultural diplomacy development, as the country does not enjoy much advantage in 
conventional diplomacy. In these circumstances, how the government frames its cultural 
diplomacy strategy despite the disadvantages is an issue worth considering. Whether cultural 
diplomacy can facilitate conventional diplomacy is also of note; for instance, realising 
cultural diplomacy programmes when there are no formal diplomatic relations between two 
countries, and diplomats and cultural attachés taking advantage of opportunities.  
Furthermore, cultural diplomacy was categorised as one of the elements of the 
practice of public diplomacy (Cull, 2008). Cultural diplomacy is an actor’s attempt to manage 
the international environment. It can be realised through ‘making its cultural resources and 
achievements known overseas and/or facilitating cultural transmission abroad’ (Cull, 2008, p. 
33). In addition, Cull (2008) identified listening, advocacy, exchange diplomacy and 
international broadcasting as other elements of public diplomacy, and that coordination 
between these elements is needed. He especially emphasised the importance of listening in 
successful public diplomacy. In each constituent practice of public diplomacy, attending to an 
audience and opinion research has been a crucial element. Moreover, Cull (2008) stated that 
sources of credibility for each element are not exclusive to itself. For example, the aspect of 
mutuality and two-way communication within exchange can be subordinated to the drive to 
project national culture when housed within a cultural diplomacy agency.     
However, some practitioners of cultural diplomacy have different opinions of the 
relation between cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy. The empirical findings of 
Pamment (2013) suggested that governments seek collaboration with other organisations that 
have overlapping objectives, but do not necessarily share or support identical goals. 
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Furthermore, despite the fact that these components of public diplomacy can be differentiated 
from each other in theory, in practice, the fundamental differences in goals and methods of 
public diplomacy actors, such as between foreign offices and cultural bodies, may not be 
sufficiently clear. Actors do not consider their work as a government activity, while public 
diplomacy is one of them (Pamment, 2013). Thus, cultural diplomacy should not 
automatically be placed on the spectrum of public diplomacy, and there is a clear distance 
between academic and practitioner discourse (Pamment, 2013). It is relevant to consider, in 
the current research, whether the government and the actors share goals, and whether 
interpretation of their work reflects their view on the governance of cultural diplomacy. I 
elaborate more on the practitioners’ views in the research findings and discussion.     
As observed above, the concepts of public and cultural diplomacy overlap or are 
distinguished depending on different interpretations. Similarly, other concepts such as 
(international) cultural relations and cultural exchange or cultural engagement, which are 
often used interchangeably, add to the terminological and conceptual confusion surrounding 
the theoretical field in which this thesis is grounded. This section seeks to provide clearer 
definitions. I start by restating an idea at the heart of this dissertation: the understanding that 
cultural diplomacy follows the rationale of public diplomacy, which is encouraging public 
opinion to influence a foreign government’s attitude towards the sender country 
(Gienow-Hecht & Donfried, 2010). For the actors, in practice, cultural diplomacy, in its 
narrower scope, refers to the ‘business of governments’, and there are two levels of meaning. 
First, there is the inter-governmental negotiation of cultural treaties, agreements and 
exchange programmes, either bilateral or multilateral, to facilitate or prescribe cultural 
exchanges. In other words, this is one of the areas of international affairs governed by 
negotiations and agreements between governments. The second-order meaning refers to the 
execution of these agreements and the conduct of cultural relations flowing from them 
(Mitchell, 1986). I suggest that the inter-governmental negotiation of cultural treaties is the 
irreplaceable function of government as it represents government authority and sovereignty. 
Mitchell (ibid.) further suggested that the execution could not be exclusive to governments, 
although it may be seen as their extended responsibility. From this illustration, cultural 
diplomacy is the governance of cultural affairs in its international relations. Although the 
execution can be delegated to agencies or cultural institutions, essentially it follows the 
government’s direction. In the glossary provided in the final report of the Preparatory Action 
Culture in EU External Relations, it is suggested that civil society and private sector agencies 
may consider the cultural relations they promote to be a form of cultural diplomacy (Isar et 
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al., 2014, p. 134). Mitchell (ibid.) noted that as the execution of cultural diplomacy is in its 
second-order, cultural institutions and agencies can be delegated by governments. However, 
Mitchell did not state whether agencies have authority beyond government delegation, and 
how much. 
The use of terms of cultural diplomacy also reflect different ideas of practice in each 
country. For instance, a preference for ‘cultural relations’ rather than ‘cultural diplomacy’ is 
evident in a number of national cultural institutes and some governments in the European 
Union. The British Council describes its work as ‘cultural relations.’ Also, Germany has long 
used the term ‘external cultural policy,’ which is closer to the idea of cultural diplomacy (Isar 
et al., 2014). For the EU institutions or related state ministries, the term cultural diplomacy is 
not clearly defined. Various terms, such as cultural relations, external cultural policy, 
international cultural relations and cultural exchange, are used interchangeably in the field of 
culture and international relations. The term ‘cultural relations’ has been preferred by 
representatives of cultural and private sectors over ‘cultural diplomacy’, as a recent study for 
the European Parliament found, in order to avoid confusion or belief that all activities are 
government-led (Smits, Daubeuf, & Kern, 2016). Furthermore, Rivera (2015) attempted to 
distinguish between cultural relations and cultural diplomacy, and he suggested that these two 
terms diverge in important ways, in terms of meaning, objectives and motivations. He further 
observed that these differences could be traced to the particular role of government. While 
‘diplomacy’ is usually associated with states, cultural diplomacy can be considered as states 
liaising with other states or people through the medium of culture. Furthermore, as Rivera 
pointed out, relevant state institutions can be accountable and instrumentalised to support 
policy objectives. This correlates to my research on how Taiwan’s public-funded cultural 
institutions play a role in cultural diplomacy programmes. In Taiwan, museums and theatres 
can participate in international professional networks or global events as part of the country’s 
cultural diplomacy. I present more details in Chapter 5.  
Although the presence of government may be the major differentiation between 
cultural diplomacy and cultural relations, this distinction remains vague. For instance, 
cultural programmes initiated by private actors may receive funding from the state or national 
cultural institutions. To what extent  is this kind of financial support considered to represent a 
government presence? Rivera (ibid.) suggested that government could financially support 
cultural relations only if these activities are free from political influences and independent of 
policy objectives. He did not rule out the possibility that cultural relations support national 
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interest. However, such support can only be the byproduct of trust and understanding 
developed through cultural relations. 
Cultural diplomacy may be characterised as the employment and involvement of 
formal diplomats supported by the national interest. However, the term ‘cultural relations’ 
can indicate a wider and possibly spontaneous process. For example, it can grow gradually by 
transactions of trade and tourism, student flows, communications, book circulation, migration, 
media access and intermarriage. These are daily cross-cultural encounters (Gienow-Hecht & 
Donfried, 2010). The characteristics of cultural relations focus on its engagement with 
foreign audiences, mutuality and the establishment of stable relationships. Although these 
activities can be enhanced by government policy, ‘cultural relations’ provides a function 
beyond propaganda or nation branding; rather than selling messages and policy-driven 
campaigns, long-term relations and building trust are more appreciated (Melissen, 2005). In 
addition to the activities carried out by diplomats, the wider policy implementation for 
enhancing cultural relations is also important. For instance, domestic cultural policy that 
encourages artists’ exchange, or education policy which welcomes international students, can 
have an impact on the development of cultural relations. 
The terms cultural diplomacy or cultural relations can have historical baggage 
associated with propaganda, as  Rod Fisher and Carla Figueira (2011) have indicated. To 
differentiate these ideas, Mitchell (1986) illustrated the spectrum of activities by placing 
‘cultural propaganda at one end of a scale that passes through cultural diplomacy to cultural 
relations at the other end.’ He (ibid) further explained ‘the progression is from the use of 
culture as a force to advance national ends, through the association of culture with current 
diplomatic aims, to an open collaborative relationship.’ From this understanding, cultural 
propaganda is the use of culture as a force to advance national interests. Culture serves as a 
medium that can be part of a systematic scheme, or concerted movement for the propagation 
of a particular doctrine or practice. Despite the growing negative association with the term 
‘propaganda,’ Mitchell (ibid.) suggested that the element of propaganda, such as the desire to 
convince partner institutions, might be at any point on the scale regardless of how big or 
small. In other words, even in cultural relations activities, the elements of propaganda may 
still exist. However, the main difference, as Melissen (2005) indicated, lies in the pattern of 
communication. Despite cultural propaganda, cultural diplomacy and cultural relations both 
desire to present cultural goods, convince their audience and deliver values, but it is the 
approach to communication and engagement that differentiates these activities. In terms of 
the projected national image, a difference between cultural relations and cultural diplomacy is 
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that the former generally presents a more ‘rounded’ picture of a country, whilst the latter 
tends to emphasise the presentation of positive images (Isar et al., 2014). The national 
interests cannot be ignored in the message being conveyed, either through direct messaging 
or cultural diplomacy. Nonetheless, it is the credibility and the purpose of messaging that is 
being questioned and challenged by the audience.   
In addition, ‘international cultural relations’ appears in studies that refer to a broader 
concept. This umbrella term refers to the fostering of understanding between countries and 
especially their peoples, seeking to engage in dialogue with a much broader public than is the 
case with cultural diplomacy. International cultural relations may include a wider range of 
activities, which can be initiated by certain government programmes or may grow organically 
without government intervention (Isar et al., 2014). Thus, the term refers to the fostering of 
activities regardless of the actor who initiates and executes them. Furthermore, ‘cultural 
exchange’ is sometimes utilised in quango or non-government institutions, and is 
occasionally seen in official documents. The use of the term was identified by Fisher and 
Figueira (2011) as one aspect of cultural diplomacy. By using the keyword ‘exchange,’ it 
implies the reciprocity in the movement of cultural organisations and artists between 
countries, either formally or informally. The primary difference between ‘exchange’ and 
‘diplomacy’ is also argued to be their respective power dynamics. Reciprocity and a 
symmetrical relationship characterise exchange, whilst cultural diplomacy is significantly 
characterised in presentation and one-way communication (Fisher & Bröckerhoff, 2008). The 
terms discussed above can be differentiated depending on the actors, the motivation and the 
messaging patterns. However, the lack of agreement over definition and the various 
government choices of terms add to the complexity of understanding. 
In the case of Taiwan, the translation between Chinese and English in official 
documents can add more variation in its usage. In Taiwan’s official documents, the idea of 
promoting ‘Chinese culture’ can be found in the Bureau of Culture’s records (Rau, 2008), 
and the term ‘international cultural exchange’ appeared in the 1998 White Paper for Culture 
(Council for Cultural Affairs, 1998). Later, in the 2004 White Paper for Culture in Taiwan, 
‘cultural diplomacy’ was used to describe cultural activities in countries that do not have 
official diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Council for Cultural Affairs, 2004a). Particularly, 
in Taiwan’s government documents, the term wenhuawaijiao (‘cultural diplomacy’) is 
commonly used to denote officially-supported activities, which can be government initiated 
or financially supported. In addition, ‘cultural diplomacy’ can be found in arts organisations’ 
documents that refer to their engagement in either government-sponsored activities or 
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invitations to tour overseas, although the latter may come under the wide-ranging initiatives 
of ‘cultural relations.’ As mentioned previously, the literal translation of ‘cultural relations’ 
(wenhuaguanxi) is not widely used in Taiwan. The term guanxi means a ‘connection,’ and a 
system of social networks and influential relationships which facilitate business and other 
dealings (Oxford University Press, 2015). This may explain the rare usage in Taiwan of 
cultural relations programmes. In addition to the multi-layered meaning of ‘guanxi,’ the term 
‘relations’ may cause confusion and does not necessarily reflect the meaning in English. 
It is worth noting that ‘cultural exchange’ (wenhuajiaoliu) has been used by the MOC 
(formerly Council for Cultural Affairs, CCA) in Taiwan to identify the department that is 
responsible for managing the affairs of cultural diplomacy. In the case of cross-Strait 
relations, ‘exchange’ is often used instead of ‘diplomacy’; the choice of terminology reflects 
the political reality of Taiwan and China. In this thesis, I also use the term ‘cultural relations’ 
to refer both to government activities and the cases of people-to-people cultural encounters, 
which occurred especially after the beginning of Chinese tourism and student programmes in 
2011. The people-to-people communication between Taiwan and mainland China has in fact 
a longer history, such as marriage and immigration; the recent tourism and education 
programmes created more opportunities for exchange. I consider that government treaties and 
agreements can attribute to the communication of culture, but it does not necessarily need to 
be formal or sponsored by the government. It can occur organically.  
However, the most appropriate umbrella term for discussion is ‘external cultural 
policy’ to cover Taiwan’s official cultural exchange strategies, which include the policies 
towards mainland China and other countries. This term can reflect the special status of 
mainland China in the affairs of Taiwan’s government, as it is located neither in foreign nor 
domestic issues. Instead, as regards relevant cultural affairs, the Taiwanese government set 
specific regulation, such as the entry control for Chinese tourists. By using the term ‘external’ 
rather than ‘international,’ this can include the often-unresolved disagreements between 
Taiwan and China.    
In addition, it is important to note the case of ‘international co-operation’ of the 
cultural institutions in Taiwan. The glossary provided in the final report of the Preparatory 
Action Culture in EU External Relations refers to ‘collaboration and encounters between 
cultural operators and/or organisations, whether or not supported by their governments or 
their agencies. It is not usually conditional on reciprocity’ (Isar et al., 2014, p.135). The 
practice of ‘international co-production’ in Taiwan is defined by the characteristics illustrated 
in the glossary. For example, theatre co-production can mean creative teams participating in 
 36 
exchange programmes, or being invited to tour overseas. It is also evident in the Ministry of 
Culture’s funding allocation, which supports public cultural institutions to carry out theatre 
productions or exhibitions. It can also refer to private arts companies that are invited to tour 
overseas and artists’ residencies. One particular case of international co-operation is the 
Flagship Production of the National Theatre and Concert Hall in Taipei. The practice of 
international co-operation can be considered stimulating and generating more encounters for 
artists and cultural operators, which fosters creativity. 
 
2.3 Criticism of cultural diplomacy 
Cultural diplomacy is the main theoretical framework of this dissertation. However, this 
conceptual grounding is not without issues, as cultural diplomacy faces criticism at different 
levels. In this section, I discuss the criticism of cultural diplomacy in theory and practice. 
Cultural diplomacy is not a new idea. The use of culture as a form of promotion and 
propaganda may result in some negative perceptions of cultural diplomacy. The term is not 
always favoured as it implies the close relationship with national government objectives and 
its promotion of national interests overseas (Holmes, 2012). It has been argued by Cull (2008) 
that cultural diplomacy can be supported if there is perceived distance from government, 
Holmes (2012), nevertheless, highlighted the difficulty of distancing cultural diplomacy from 
government if it is the funding source. The projected image might be under suspicion and a 
more ‘rounded’ image preferred by the state.  
Despite the many positive connotations, as illustrated above, cultural diplomacy, in 
terms of its practice by governments, has also been challenged by academics. Isar (2010) 
argued that the true actors in cultural diplomacy are neither nations nor people, but 
governmental agents and envoys. He further questioned whether artists and arts organisers 
are interested in singing the government-led tune. Furthermore, Isar (ibid.) noted that despite 
the aim of cultural diplomacy to engage with the masses, it often preaches a form of high 
culture to the converted, namely, cultivated and influential individuals. Considering the way 
in which governmental agents carry out cultural diplomacy, this may not reach the majority 
as desired. The reasons behind prioritising high culture include strategies that particularly 
favour elite in both the sending and receiving countries, as they are considered the persuaders 
and influencers. Similar characteristics can be found in Taiwan’s programme of strategic 
international communications (Rawnsley, 2014). However, it can be a blind  spot for the 
policymakers to seek only to reach people who are like them, or those who are already 
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familiar with the sender’s culture. Also, this reflects the existing structure of social class in 
their choice of cultural activities 
Furthermore, the relationship between artists and government in cultural diplomacy 
can be a sensitive issue. For example, would the artists be censored if they received funding 
from the embassy? One can cynically argue that artists are exploited for government 
propaganda. Nonetheless, as Holmes (2012) indicated, today’s global audience would not 
necessarily accept any kind of overt propaganda. He also argued that it could have a more 
positive effect when artists express criticism of aspects of life in their own country on 
overseas visits. That is to say, the tolerance and freedom of speech truly expresses a country’s 
political value and soft power. However, whether the government and the cultural 
representatives think the same or can be persuaded is another matter. It may also be 
questionable whether artists’ ‘edginess’ can be maintained towards authority when the 
government sponsors them. Similar questions were raised as regards the Taiwanese 
government’s support for independent musicians’ participation in overseas music festivals. 
In practice, cultural diplomacy is not a solution for existing conflicts. The underlying 
problem caused by the exercise of hard power needs to be tackled first (Holmes, 2012). I 
argue that the support from governments and institutions may potentially backfire on cultural 
activities otherwise. This is illustrated in the Taiwan-China cultural exchange, in relation to 
the European Association for Chinese Studies Conference in 2014 (section 4.4). It can be 
argued that the conflict in politics and military could backfire in cultural activities. Despite 
the power of cultural activities to transcend barriers and prejudices, they can become targets 
of protests due to the institutional support.  
In addition, as individuals are empowered by the Internet to engage in the digital age, 
cultural diplomacy can operate beyond the top-level arena of policymaking by government 
actors. This change also enables powerful disseminators of information to work from below. 
However, the established national media conduits of the most powerful countries 
economically still enjoy the highest forms of technology to generate and disseminate 
information on the international stage. This advantage, it is often argued, can easily lead to 
perceptions that practitioners have become agents of cultural imperialism. It was also pointed 
out that even if a range of strategies were mobilised, they could only generate soft power 
when they are seen as attractive (Topić & Sciortino, 2012). The authors adopted the 
definition of ‘cultural imperialism’ as ‘the use of political and economic power to exalt and 
spread the values and habits of a foreign culture at the expense of a native culture’ 
(Tomlinson, 2002, p. 3). Nonetheless, Tomlinson (ibid) suggested that ‘[…] the practice of 
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watching television cannot be deemed to be straightforwardly imposed, that the intention of 
the broadcasters may not be directly to exalt and spread values and habits.’ He argued that the 
notion of the process being at the ‘expense of a native culture’ is extremely ambiguous. This 
perception of linking cultural diplomacy to cultural imperialism might be the baggage that the 
former cannot easily discard. However, this can serve as a reminder to examine the process 
and intention of cultural diplomacy, or even the changes of cultural relations over a period of 
time. In this research, the intention is to determine what objectives are claimed in government 
documents. 
In addition, as part of government activity, cultural diplomacy can hardly be 
exempted from the bureaucratic institution. The issues raised above relate to policy- and 
strategy-making processes in each country in terms of its research and evaluation 
mechanisms. Government needs to have knowledge of the country-specific context. Despite 
the criticism of cultural diplomacy, the existing literature still provides a background for 
examining Taiwan, although, as Holmes (2012) suggested, it is often easier to identify what 
has not worked than that which has. Also, the  public sector is bad at recognising its failures. 
As the impact of soft power and cultural diplomacy often takes a long time to present itself, 
how a government chooses to review its policy and strategy also reflects its strength in 
encompassing the country’s political values. 
By reflecting a country’s political values, the policy and strategy of cultural 
diplomacy are intertwined with existing strategies in foreign affairs and internal cultural 
policy (including education policy). The responsibilities of cultural policy, foreign affairs and 
education policy are commonly decided by several government departments, but need to be 
integrated to generate a coherent cultural profile. As Mitchell (1986) argued, without the 
product of internal cultural policy, such as the artefacts or performers who make up a 
country’s cultural profile, the external cultural policy is not conceivable. To elaborate, the 
existing problems in internal cultural policy, or the domestic politics, would constrain the 
development of external cultural policy. The existing problems can be more complicated 
when it comes to cooperating with other government departments, or when cultural 
representatives work overseas. If a country is inconsistent in its foreign policy, then it can be 
difficult to project a coherent and positive national image to other countries. 
 
2.4 Studies on nation branding 
In parallel with public and cultural diplomacy, it is important to examine nation branding and 
the Taiwanese government’s promotion of the country’s image abroad. The field of nation 
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branding has also drawn the attention of policymakers, who aim to promote their national 
image, and the Taiwanese government is no exception. The promotion of Taiwan’s 
manufacturing products, tourism and food are among the subjects of overseas advertisements. 
Here, I address the differences of ideas in public diplomacy and nation branding and how 
they are applied to my analysis in the case of Taiwan.  
Nation branding and propaganda, as with public diplomacy, are about the 
communication of information to foreign audiences (Melissen, 2005). The expectation is to 
change foreign attitudes towards the originating country or to reinforce existing beliefs. 
Nation branding is not a novel concept, but a new term for image management. In academic 
research, the concept of nation branding emerged from the combination of country-of-origin 
studies and interdisciplinary studies on national identity (Szondi, 2008). Similar strategies 
can be found in cultural diplomacy programmes or in employing culture as part of the nation 
branding process. In this section, I discuss relevant literature about nation branding as a 
context for examining Taiwan’s strategy to promote its national image through designed 
programmes. The British scholar Simon Anholt produced several studies on relevant 
concepts of nation branding. However, his arguments and theories, including those of nation 
branding, are open to criticism. 
Nation branding can be defined as the result of the inter-penetration of commercial 
and public sector interests to communicate national priorities among domestic and 
international populations for a variety of interrelated purposes. According to Szondi (2008) 
nation branding is ‘the strategic self-presentation of a country with the aim of creating 
repetitional capital through economic, political and social interest promotion at home and 
abroad’ (p. 5). Szondi’s definition is quite useful for my analysis as it sets concrete objectives 
for government strategy-making and reasoning. Nation branding can operate both externally 
and internally – the promotion is not limited to the foreign audience, people at home are also 
included. Citizens in the home country are both the audience and the stakeholders in the 
process. Domestic consensus, pride and patriotism can be fostered by positive foreign 
opinion ‘boomerang’ back home, as some national leaders wish (Aronczyk, 2013). Therefore, 
nation branding can help the construction of national identity and generate social and political 
capital. I would suggest that the ‘boomerang effect’ and the pride generated might encourage 
more citizens to participate in nation branding as stakeholders. In the process of nation 
branding, the identity of a nation or a place can be mutually reinforced. This is particularly 
interesting when analysing the participation of private actors in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. 
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The engagement of citizens in nation branding can contribute to nationalism. 
Anderson (1991) famously referred to ‘nation’ as being an imagined political community – it 
is imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. Smith (1991, as cited in Guibernau 
2004) defined ‘nation’ as a named human population sharing an historic territory, common 
myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common 
legal rights for all members. Subsequently, Smith (2002, as cited in Guibernau 2004) futher 
developed this definition to include ‘a named community possessing an historic territory, 
shared myths and memories, a common public culture and common laws and customs.’ If the 
commonness is key to the imagined community, then it can be questioned what is shared in 
the process of nation branding. Citizens might feel proud about their national image, but they 
share less common myths and historical memories. If that is the case, the making of a shared 
national image and pride can also be questioned. In the case of Taiwan, how would the 
contested national identity influence its nation branding? 
When branding the nation, it targets both the internal and external audiences in 
foreign and domestic markets. The state can strengthen its bond with the population. As 
Castells (2010) noted, ‘[o]nce a nation became established, under the territorial control of a 
given state, the sharing of history did induce social and cultural bonds, as well as economic 
and political interests, among its members’ (p.333). This represents the process of identity. 
The sharing of economic interests may link to actual benefits that citizens can enjoy through 
successful nation branding. When discussing nationalism and nation branding, Bolin and 
Ståhlberg (2010) referred to a shift in the efforts to construct nations. This shift directed the 
traditional nationalistic rhetoric towards a domestic audience, to unify and build social 
solidarity. In comparison, the new rhetoric is directed towards an international audience of 
investors, whilst the old nationalistic rhetoric can sometimes be used as a resource. 
Economically, the ‘country-of-origin’ (i.e. where the product is made) effect in nation 
branding may bring pride and confidence for people in the homeland. It is argued that the 
‘made-in’ mark is also an evaluative indicator for customers, who link the products of that 
country with its image. That is to say, if there is a positive national image associated with a 
brand, it is more likely to be accepted by the customers (Jaffe & Nebenzahl, 2006).  
However, there can be challenges if not all the people from different sectors of society agree 
 with the approach for nation branding or financially support it. In international business, to 
brand a product with a national image may impress consumers with the country’s culture or 
vice versa. For the consumers, their perception can influence the image of a nation. It should 
be noted that in a global supply chain, the brand’s country of origin is not necessarily where 
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the product is made. In the case of Taiwan, the business model of Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM) plays a role in the supply chain that produces parts or system of end 
products. Under the circumstances, as the brand is not necessarily Taiwanese, the consumer 
does not easily link it with the country’s culture or vice versa. I argue that this is a deficiency 
for the overall strategy of national image building, which has an impact when arts companies 
seek sponsorship for their touring. 
Anholt (2010, pp. 96-97) discussed the link between public diplomacy and place 
branding, arguing that ‘if the purpose of public diplomacy is simply to promote or attempt to 
excuse government policies, it is likely to be superfluous or futile, depending on the good 
name of the country and its government at that particular time.’ He further observed that the 
reputation of a country much depends on how it is perceived in other countries. For instance, 
the current government of a country may be held in higher or lower esteem than the ‘brand 
image’ of the nation. If the nation has a better brand than its government, there might be less 
harm to the country’s overall long-term interests. In comparison, an internationally unpopular 
government might irreversibly damage a nation brand. Anholt’s viewpoint may serve as a 
reference when observing some countries’ foreign policy in different administrations, 
especially in their attitude towards immigrants or human rights issues including same-sex 
marriage. These issues would easily draw the attention of people in similar situations 
worldwide. Nonetheless, Bolin and Ståhlberg (2010) argued that the concepts of ‘nation 
branding’ and ‘public diplomacy’ should be differentiated. ‘Public diplomacy,’ they asserted, 
refers to the activities a government embarks on in promoting a certain image of its 
nation-state and using it as an instrument of power. Moreover, it can influence international 
political relations; ‘nation branding’ is directed primarily towards the global market rather 
than political actors, but could be a proper asset to public diplomacy.    
A further criticism is that there is little empirical evidence to credit the success of 
enhancing a nation’s image to so-called nation branding strategies (Volcic & Andrejevic, 
2011). Anholt (2010) also asserted that he had not seen any promising evidence that 
marketing communications techniques could influence the international perceptions of a 
country. The awareness of a country might be raised by slogans, but that is not equivalent to a 
power to alter people’s behaviour and opinion towards it. He stated that ‘[g]overnments need 
to help the world understand the real, complex, rich, diverse nature of their people resources: 
to prevent them from becoming mere brands’ (ibid, p. 3). However, Anholt’s arguments and 
suggestions appear contradictory, although he attempted to clarify the myth of ‘nation brand’ 
by reiterating his position on this issue. Nations may have brands that have reputations, and 
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the reputations of corporations show their progress and prosperity in a modern world. This 
does not mean a nation; a region or a city could be branded in the same way as products. The 
governments may simply think it is workable to brand places by using the best PR and 
marketing strategies. Bolin and Ståhlberg (2010) also argued that political actors might 
promote and initiate nation branding skillfully, but commission their campaign to commercial 
consultancies, not to intellectuals and artists. They also pointed out a trend in which 
nation-states today are increasingly acting in the same way as commercial enterprises. Unlike 
product branding where companies have a high degree of control over the product image, 
there is less control for the states over place branding. Controls over propaganda and 
communication can only work in closed societies, not in a constantly communicating 
international arena.  
It is important to note that ‘branding’ itself does not necessarily benefit mutual 
understanding. On the contrary, it is closer to a one-way image projection. The process of 
nation branding can easily become a snapshot of a country image, but it is difficult to change 
existing stereotypes. The complexities of a place, a city or a nation cannot be understood in 
such a short time. Nor can a country’s efforts in nation branding easily neutralise negative 
news reports that are being broadcast. It is easy for government to fall for the myth of image 
branding and marketing, but fail to recognise the restrictions beforehand; for instance, when 
governments develop their ‘competitive identity’ as ‘the synthesis of brand management with 
public diplomacy and with trade, investment, tourism and export promotion’  (Anholt, 2007, p. 
3). The strategy might be good, but still have no effect because governments may forget to 
make it a good policy. The branding might fail when the process is not fully democratic, fully 
transparent and fully inclusive, and this may be problematic. Unfortunately, a similar 
problem occurred in the case of Taiwan’s gastronomy promotion. As I illustrate in Chapter 5, 
this example of nation branding did not receive equivalent support at home. 
          
2.5 Cultural diplomacy and cultural policy 
Having briefly examined the link between cultural diplomacy and cultural policy in the 
Introduction, I now further investigate relevant work analysing the relationship between the 
two areas. However, the studies focusing on this relationship are scarce. The literature review 
identified disagreements in placing cultural diplomacy research in the domain of foreign 
policy or cultural policy (Nisbett, 2011). There are two types of positioning as regards the 
placing of cultural diplomacy in relevant disciplines. On the one hand, cultural diplomacy is 
considered an instrument and part of a broader foreign policy, while, on the other hand, 
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cultural diplomacy is an explicit cultural policy instrument (ibid.). However, as mentioned 
earlier, the presentation of a national culture to other cultures could be examined in relation 
to both foreign policy and cultural policy (Williams, 1984/2014). To separate cultural 
diplomacy from either foreign policy or cultural policy would be to neglect equally important 
perspectives.  
The complexity of defining cultural policy and conducting relevant research has been 
mentioned in several studies. This is partly due to the difficulty of defining ‘culture’ when 
attempting to set the limits of the research field. The overuse of the word ‘culture’ to denote 
‘everything’ has raised methodological and political problems for the analysis of cultural 
policy (McGuigan, 2004). Decisions on methodology in the area of cultural policy should be 
made on a case-by-case basis, by applying the theoretical approaches of different disciplines 
(e.g. cultural studies or anthropology) to the problems cultural policy researchers are 
investigating. In this study, I adopt the qualitative research method from the social sciences 
and I further elaborate on my methodology in Chapter 3. 
In terms of placing cultural diplomacy within the context of cultural policies, two 
approaches are available for discussing its significance: concept and structure. As 
Gienow-Hecht and Donfried (2010) suggested, the former looks at motivations, whilst the 
latter addresses the setup of cultural diplomacy. Regarding the organisation of cultural 
diplomacy, they question who are the responsible agents of cultural diplomacy, and how they 
correlate with state interests. What needs to be stressed is that the main concern of cultural 
policy changes over time, and that it is highly contextual. To establish offices and institutions 
for the purpose of exporting culture, as the authors pointed out, reflected governments’ 
unease with any direct and official involvement in cultural affairs (ibid.). Thus, an 
understanding of structures of cultural diplomacy in different countries can reflect the 
government’s attitude towards cultural affairs and its response to the changing internal and 
external environment. In the case of Taiwan, this is particularly significant historically and 
politically when tracing the changes of cultural diplomacy programmes 
When it comes to analysing cultural policy implementations, the policy cycle stage 
model can be a useful reference. The model (Paquette and Redaelli, 2015) illustrates four 
stages of policymaking: Emergence (agenda-setting), Formulation, Implementation and 
Evaluation. The authors (ibid.) indicated that in the agenda-setting stage, the enabling forces 
are often related to politics, current events and available solutions. Subsequently, policy goals 
and objectives are defined in the Formulation stage and policymakers determine the best 
instrument and measures to achieve policy goals. Then, in the Implementation stage, policies 
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become reality and this involves several parties, such as artists, public servants, professionals 
and stakeholders. Finally, in the Evaluation stage, policies are assessed by several parties: 
policymakers, media, broad artistic community and the general public. The policy Formation 
and Implementation process can be seen in Taiwan’s cultural policy and cultural diplomacy. 
For instance, a new proposal or a transition of existing policy might relate to an event or 
changes of government, such as the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement, which started 
in 1966 (discussed in Chapter 4). In this research, the goals and objectives of a cultural 
diplomacy project, and how evaluation operates, are explored in the research findings. 
The primary concerns of cultural policy have shifted from the civilising influence of 
the high arts to a broader concern with a variety of modes of expression and entertainment. 
Furthermore, there are differences according to geography; ideas can have different 
understandings depending on each country. It is crucial that cultural policy is determined 
through politics (Bell & Oakley, 2015). I argue that changes in domestic politics could have 
an impact on cultural policy, especially when the ruling parties have different ideology 
towards cultural policy. When placing cultural diplomacy as part of cultural policy in Taiwan, 
the context of political change is particularly important to the analysis. The primary concerns 
of cultural policy evolve over time and are also reflected in the policy objectives of cultural 
diplomacy, themes that are examined in Chapters 4 and 5.  
Furthermore, the development of cultural industry is worth addressing in cultural 
diplomacy. The international trade of cultural products has been an important element of 
globalisation and has become a significant aspect of cultural diplomacy; this is indicative of a 
recent development in cultural diplomacy, beyond the traditional role of supplementing 
conventional diplomacy. David Throsby (2010) considered international cultural exchange 
and cultural diplomacy as areas where culture engages with the economy internationally. He 
alluded to areas of international cultural exchanges such as tours by performing companies, 
the circulation of artworks and artefacts on loan between museums and galleries. The 
activities illustrated by Throsby have been a part of the Taiwanese government’s cultural 
diplomacy programmes and are often supported by public subsidy. Considering the 
transactions generated by these activities, such as ticket sales and artists revenues, cultural 
diplomacy cannot be seen solely as a political activity, but also as an area of economic value. 
Often, from the arts organisations’ perspective, it is the economic incentive that encourages 
them to engage in cultural exchange and the political effect of cultural diplomacy is a 
by-product (Nisbett, 2015). The economic aspect of Taiwanese arts organisations 
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participating in cultural diplomacy programmes is examined in Chapter 6 including their 
motivations and challenges during the process.  
As policies on creative and cultural industries have gradually become the main 
concern of cultural policy, the role of government in cultural trade is increasingly important. 
Cultural products are not only representations of national culture but actual goods in trade. 
According to Bell and Oakley (2015) cultural goods are often the more problematic aspects 
of international trade negotiations. The problems are not restricted to the conflict between 
economic values and cultural values; cultural products are often entangled with and 
expressive of localised identities, beliefs and sense of place. In the case of Taiwan, the 
problematic aspects are significant, as can be seen by the impact of international trade 
negotiations on the development of Taiwan’s film industries (see section 5.7). Additionally, 
these issues are crucial for the formation of cultural identities connected to government 
attempts to promote Taiwanese cultural products, which I examine in detail in Chapter 5.  
In this chapter, a theoretical framework was presented for understanding the concept 
of soft power and its application in public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and nation branding. 
The literature review, furthermore, provides the basis to analyse critically Taiwan’s cultural 
diplomacy and policy implementation, and to understand how, for example, the idea of soft 
power has developed and its limit in international relations. Public diplomacy and cultural 
diplomacy have been used by governments as tools to communicate with international 
audiences. The problem that governments face is the difficulty of measuring their impact. 
The reinforcement of pre-existing beliefs in the process of policymaking is relevant to 
examining the strategy-making process of communicating Taiwan’s soft power through 
cultural diplomacy. Whilst linking the study of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy to cultural policy, 
this research examines how the changes in domestic cultural policy influence the overall 
external cultural relations. In the next chapter, I discuss the methodology employed in this 
research for data collection and analysis.  
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
 
This chapter details the research methodology of the thesis. The study of Taiwan’s cultural 
diplomacy employed a case study approach and data were collected through qualitative 
methods. The chapter consists of six sections. In the first, I present the research questions, 
objectives and the framework for analysis. Subsequently, I explain the research assumptions 
and research design. The methodology and data collection process are discussed in the 
following sections. In the last section, I consider the practical constraints of data collection. 
 
3.1 Research questions and objectives 
The research is designed to examine the policymaking process of Taiwan’s cultural 
diplomacy from the perspective of cultural policy. It seeks to answer this principal question: 
how do Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy and cultural policy operate to fulfil the political 
objective of making the country internationally visible through policy implementation? The 
research investigates the reasons why cultural diplomacy is considered crucial in Taiwan’s 
foreign affairs, examining also how it has been incorporated in Taiwan’s cultural policy.  
Taiwan presents a specific case of cultural diplomacy where an under-recognised 
country seeks to become more visible via cultural activities. While the majority of existing 
country-specific studies focus on important players in international affairs (e.g. US and 
China), this is a case of soft power as Taiwan has limited foreign affairs resources. The 
promotion of its own culture is restricted without much diplomatic recognition. How does the 
status quo influence its cultural diplomacy? Furthermore, does cultural diplomacy 
complement Taiwan’s formal diplomacy, and vice versa? 
The research reveals how cultural diplomacy is incorporated in Taiwan’s cultural 
policy. Cultural diplomacy is commonly considered part of foreign affairs and operated as a 
sub-category of public diplomacy. In the case of Taiwan, however, the government 
department in charge of cultural affairs has been the main authority in charge of cultural 
diplomacy programmes. In other words, the division of tasks in the administrations 
emphasises the ‘cultural’ side, namely, cultural diplomacy as part of cultural policy. The 
research traces the historical context for relevant government operation and analyses the 
advantages and disadvantages. By contextualising cultural diplomacy as a cultural policy of 
‘display’ (Williams, 1984/2014), the research also evaluates the types and reasons of the 
cultural products on display. It is a part of the government’s attempt to exhibit the chosen 
cultural images in order ‘to be seen’ and further to be appreciated by the external audience. 
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The different actors in cultural diplomacy represent several powers in the process. 
When the government organises events and allocates funding and subsidy for various projects, 
it is not down to one person or two to decide whom should receive the funding. In conducting 
cultural diplomacy projects, the initiatives could involve several departments, and levels of 
authority in Taiwan. In the institutions, the cultural centres and cultural attachés are at the 
frontline of government projects and engage with local networks in the host country. 
However, as they are at the far end of policy realisation, I am interested in determining the 
extent to which they have authority and autonomy in the organisation, and whether they are 
sufficiently trained. Furthermore, it is essential to find out the reason why the private actors 
are motivated in cultural diplomacy projects. How does their motivation evolve throughout 
the political changes? Do they have any conflicts of interest? These are the questions I 
address in this research, to identify whether there is a gap between the government rationale 
and the practice of cultural relations. 
Based on the process of projecting the curated image overseas, the study analyses the 
relationship between the exhibited image and domestic cultural identity. The correlation 
between Taiwan’s cultural identity formation and its curated programme of cultural 
diplomacy is also traced. Why is ‘being seen’ so important to Taiwanese people? Is it also 
important to the Taiwanese government and influential in policymaking? Does cultural 
identity influence people’s support for cultural diplomacy? I consider some Taiwanese artists’ 
participation in cultural diplomacy and analyse how this participation differs among various 
actors and in the private sector.  
In terms of policy realisation, I investigate the challenges encountered by the 
government when practising cultural diplomacy and suggest potential solutions. The research 
examines how policy objectives are set, and how they reflect the actual practice of cultural 
diplomacy. Through analysing the policy objectives, I trace the changes of cultural policy 
over time and its influence on the desired outcome in cultural diplomacy programmes. 
Moreover, I illustrate the challenges from the perspectives of funding, personnel and 
administration. By pointing out the problems faced by the practitioners across the sectors of 
cultural diplomacy, I identify the difficulties Taiwan faces when carrying out its cultural 
diplomacy.  
I consider how Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy projects its image internationally through 
policy implementation; the principal research question is whether the current strategy of 
cultural diplomacy successfully portrays a positive image of the country overseas. However, 
the research topic has limitations. First, there is no consecutive and long-term survey on the 
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reception of cultural diplomacy, i.e. the reactions of the target audience of Taiwan’s cultural 
diplomacy programmes. Secondly, even if surveys were available on long-term trends of 
image perception, it is extremely difficult to justify the results and prove a policy initiative 
successful. Due to time and resource restraints, the research did not attempt to survey the 
receptions of the Taiwanese image from the perspective of foreign audiences. However, 
although accepting that it is a complex task for a researcher from the outside to evaluate the 
outcome of policies, it may be questioned how internally the government assesses its own 
implementation and formulates and reviews policy plans. This research question looks at the 
policy formation and its realisation, as it seems more plausible and allows for feasible 
operationalisation. 
My analysis of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy is mainly based on Wyszomirski, 
Burgess and Peila’s (2003) categories of cultural diplomacy programmes and Schneider’s 
(2003) typology of cultural diplomacy. This multi-country study provides a set of questions 
for evaluation and five major dimensions are used in the comparison. The set dimensions in 
the research are the following:  
1. Terminology and Role: how does each country refer to and regard what we call 
‘cultural diplomacy’? 
2. Goals and Priorities: what are the stated goals and purposes of cultural diplomacy? 
Are there any explicit regional priorities? 
3. Structure: how is cultural diplomacy managed? Which departments/ministries or 
agencies are involved in policy development and programme administration? 
4. Programme Tools: what are the programme tools employed in each country’s 
cultural diplomacy efforts? A preliminary examination of cultural diplomacy 
programmes in a number of countries revealed a fairly common repertoire of nine kinds 
of programme activities. Few countries employ all nine types, but most countries do 
have a varied repertoire of programmatic activities.  
5. Indications of Scale and Support: how much does each country spend to support 
cultural diplomacy activities and how much activity is involved? (Wyszomirski et al., 
2003, p. 3) 
Wyszomirski et al. (ibid.) further categorised the main activities and programmes in 
the selected countries according to these criteria: 
(1) the exchange of individuals for educational and cultural purposes.  
(2) sending exhibitions and performances abroad.  
(3) sponsoring seminars and conferences both in-country and abroad that include 
international participants. 
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(4) support for language studies programmes and institutions.  
(5) support for infrastructure in the form of cultural institutes/centres/forum abroad.  
(6) resources in the form of staff and personnel (both at home and abroad).  
(7) support for country studies programmes (e.g., American studies, Austrian studies, 
etc.). 
(8) international cooperation on cultural programmes and projects.  
(9) activities that are related to trade in cultural products and services (Wyszomirski et 
al., 2003, p. 3). 
 
The work of Wyszomirski et al. (ibid.) is important for analysing Taiwan’s cultural 
diplomacy practice. The cultural activities supported by the Taiwanese government abroad 
generally fall into the categories, although the focus is on the performing arts programmes. 
The index provides an overview of the potential cultural dimensions governments could 
sponsor. Despite various other terms governments employ to describe their supported 
activities and policy orientation, the objective remains to trace the allocation of resources and 
funds for different cultural projects. The strategy of different countries regarding foreign 
cultural policy can be highlighted through distinguishing the types of cultural activities 
relevant to cultural exchange and diplomacy, as it demonstrates the prioritisation and 
underlying logics of respective governments. 
Another typology of cultural diplomacy was proposed by Schneider (2003). With 
reference to the United States, she suggested several characteristics of successful cultural 
diplomacy initiatives from the aspects of diplomatic function, content, mutuality and legacy. 
On the sender’s side, these characteristics can be: communicating the country’s values; 
opening doors between the diplomats and their host country; providing another dimension to 
the official presence in the host country. For the receiving countries, those characteristics are: 
catering to the interests of the host country and offering pleasure, information or expertise 
with mutual respect and the spirit of exchange. Furthermore, successful cultural diplomacy 
initiatives, as she pointed out, are creative, flexible, and opportunistic. In addition, a 
successful initiative can form part of a long-term relationship. Schneider’s analysis placed 
much emphasis on the mutuality between the home country (the United States) and the host 
country, but remained an alternative reference for examining the cultural diplomacy 
initiatives. By analysing the function the initiative serves, the mutuality it has with the host 
country, and the legacies it creates, these aspects help to put into perspective how Taiwan’s 
cultural diplomacy has been practised.    
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3.2 Research assumptions 
The choice of subject partly rests on my experience as a Taiwanese who lived and studied 
abroad. This provided an opportunity to observe how Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy 
programmes are carried out in host countries. Despite the claim of the Taiwanese government 
that the country’s cultural diplomacy could be a vehicle to project its soft power, there 
remains some challenges. The challenges include the identification – not to mention finding 
the sources – of Taiwan’s soft power in the first place. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
it is doubted whether soft power is a tangible tool that can be amassed and deployed through 
concerted effort (Mattern, 2007). I have also hinted that it is questionable whether cultural 
diplomacy could realistically open more doors for Taiwan when considering its deficits in 
formal diplomacy. It is my contention that cultural diplomacy is not the solution to existing 
diplomatic problems. By contrast, the weakness in formal diplomacy would potentially 
restrict the government’s ability to practise cultural diplomacy.  
In this context, I was especially keen to explore how the government projects 
Taiwanese culture overseas through institutional power, and how the process connects with 
the formation and projection of cultural identity. As a Taiwanese, I am particularly interested 
in presenting the ‘self’ image throughout the process of cultural diplomacy and how the 
image is received by ‘others.’ Combined with my roles as a researcher and an arts 
professional, I expected to find some limitations to the realisation of cultural diplomacy 
programmes. For instance, this may be bureaucratic. However, I remained hopeful that 
Taiwan’s soft power could be appreciated. In addition, there could be a gap between the 
knowledge produced in academia and practice. 
It is worth noting that the course of this research (2010-2015) coincided with several 
important events in Taiwan, including the introduction of education programmes for Chinese 
students in 2011, and the Sunflower Movement in 2014. In the former, it is possible to 
observe the changes in cross-Strait relations and how Taiwanese people responded to it. 
Despite not being a main subject of this research, the Sunflower Movement and 
corresponding events involving Taiwanese oversea students served as an opportunity to see 
how private actors could actively participate in public diplomacy.  
 
3.3 Research design 
The case study approach was chosen to research Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. With the 
characteristics that Robert K. Yin (2014) illustrated, this case study is an in-depth empirical 
enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-world context,  and 
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‘tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were 
implemented, and with what result’ (p. 110).  
At an early stage of this research, I considered including other countries’ examples for 
comparative purposes. However, the special political status of Taiwan made it difficult to 
find other cases suitable for comparison. In the context of Taiwan’s foreign relations, its 
cultural diplomacy may not be easily generalised for other settings.  
One of the reasons for the specificity of the Taiwanese case is the China factor and 
the bi-lateral relations between Taiwan and China. Therefore, in this research, I explore 
China-Taiwan cultural relations, and how the China factor influences other aspects of cultural 
diplomacy. Internally, I explore how the current policy contributes to the construction of 
cultural identity and how it is differentiated from that of China to external audiences. 
Despite the special context of Taiwan, the engagement of private actors in the process, 
the administration of overseas cultural institutions and the role of government or corporate 
support can be generalised as an issue that may exist in other countries. Also, from the 
perspective of cultural policy, the development of cultural industries in Taiwan and the 
related overseas promotion can be compared with cases in other countries. This study focuses 
on the performing arts, especially government policy and private actors’ participation. The 
decision was made based on the government’s continuous support for the performing arts in 
cultural diplomacy programmes and the actors’ active participation.  
Although this is a single case study focusing on only one country, there is discussion 
of several sub-categories that are part of the policy implementation. By analysing cultural 
diplomacy in relation to policy, the thesis covers different aspects of policy realisation 
through subordinate cases. The analysis includes the public sector and its sub-organisations 
and the private sector. This matches the methodological characteristics suggested by Yin 
(2014) as the result relies on multiple sources of evidence, and data collected from these 
actors. While the case is significant in terms of Taiwan’s political status, it has implications 
for the interaction between government and artists. It is examined the degree to which 
government should subsidise arts and cultural organisations, and whether corporate 
sponsorship is beneficial for artists.  
 
3.4 Research methodology 
Grounded theory was adopted to process the research data (Bryman, 2012), beginning with a 
general research question. After coding the data, the concepts could be generated, and 
categories generated through a constant comparison of indicators and concepts. Later, the 
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categories were saturated during the coding process. In my research on Taiwan’s cultural 
diplomacy, the steps of grounded theory frame the research questions to explore relevant 
theories.  
The topic of cultural diplomacy is based on relevant theories of soft power and public 
diplomacy. Additionally, in the case of Taiwan, it is important to include theories about 
cultural identity as a reference for the formation and transition of cultural identity. Through 
the process of coding data and generating categories, concepts related to cultural diplomacy 
are iteratively reviewed to frame the sub-questions of the main research question and further 
refer to other theories, such as nation branding and place branding. 
The theoretical contexts for this research are mostly generated from English 
publications, while literature in Chinese provided materials to understand the context of 
cross-Strait relations and Taiwan’s foreign affairs. There is a considerable number of English 
language publications produced by both Taiwanese and non-Taiwanese scholars, which helps 
to position the case of Taiwan in a broader context. Although the majority of the Chinese 
sources are from Taiwan, some were published in Hong Kong and mainland China. The 
issues of language differences in the literature and policy documents are discussed in Chapter 
2. 
Concerning the process of coding data and generating categories, concepts related to 
cultural diplomacy were iteratively reviewed to frame the sub-questions of the main research 
question. Based on the nature of my research question and existing constraints, I decided to 
use a qualitative research method. There are two reasons why the qualitative research method 
helps achieve credibility and validity in this study. First, the number of actors in Taiwan’s 
cultural diplomacy (policymakers, cultural attachés and cultural professionals) is relatively 
small, and thus might constitute a problem of sampling if quantitative methods are used. In 
comparison, qualitative methods can offer an in-depth understanding of their engagement. 
Secondly, their participation constituted different approaches to realising cultural diplomacy 
projects. Therefore, it was difficult to process a standardised questionnaire or a large-scale 
survey. Instead, a qualitative research method was considered appropriate for exploring the 
actual process of policymaking and for different actors to give detailed accounts.  
In the practice of cultural diplomacy, public reception is important. However, it is 
beyond the capacity of this research to conduct a survey of the general public or to trace 
audience members for all cultural activities hosted by Taiwan’s cultural centres. Therefore, in 
I chose to conduct recorded interviews of government officials, cultural attachés, cultural 
professionals, representatives of arts organisations and private foundations that engage in 
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cultural diplomacy. In their participation in organisations and various projects, they provide 
different perspectives. With careful process tracing and textual analysis, the interviews allow 
understanding of policy narratives, and how national or international narratives constrain the 
way political actors conceive the realm of the possible (Roselle, Miskimmon, & O'Loughlin, 
2014).  
The chosen research methods provide traces of narrative from different actors of 
cultural diplomacy, namely, the policymakers and the practitioners. In the case of Taiwan, 
this includes actors in the government, cultural sectors and the artists. Only a few 
interviewees were selected, 12 in total. The research aims to fulfil the criteria of a good 
qualitative study. The four criteria for trustworthiness, as suggested by Bryman (2012), are 
credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. The choice of interviewees was 
considered to ensure they were as representative as possible in the process of policy 
formation and implementation. The method of selecting cases was purposive sampling. Also, 
my study in London and fieldwork in New York and Paris were great opportunities to 
observe how cultural diplomacy programmes were implemented.  
To ensure the credibility of the research, different accounts between the collection 
data with grey literature and news reports were triangulated to approach a relatively authentic 
picture of reality. Furthermore, official documents, press releases and news articles were 
sources for data collection. After coding the data, I expected to generate categories by 
constant comparison of indicators and concepts. Through the examination of these documents, 
I attempted to understand the cycle of policymaking and implementation; for instance, the 
Administration Plan released by the MOC, the policy address and relevant reports and news 
coverage of the policy plan. The policy plans chosen for reference and analysis were mainly 
mid-term or long-term lasting more than one year. Other than official documents, events that 
raised controversy or contrasted with policy objectives were also included for analysis.  
       
3.5 Data sources, collection methods and analysis 
The research was designed with a qualitative approach to collect evidence of policy 
formation and implementation. First, the overall strategy published by the government 
provides a general orientation of policymaking. It also requires cross-examination and 
reference to other policy plans and legislation.  
The data collection started with research on the public sector in Taiwan, the MOC 
(formerly CCA) and its sub-organisations, which generated the official statements and 
insights into strategy-making in cultural diplomacy and relations. Important government 
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documents provided the basis, including the White Papers for Culture published in 1998 and 
2004. Project plans for international cultural exchange, and grant guidelines were included in 
the primary data. The proceedings from Taiwan’s parliament, the Legislative Yuan and 
policy addresses from both MOC and MOFA were analysed. Most of the documents are 
published in Chinese and their corresponding English versions are cited where available. 
Nonetheless, it was necessary to translate certain official documents from Chinese into 
English when the English version was not available or not comprehensive. I am responsible 
for the translation of quotes from interviewees and some newspaper articles, and every effort 
has been made to render these accurately.  
Based on the collected materials, I interviewed officials in the MOC as to why and 
how the strategy was decided and the cross-departmental communication. Subsequently, I 
focused on the operations in overseas cultural centres. Understanding the works of cultural 
centres enabled me to investigate how the government engages with public audiences in host 
countries and its priorities. As the key actor in cultural diplomacy, I emphasise the 
significance of the cultural attaché in these centres. I am aware that cultural diplomacy 
programmes are cross-departmental in Taiwan, especially between the MOFA and the MOC. 
Data from the former were mainly derived from official documents, as I experienced 
difficulty attempting to gain access for one-to-one interviews. 
Content analysis method was applied for analysing the qualitative data. Burnham, 
Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry (2004) defined this as a technique for analysing the content 
of communications. The process is to summarise and interpret the information when one 
perceives a body of communication. Furthermore, Burnham, Gilland, Grant and 
Layton-Henry (ibid.) suggested that the researcher establishes the topic or hypothesis for 
investigation, and the importance of the content is determined by the researcher’s judgement, 
which includes the intrinsic value, interest and originality of the material. By utilising the 
content analysis method, the advantage is to process the documentary or other 
communication material in a precise and systemic way. Additionally, it fits well with the 
research topic on how cultural diplomacy and cultural policies change over time.   
The primary data of my research were mainly collected through fieldwork in Taipei, 
Paris, London, Edinburgh and New York. The main part of the fieldwork was carried out in 
2013 and 2014. The formal interviews were in Mandarin (one in English) and in person, 
except for one, which was conducted through Skype. By choosing to visit Taiwan’s overseas 
cultural centres rather than simply interview by phone or email helped to contextualise the 
local situation and to conduct more detailed interviews. The field trip enabled me to visit the 
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premises of a cultural centre and to understand how the spaces were designed to fulfil its 
mission. By actively participating in the work of cultural diplomacy, I could observe and 
record social interactions that relate to cultural diplomacy and nation branding. As a 
researcher, participating in these events visualised the real interactions between people in 
cultural relations. The interviewees included Ms Tchen Yu-chiou, former Chairperson of the 
CCA, who served in that office from 2000 to 2004, and actively initiated cross-cultural 
productions during her service as Board Director in the National Theatre and Concert Hall 
(NTCH) in Taipei. Former Artistic Director of the NTCH, Ms Ping Heng also provided an 
account of her experience executing intercultural productions. In addition, Director Susan Yu 
of the New York Cultural Center and former Director Dr Chen Chih-cheng of the Paris 
Cultural Centre gave insights into regional strategies. One other government official in the 
Ministry of Culture and two cultural attachés also discussed their professional experiences, 
but did not wish to be identified in this thesis.  
Some of the interviewees were found through snowballing method, using my personal 
network of contacts from my career as an arts administrator in Taiwan. These interviewees 
were chosen because of their professional experiences with the government policymaking 
process. The choice of government officials matched the definition of ‘expert interview,’ as 
specified by Meuser and Nagel (2009). It is the researcher who decides who she or he wants 
to interview as an expert, in accordance with the research objective, but this is not an 
arbitrary choice. It is related to the recognition of a person as an expert within his or her own 
field of action. The authors also indicated that the process should focus on the individual 
expert’s action strategies and criteria of decision-making connected to a particular position, 
but not biography (ibid.). In other words, what deserves more attention is the institutional role 
of the expert. The interviewed government officials and cultural attachés were chosen as their 
work plays a significant role in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. Although they may change job, 
the information provided is treated as accurate based on their professional work.  
The research focuses on the performing arts programmes. The choice was made partly 
due to the continuous government support for this art form in cultural diplomacy. Also, it is 
an area that I am more familiar with because of my professional experience. The cases, 
moreover, of artists’ and arts companies’ engagement in national showcases and festivals 
provided opportunities for in-depth observation of the policy implementation. With the 
exception of the performing arts, some cases of visual arts and films promotion are also 
included in this research for a wider understanding of cultural policy. Several cases of artists’ 
participation in cultural diplomacy concerned the OFF d’Avignon, which, supported by the 
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Paris Cultural Centre since 2007, is a long-standing programme of the MOC. The arts 
organisations’ website and social media accounts provide a new form of self-promotion, and 
also serve as a source of primary data. The interviewees were chosen for their participation in 
OFF d’Avignon or touring abroad.  
In addition, financial support from the private sector and its influence is an important 
part of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. The research found several modes of private 
sponsorship, including philanthropy, private foundation and crowd-funding. Among the 
private actors, the Asia Cultural Council of the Rockefeller Foundation is a special case for 
its collaboration with the Taipei Cultural Centre in New York. Their collaboration is an 
example of how cultural centres can engage with local networks and build partnerships with 
private organisations. All these cases provide an in-depth understanding of the whole process 
of cultural diplomacy, with the aim of exploring the dynamics between several sectors. 
Furthermore, secondary data were sourced from government commissioned research 
reports and degree dissertations published in Taiwan and the UK. The findings of 
professional conference proceedings on arts management and cultural policy are also 
included. Newspaper articles, whether in hard copy or online versions, were used to analyse 
certain important cultural diplomacy events. Again, I attempted to find the English versions 
wherever possible; however, I had to translate when these were not readily available. As 
regards the media coverage of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy programme, reviews from art 
critics are not only an indicator of programme outreach, but they also provide evidence of 
how these activities are perceived in the host countries. Online archives from Taiwan’s 
cultural centres are also valuable resources for my research. I am aware that certain contents 
in media coverage are from press releases produced for promotion purposes; therefore, the 
source of the information is verified and taken into consideration when analysing the data. 
Tertiary data, such as encyclopaedias and dictionaries, are occasionally used. 
     
3.6 Ethical issues and practical constraints 
Several practical constraints affected the data collection. First, government re-organisation 
started in 2012, and this process provided an opportunity to observe how cultural diplomacy 
evolves because of such change. By the time the research concluded in 2014, the influence 
and impact of this remained to be seen. Nevertheless, it also increased the difficulty when I 
attempted to access archived documents. For example, some of the documents were removed 
from the government database, and whilst the old department’s website was no longer active, 
this did not appear on the new website. Fortunately, certain documents reappeared after a 
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fellow researcher’s request. Some archived documents once moved to the new department are 
no longer classified as open to the public. The fact that cultural diplomacy projects are 
carried out with several government ministries also reflects the confusion and difficulties in 
requesting information. It is sometimes unclear whether information on cross-ministry 
projects can be provided, and which ministry has the authority to release it. When the primary 
sources were not available, I tried to access the related material where possible or refer to 
secondary sources.  
In December 2014, Taiwan’s cabinet resigned en masse after the ruling party was 
overwhelmingly defeated in the island’s biggest-ever local elections, and the cabinet entered 
a care-taking period (Agence France-Presse in Taipei, 2014). As Taiwan’s first Minister of 
Culture, Ms Lung Ying-tai was among the cabinet members who resigned. Thus, 2014 
marked the end of the first minister’s administration of the MOC. Nonetheless, several 
government projects are ongoing and may require longer observation for their impact. Other 
cases occurred after the completion of the research and may be included in future study plans. 
As a further presidential election took place in early 2016, and the DPP returned to power, 
further investigation will be required of the development of Taiwan’s foreign affairs, cultural 
diplomacy and bilateral relations with China.  
Furthermore, as part of the GIO merged with the new MOC, several former GIO 
overseas offices became new outposts of the MOC. Despite the increasing number of 
outposts, several of them were still in the preparatory stage of opening a new cultural centre. 
In this research, New York and Paris are the two cultural centres mainly under study among 
the outposts of the MOC. The two centres were selected because they have a longer history 
and established networks. I also took advantage of the opportunity to observe the projects of 
the MOC UK office in London at their preparatory stage. Further follow-up study is required 
of the developments in more recent offices and how these influence the regional strategies.  
The interviews with government officials and cultural attachés were expected to 
provide professional perspectives on strategies and evaluation. However, it is not always easy 
to interview experts, especially when certain negotiations are ongoing and need to be kept 
confidential. In terms of choosing interviewees, it might be easier to go further down the 
organisational hierarchy. As Hoffmann-Lange (1987) argued, people who participate more 
intensively in individual decisions may sometimes be more important than those in the top 
stratum. To gain access to interviewees from a certain hierarchy is challenging, so it might be 
easier to contact the gatekeepers first.  
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In the case of interviews with some Taiwanese officials, I sought to find a connection 
for the contact information. Writing e-mails was the first step. However, most of the replies I 
received were from their secretaries or assistants. There was also rejection of my interview 
requests when attempting to seek connections. I was told that the person was either 
preoccupied to accommodate an interview request or unwilling to provide assistance to an 
academic researcher. Nonetheless, I was advised to refer to the published proceedings from 
the Legislative Yuan as government officials are obliged to provide information. Other 
advice I received included writing a formal request to the ‘Minister’s mailbox,’ which is the 
general public service contact to retrieve undisclosed information.  
Professional links proved helpful for my data collection. From my previous 
experience in the public sector in Taiwan, I assumed that interviews would be mostly 
semi-structured, although ideally the data should be collected from the experts in open 
interviews, and questions based on general topics, and closed questions or pre-determined 
guidelines avoided. However, to introduce topics, the interviewer must be well prepared and 
have understanding in that specific field (Meuser & Nagel, 2009). As expected, several 
government officials requested an outline of questions in advance as they prepared for the 
interview. When carrying out the interviews, one of the government officials admitted that on 
account of the heavy workload, there was no time to prepare more detailed answers. Also, I 
was asked by one of the interviewees to clarify the outlines I had provided before switching 
on the recorder. This experience revealed the conservative and cautious side of bureaucracy. 
Interestingly, the preparation of an outline added credibility to the research as the 
questions showed sufficient background knowledge. Thus, it was easier to be considered an 
‘insider’ in addition to my previous work experience. A set of guidelines requires preparation 
and extensive knowledge of the actual area of expertise to indicate competence to the 
interviewees, which is of particular importance as experts hold a higher degree of interpretive 
power (Littig, 2009). It is beneficial to be recognised as acquainted with the public sector for 
building connections with the interviewees. While my previous work in the public sector 
added credibility, it was also a challenge, as a researcher, to remain objective when analysing  
the collected materials. For instance, when my interviewees referred to the bureaucratic 
restrictions of their jobs, it was important to reconsider carefully the information rather than 
take it for granted.  
In addition, several government officials requested to remain anonymous as some 
content may be considered sensitive and it would be inappropriate for them to give 
unauthorised interviews. The requests were mutually agreed before the interview and 
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carefully observed when processing data to maintain anonymity. Other than the government 
officials, several artists who participated in this research also requested to remain anonymous 
and the personal information was treated accordingly. In addition, despite the promised 
confidentiality, they still requested not to be included in the thesis some of their personal 
opinions or criticisms of government policy, including parts of the conversations considered 
sensitive by the interviewees. Although this information is not presented as raw material, the 
sensitive parts still helped to analyse the data. 
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Chapter 4: Research Findings: The Historical Context and 
Cultural Exchange in China-Taiwan Relations 
 
In this chapter, I provide in brief the historical background of Taiwan-China cultural relations, 
which facilitates understanding of contemporary developments in Taiwan’s foreign affairs, 
cultural identity and cultural policy. In order to explicate the issues in the bilateral relations, I 
trace the changes of regimes on the Taiwan Island from the Qing dynasty, to the Japanese 
colonisation, and current Republic of China (ROC) government. This sheds light on the 
territorial disputes between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China 
governments. The political changes had a huge influence on the formation of Taiwan’s 
national and cultural identity, and this is reflected in the images that the ROC government has 
attempted to project overseas. In the hope of clearer understanding of history and political 
disputes, the names of the ruling regimes of China (PRC) and Taiwan (ROC) are used in this 
chapter.   
As a political entity, the political status of Taiwan is often disputed. Taiwan can be 
regarded as a state without being a nation, as Castells (2010) stated. According to Castells 
(2010), nations are ‘cultural communes constructed in people’s minds and collective memory 
by the sharing of history and political projects’ (p. 54). He further illustrated that this 
definition varies with context and period, and how much history must be shared for a 
collectivity to become a nation. The elements that predispose the formation of such 
communities vary as well. In the case of Taiwan, the ambiguous national identity, 
contentious political status and complicated cultural and historical background further 
influenced the issues of cultural identity, and the ideologies of cultural policymaking.  
This chapter examines the history of Taiwan and its external relations and the 
presentation of arts and culture in foreign affairs, with the aim of explaining how the cultural 
policy and cultural diplomacy have evolved over time. Although cultural diplomacy after the 
establishment of the Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA) is of prime concern in this thesis, it 
is important to recognise the historical antecedents of Taiwan’s contemporary cultural 
diplomacy and cultural relations with China. 
The chapter is divided into five sections. First, I briefly discuss the history of 
Taiwan-China relations and Taiwan’s external relations and international status. Then, I 
introduce the development and specific issues regarding Taiwan’s cultural identity. In the 
final three sections (4.3, 4.4 and 4.5), I illustrate how the concept of soft power has developed 
and has been adapted in the cross-Strait relations, and the cultural exchange between both 
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sides. Addressing such contextual issues helps to illustrate the complicated relations that 
Taiwan faces externally.   
 
4.1 Brief history of Taiwan and its external relations 
Geographically, the island of Taiwan is just 100 miles southeast from mainland China. In the 
history of political establishment, the Dutch and Spanish had brief occupation of parts of 
Taiwan in the seventeenth century. The Dutch settlement lasted from 1624 to their expulsion 
in 1662 by Koxinga, a general of China’s Ming dynasty, who resisted the Qing conquest. 
Opinions on Koxinga’s victory differ depending on which side of the Taiwan Strait they 
originate. In Beijing, Koxinga is the man who made Taiwan an unalienable part of China. 
Before that, mainland China made no claim to Taiwan (Manthorpe, 2005). The period in 
which Taiwan became ‘part of China’ is debatable. However, it was not until the Cheng 
family’s submission to the Qing dynasty in 1683 that Taiwan came under the control of 
China. Despite this, the Qing dynasty did not acknowledge the military strategic position that 
Taiwan occupied. In recognition of the importance of the island after the Sino-France war 
ended in 1885, Taiwan was made a province in its own right in 1887, and so began its 
modern development, such as the construction of a railway and in-land administrative system 
(ibid.). In a purely legal sense, the assimilation to the Qing dynasty in 1684 can be considered 
as evidence of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan (Hughes, 1997). However, Taiwanese 
scholar A-chin Hsiau (2012) described this incorporation as in fact an invasion of Taiwan. 
These historical events have different and even contradictory interpretations in the 
Taiwan-China relations. 
One of the decisive turning points of Taiwan’s history was the First Sino-Japan War 
from 1894 to 1895, which had huge impact on political development. In 1895, Japan defeated 
China in the Sino-Japan War and colonised the Taiwan Island until 1945. When the ROC 
regime was established in 1912 in mainland China, the Taiwan Island was a Japanese colony. 
Although the Chiang Kai-Shek government made claims over the sovereignty of Taiwan in 
1942, it was not until the Cairo Conference with Great Britain and the United States in 
November-December 1943 that this finally received international recognition (Hughes, 1997; 
Hsiau, 2012). From most accounts, Taiwanese people welcomed the ROC government in 
1945, but were soon disappointed with the corruption, coercion and economical chaos that 
followed under the KMT rule. This dissatisfaction led to government repression on 28 
February, 1947, of Taiwanese who sought to hold talks with the government to gain 
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democracy. This incident is considered the source of developing Taiwanese self-awareness 
and the concept of ‘Taiwan independence’ (Fleischauer, 2011; Hsiau, 2012; Jacobs, 2005).  
Despite the victory over Japan in the Second World War, the KMT government soon 
lost to the Chinese Communist Party in the civil war. Following defeat, the ROC government 
retreated to Taiwan Island in 1949. The ROC, which was once the legitimate regime of China 
and recognised by the international community, soon began to lose its allies to the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). Although the ROC was democratic in its constitution, the KMT 
government enforced martial law from 1949 to 1987. The lifting of martial law in 1987 
marked the beginning of political democratisation in Taiwan. As Huntington (1991, p. 25) 
observed, the democratisation was due to ‘Taiwan's spectacular economic 
development…[which] overwhelmed a relatively weak Confucian legacy.’ In response to the 
pressures produced by economic and social change, two leaders of Taiwan in the late 1980s, 
Chiang Ching-kuo (in office 1978-1988) and Lee Teng-hui (in office 1988-2000) gradually 
moved to open up politics in the country (ibid.). As the successor of Chiang Ching-kuo, Lee 
had been consistently supportive in the process of Taiwan’s democratisation (Wachman, 
1995). In 1996, Lee Teng-hui became the first directly-elected president. The KMT remained 
the ruling party of Taiwan until Chen Shui-bian (in office 2000-2008) from the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) won the election and formed the first non-KMT government in 2000. 
This was a significant milestone in Taiwan politics as it was the first party alternation since 
1949. The state power transferred peacefully from one party to another once again in 2008, 
while Ma Ying-jeou from the KMT won the election. President Ma Ying-jeou finished his 
second term in office in 2016. His successor Tsai Ing-wen from DPP was the first female 
president of Taiwan, and this marked another party alternation. On the whole, these peaceful 
party alternations signified the steady progress of Taiwan’s democratisation. 
Since the PRC was formed by the Communist Party in Beijing in 1949, territory and 
legitimacy issues have arisen. The PRC claimed sovereignty over Taiwan as a breakaway 
province. It ratified the Anti-Secession Law in 2005, which is designed to clear up any 
uncertainty over whether China is willing to sacrifice peace to preserve territorial integrity. It 
also establishes an explicit national mandate to use force if necessary for unification 
(Lieberthal, 2005). The PRC government rejects the claim that two Chinas – PRC and ROC – 
exist de jure today. Nonetheless, the ROC is considered a de facto independent country, 
which ‘fulfills all criteria for statehood but has not been recognised by the international 
community as a state’ (Kaczorowska-Ireland, 2015, p. 187). With a vague and uncertain 
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national identity, Taiwan’s cultural identity is substantially related to the political and 
historical narratives.      
The political disputes are especially complex when it comes to foreign affairs, as the 
ROC has not officially given up the claim to be the legitimate government of China. This 
situation is more complicated under the ‘One China Policy’ – recognising the PRC 
government as the sole legal government of China. However, the PRC has never ruled 
Taiwan and other islands as it has been under the control of the ROC government (Kan, 
2011). Gaining official recognition from other international organisations has become a 
competition between the ROC and PRC. For the ROC government, ‘chequebook diplomacy’ 
was the notorious practice of using secret slush funds to bribe nations into offering 
diplomatic recognition, and this was hardly transparent (The Economist, 2011). As reported 
in The Economist (ibid.), there were accusations that former presidents of Taiwan, Lee 
Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian were involved in similar political bribes. When Ma Ying-jeou 
succeeded Chen Shui-bian in 2008, he wanted to end ‘chequebook diplomacy’ (or dollar 
diplomacy). Under President Ma Ying-jeou, in 2008, a ‘diplomatic truce’ was tactically 
agreed between PRC and ROC. That is to say, the PRC would not establish official 
diplomatic relations with the 23 allies of the ROC, whilst the latter would not seek new ones. 
Both the PRC and ROC recognised the diplomatic truce and would maintain the status quo 
whilst improving bilateral relations (Alexander, 2011). Instead of chequebook diplomacy, 
President Ma Ying-jeou (Office of the President, 2015) declared that he would promote 
‘viable diplomacy’ (huoluwaijiao). Unlike chequebook diplomacy, which competed for allies 
with China, the ‘viable diplomacy’ aimed to promote Taiwan’s business and trade, national 
image and soft power. However, his idea was not new as the DPP embraced the idea of soft 
power as well (Rawnsley, 2014). In Ma’s foreign policy, ‘viable diplomacy’ could increase 
practical cooperation with other countries based on the political status, and the importance of 
cultural diplomacy was particularly stressed from the start of President Ma Ying-jeou’s first 
administration in 2008. 
Despite the ‘viable diplomacy’ policy proposed by Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan still lost 
another ally during his administration. The Gambia severed its diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 
2013 in a surprise move, and it was considered as a sign of China’s rising influence in Africa 
(Smith, 2013). The number of Taiwan’s allies decreased to 20 in June 2017 as São Tomé and 
Príncipe and the Republic of Panama  ended their diplomatic relationship with ROC in 2016 
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and 2017 respectively.1 In countries that have official diplomatic relations with China, the 
Taiwanese government set up representative offices as an alternative embassy or a consulate. 
Several names are used for the representative offices, such as Taipei Economic and Cultural 
Representative Office (TECRO), Taipei Economic and Cultural Office (TECO), or Taipei 
Representative Office (TRO). The representative offices serve to enhance trade, investment, 
education and cultural exchange. The name ‘Taipei’ downplayed disputes over Taiwan’s 
sovereignty. The overseas cultural centres were named in accordance with a similar principle, 
though there are more variations.  
Nonetheless, Taiwan has been prevented from participating in international 
organisations as a sovereign state, as the PRC government claims the island as part of its 
territory. The ROC government lost its legal representative status of China to the PRC in the 
United Nations in 1971, and some clever devices are employed by the international 
community to allow Taiwan to participate in multi-lateral treaties (Kaczorowska-Ireland, 
2015). As regards the few existing memberships, such as Taiwan’s participation in the 
International Olympic Committee, ‘Chinese Taipei’ is used instead of ‘Republic of China’ or 
‘Taiwan.’ In international trade and economic organisations, Taiwan’s membership of the 
World Trade Organisation has been under the name Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei) since joining in 2002 (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2014). This compromise in the usage of names not only lowered the level of the 
government from state to city, but also weakened the authority of the state.  
Furthermore, as Taiwan is not a member state of the United Nations, it has 
participated in the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) as a founding 
member since 1991. The UNPO is an international, nonviolent and democratic membership 
organisation. Members of the UNPO include indigenous peoples, minorities and 
unrecognised or occupied territories. The mission and work of UNPO cover issues of human 
and cultural rights, environment and nonviolent solutions to conflicts that affect its members. 
The Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, a quango heavily funded by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, has represented Taiwan in the UNPO since 2006 (Unrepresented Nations and 
Peoples Organization, 2008). Despite the long-term participation in the UNPO, the 
Taiwanese government does not proactively participate in cultural diplomacy with members 
of the UNPO. This reveals the differentiation of Taiwan’s strategy in foreign affairs.   
                                                            
1 As of June 2017, the 20 allies are (Asia Pacific) Kiribati, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Republic of 
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In this section, I briefly discussed the historical and political background of Taiwan’s 
international status and external relations, which also have an impact on the formation of 
Taiwanese cultural identity. Despite the fact that its status as a political entity remains 
uncertain in the international community, Taiwan still tries to seize opportunities to 
participate in global affairs. The Taiwanese government has sought for a long time to take 
alternative measures in diplomacy, including public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and 
foreign aid. In the next section, I further illustrate the changes and different discourses of 
identity politics, and how these changes have influenced the image that the Taiwan 
government wishes to project overseas.  
    
4.2 Cultural policy and changes in Taiwanese cultural identity 
The political and cultural relationship between Taiwan and China provides the context for the 
analysis of issues that influence Taiwan’s internal and external cultural policy. Important 
cultural policy initiatives in relation to cultural identity were introduced in different periods. 
One significant example was the Cultural Revolution in China in the 1960s. With the wish to 
reclaim mainland China, the Chiang Kai-Shek government emphasised Chinese culture as 
part of the formation of its legitimacy. In May 1966, the full force of the Cultural Revolution 
severely destroyed cultural heritage. To counter this and re-affirm the legitimacy of the ROC 
government, the KMT authority decided to begin an initiative to resist the destruction of 
traditional culture. Consequently, the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement was launched 
to counter the Cultural Revolution in the same year (Chang, 2002; Wang, 2005). The national 
policy turn, as Chang (ibid) pointed out, shifted from anti-communist to preserving 
traditional culture. The purpose of the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement was twofold, 
as Fu-Chang Wang (2005) suggested: to show the world that Chinese culture was well 
preserved in Taiwan and to restore people’s confidence in the superiority of their cultural 
inheritance. Therefore, the KMT portrayed itself as the legitimate heir and defender of 
Chinese cultural tradition and hence of the Chinese nation. This can be considered as the 
ROC’s early attempt to differentiate itself culturally from the PRC.      
Despite the KMT’s effort to promote the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement, 
the ethnic issue in Taiwan cannot be ignored. Taiwan was six times more populous than the 
mainland in the time of the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement (Fu-Chang Wang, 
2005). The dialects thus could be preserved despite the government’s imposition of Mandarin 
as the official language. After the government became aware of the popularity of television 
programmes broadcasted in Taiwanese dialects, more rigorous actions were taken, such as 
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measures to counteract the resurgence of Taiwanese regionalists among school children 
(ibid.). Nonetheless, the prioritisation of Traditional Chinese also faced its challenges from 
Taiwanese society. The top-down Chinese cultural identity construction policy was 
challenged by the emerging Taiwanese identity awareness in the 1970s, and further had 
tremendous influence on Taiwan’s cultural policy. In the late 1970s, particularly, the 
democratisation of Taiwan was increasingly evident in the context of pressure both internally 
for further reform and externally to move away from isolation (Jacobs, 2005). Taiwanese 
scholar A-chin Hsiau (2005) illustrated the shifts of historical narrative identity and how the 
indigenisation paradigm influenced the development of literature. This development 
enhanced the awareness of tracing the development of literature and local history. The 
proponents and critics in Taiwan started to address questions in a ‘historicised’ way, such as 
‘what is the literature developed in Taiwan?’ and ‘what should it be?’ Hsiau (ibid, p. 131) 
argued that both proponents and critics of the indigenisation paradigm ‘have relied on 
narrative modes that embrace the past, the present, and the future of the Taiwanese people in 
addressing these questions.’ The paradigm shift in historical narratives had a strong influence 
on breeding the emergence of Taiwanese awareness both culturally and politically. 
Consequently, the awareness and historicism started to have an impact on films, popular 
music and the performing arts. These cultural products further strengthened the distribution 
of Taiwanese awareness among the general public and framed collective identity. 
Cultural identity and cultural politics in Taiwan changed dramatically in the 1980s. 
Along with democratisation after the end of martial law, a new national identity developed 
(Hsiao, 2002). As Hsiao (ibid.) observed, the changing political landscape facilitated and 
inspired Taiwan’s cultural reconstruction and re-vitalisation. This process was a move to 
establish the cultural foundation for the new nation-building process. He noted that there was 
a movement among political and academic circles toward ‘de-Chineseness’ and 
‘re-Taiwaneseness’ in the effort to review the last four hundred years of Taiwan’s history, 
since the Han Chinese first emigrated to the island (Hsiao, 2002). This academic and political 
movement enabled Taiwanese people to re-examine the complicated issue of identity and 
history. As Rigger (2011, p. 133) observed, this is inevitably related to the ‘China inside’ – 
encompassing both Taiwan’s ancestral heritage and its recent history – and ‘the China outside’ 
– the China that exists on the other side of the Taiwan Strait and is recognised today as the 
PRC. In other words, the attitude towards the PRC could also affect the identity of Chinese 
heritage. If the Taiwanese people wish to be distinguished from the Chinese, it is inevitable 
they will face the challenges of self-identity. Indeed, the term ‘Chinese’ can be an example of 
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the challenges of identity. It can refer to an ethnicity, a language, or the citizenship of ‘China’, 
whether it is ‘People’s Republic of China’ or ‘Republic of China’. For Taiwanese who wish 
to be distinguished from Chinese, the multi-layered meanings of this term represent the 
complicated issues of Taiwanese cultural identity.  
The shared ancestral heritage and cultural ties between Taiwan and China are often 
described as a ‘brotherhood.’ Nonetheless, such a description could disguise hostility. One of 
the best examples was in 1996, when Beijing carried out a missile test to intimidate Taiwan 
in the run-up to its first direct presidential election. New York Times columnist Thomas 
Friedman once described China as an 800-pound gorilla in Taiwan’s living room, and Jason 
Hu, a Taiwanese politician, who is famous for his humour, replied to him that it was even 
worse as that gorilla happens to think he is the brother of Taiwan (Rigger, 2011). The huge 
gorilla – the PRC government – next to Taiwan implied the uncontrollable danger in the early 
stage of Taiwan’s democratisation. This anecdotal episode provided evidence of how the 
attitude towards ‘the China inside’ related to ‘the China outside.’ Whilst the obvious threat to 
Taiwan’s national security was also in contradiction of the PRC’s claim of ‘brotherhood,’ it 
was inevitable that resistance would emerge to relations with China. When the Taiwanese 
started to resist the discourses on shared cultural heritage or so-called ‘brotherhood,’ it 
provided an opportunity to re-think and re-frame the cultural identity of either being ‘Chinese’ 
or ‘Taiwanese,’ or maybe accept that both coexist. From the annual research of the 
Taiwanese/Chinese Identification Trend Distribution in Taiwan as part of important political 
attitude trends distribution conducted by the Election Study Centre, National Chengchi 
University, the percentage of its respondents that identified themselves as ‘Taiwanese’ 
instead of ‘Chinese’ or ‘both Chinese and Taiwanese’ had risen significantly since 2007 
(Election Study Center, 2016) (see Appendix 2). I would suggest there is a correlation 
between the DPP policy and the research results. The construction of identity has played a 
significant role in motivating private actors to participate in cultural diplomacy. This 
approach roused the enthusiasm of the general public in Taiwan to contribute to cultural 
diplomacy, such as artists’ participation in theatre festivals and their crowd-funding projects. 
Relevant examples can be found in theatre companies’ fundraising appeals (see Section 6.3).  
In domestic politics, the desire in Taiwan to be distinguished from China became 
stronger in the second administration of Chen Shui-bian (2004-2008), the first president from 
the DPP. A cultural identity discourse of multiculturalism and consequent policymaking 
developed during this period. The multiculturalism of different ethnic groups was proposed 
by the DPP in 1992, whilst the party was in opposition. Its notion of a ‘multicultural Taiwan’ 
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holds that Taiwanese culture consists of ‘the Four Ethnic’ groups – Hakka, Haklo, the 
Mainlanders and the Taiwanese indigenous people. The proposed cultural identity discourse 
of Taiwan is conceptualised as harmonious, democratic and tolerant towards the four main 
ethnic groups with the aim to create a liberal nation (Kaeding, 2011). The Hakka and Haklo, 
who speak different dialects, are mainly early emigrants from South-eastern China from the 
second half of sixteenth century (the time of the Ming and Qing dynasties) (Hsiau, 2012). 
The mainlanders are the emigrants who arrived in Taiwan with the Kuomintang government 
in 1949. However, the proposed multiculturalism is mostly Han-Chinese-centred. Li-jung 
Wang (2004) pointed out the two main objectives of the policy of multiculturalism. One is to 
create a new political legitimacy and social justice based on ethnic equality. And the other is 
to present a new national identity in an attempt to resolve the conflicts between Chinese 
nationalism and Taiwanese consciousness. Three out of the Four Ethnic groups – Hakka, 
Haklo and the Mainlanders – are actually Han-Chinese. The multiculturalism in Taiwan is 
unlike the multiculturalism in Europe, which includes diverse ethnic groups, such as White, 
Asian, African-origin and Muslim (ibid.). That is to say, Han culture is actually the dominant 
majority in Taiwan’s cultural identity, but the proposed ‘multicultural Taiwan’ discourse can 
resolve the existing conflict between Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese consciousness.  
In the discourse of ‘multicultural Taiwan,’ the increasing awareness of the indigenous 
people’s rights is also worth noting. The Taiwanese indigenous peoples were marginalised 
partly due to previous cultural policies that tried to assimilate them into Han ethnicity. 
Li-jung Wang (2004) noted that a series of movements in search of indigenous identities 
emerged in the 1980s with growing awareness. Indigenous culture is a vital reference point to 
distinguish between Chinese and Taiwanese culture. It is said to be ‘native’ to Taiwan, 
whereas the other three ethnic groups have origins from mainland China. The importance of 
indigenous culture has been recognised not only from institutionalising relevant affairs and 
legal rights; it has subsequently been promoted overseas in both the Chen Shui-bian and Ma 
Ying-jeou administration. However, controversies arose in some cases of presenting 
Taiwanese culture with indigenous costumes and dances, misunderstanding of the costumes 
and the occasions to wear was criticised as cultural appropriation. A more detailed discussion 
on the controversies continues in Chapter 5.   
The process of cultural identity formation entered another phrase when the KMT 
returned to power in 2008. During his first administration, President Ma Ying-jeou, with his 
mainlander origin, proposed a new interpretation of Taiwanese culture. He elaborated his 
statement of Taiwan’s cultural identity in his President’s Address on the National Day in 
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2009, marking the sixtieth anniversary of the ROC government retreat to Taiwan (Office of 
the President, 2009). President Ma Ying-jeou stated that the six core values of ‘Taiwan spirit’ 
are integrity, kindness, diligence, honesty, ambitiousness and tolerance. These values can 
also be found in Chinese culture (zhonghuawenhua), but they are appreciated and practised 
further in Taiwan. This also enriches Chinese culture, which, over the past 60 years, people in 
Taiwan have defined with Taiwanese characteristics. In addition, Taiwan spares no effort to 
preserve the fundaments of Chinese culture, for example, Traditional Chinese language 
characters.  
The discourse proposed by President Ma Ying-jeou, to define Taiwanese culture as 
‘Chinese culture with Taiwanese characteristics,’ denotes a key transition in the politics of 
cultural identity. The president’s statement defined Taiwanese culture as part of pan-Chinese 
culture. Interestingly, in comparison with the emphasis on ‘Taiwanese awareness’ during the 
previous Chen Shui-bian administration from 2000 to 2008, President Ma Ying-jeou 
emphasised the cultural link between Taiwan and China. Although the new identity seemed 
politically correct, the actual content in the ‘Chinese culture with a Taiwanese characteristics’ 
was not clearly articulated except in vague spiritual concepts. By emphasising the 
preservation of Traditional Chinese characters, in contrast to the Simplified Chinese 
characters used in mainland China, the president’s statement not only maintained the link to 
Chinese culture, but also differentiated it from China. However, I would suggest President 
Ma Ying-jeou’s interpretation of Taiwan’s cultural identity is a safe choice and may be 
politically correct. It did not entirely contradict the DPP’s cultural identity discourse and 
refrained from triggering radical disagreement. In the next section, I illustrate how the 
government develops cultural relations with China and the related issues. 
 
4.3 Soft power competition between Taiwan and China 
The notions of soft power and peaceful uprising were aspects of the Chinese government 
under the leadership of Hu Jintao (in office 2003-2013). The concept of soft power has 
constantly appeared on the political agenda of both governments in China and Taiwan. The 
President of China, Hu Jintao, declared his wish to enhance culture as part of China’s soft 
power initiatives (Nye, 2011). President Ma Ying-jeou of Taiwan also believed that soft 
power was crucial in cross-Strait relations (Chu, 2011). Whilst existing studies in cross-Strait 
relations have focused on politics, defence and economy, Taiwanese scholars, such as Su Chi 
(2009) and Yun-Han Chu (2011), have analysed the use of soft power in the bilateral 
relations within the context of domestic governance. Furthermore, Wang and Lu (2008), 
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deLisle (2010) and Rawnsley (2012) examined the similarity of Taiwan’s and China’s soft 
power strategy in diplomacy. Other than the focus in the literature on mutual relations, 
discussion can be found on soft power in either of the two states (Kurlantzick, 2007; Rigger, 
2011). As the Chinese government ambitiously promotes China’s soft power abroad, there 
are also a considerable number of publications addressing its strengths and weaknesses 
(d'Hooghe, 2011b; Li, 2009; Wang, 2011). Two main themes are evident in the analysis. One 
concerns the bi-lateral communications with China, and the other compares the strategies of 
the two states.    
Rawnsley (2012) pointed out that in most soft power and public diplomacy strategies, 
including those designed by Taiwan and China, there is a notable emphasis on outputs rather 
than impact. Rawnsley (ibid.) further argued that any attempt to ‘stockpile soft power’ or 
‘wielding soft power’ suggests that it is as tangible as weapons. This relates to some of the 
issues surrounding soft power already discussed in the theoretical background of the research. 
The concept is beginning to lose its relevance for two reasons. First, if the term describes 
everything, it becomes meaningless and its value as a conceptual tool diminishes rapidly. 
Secondly, Rawnsley (ibid., p. 124) questioned: ‘where does hard power end and soft power 
begin?’ These issues are similar to those found in Taiwan’s official documents. The term 
‘soft power’ is used in government mission statements, such as the Ministry of Culture’s 
(MOC) policymaking, but the content is not yet clearly articulated. Thus, Rawnsley’s 
arguments also concern the use of soft power in policy documents. Arguably, the term ‘soft 
power’ has become jargon and is losing its relevance in Taiwan’s policy documents.  
Both sides of the Taiwan Strait want to practise soft power, not only in relation to 
each other, but also the rest of the world. As deLisle (2010) observed, the PRC and Taiwan 
have sought to develop and deploy soft power sometimes in similar ways despite their 
different positions and agendas. When it comes to projecting their soft power to other 
audiences, the similarities become more obvious, a mirroring in strategy-making. A similar 
case can be found in relation to the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement in Taiwan 
versus the Cultural Revolution in China. Taipei’s soft power resources and tactics in many 
respects mirror Beijing’s, such as the political and ideological contrast to the self-proclaimed 
communist regime across the Strait (ibid.). The contrast has been a principal weapon in 
Taiwan’s soft power arsenal and a key to maintaining support from the United States. Thus, 
the proclivity of the United States made itself a key audience and motivation for cross-Strait 
soft power competition (ibid.).  
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The fact that both Taiwanese and Chinese governments adopt the idea of soft power 
represents the influence of United States soft power in its own right. It shows how this 
political value influences Taiwan and China. The consideration of soft power resources 
represents and influences the different strategies the Taiwan and China governments employ. 
In terms of culture, unlike the emphasis on American popular culture in the United States soft 
power (Nye, 2004), China highlights traditional Chinese culture in its strategy (Wang & Lu, 
2008). The focus on different cultural products reflects domestic cultural policy and the target 
audience of cultural exports. The prioritisation of traditional culture over political value in the 
soft power strategy of China is worth discussing. The inconsistency in China’s ambition, 
rhetoric and behaviour, especially regarding human rights, could undo any positive 
achievements in the soft power domain (Rawnsley, 2012). In comparison, Taiwan’s 
achievements in democracy were recognised by the government. For instance, President Ma 
Ying-jeou stated that soft power was crucial in cross-Strait communications, especially the 
emphasis on democracy and freedom in Taiwan (Office of the President, 2011). Furthermore, 
Taiwan has soft power resources in its economy model, transparency, legal system and 
respect for intellectual property. Additionally, Taiwan shares values with the United States 
and other developed countries (deLisle, 2010). Thus, the promotion of Taiwan’s soft power 
also provides a separate identity to confront China for the domestic audience (Wang & Lu, 
2008). In other words, the promotion of soft power helps identity formation among the public 
in Taiwan, and to differentiate themselves from mainland Chinese. 
Despite the different prioritising of soft power resources, China and Taiwan follow a 
similar route in cooperating with higher education institutions overseas: both have set up 
dedicated bodies to establish these partnerships. Since 2004, China’s Confucius Institutes 
have rapidly expanded worldwide, and this speed of growth could be considered as a success 
of China’s soft power. Nevertheless, there remains suspicion that the Confucius Institutes are 
propaganda machines despite their declared intention to promote Chinese language and 
culture in foreign countries (Nakagawa, 2011). As the number of Confucius Institutes grows, 
so does concern among Western academics. They are considered a serious threat to freedom 
of thought and speech in education, and calls have been made to universities to stop hosting 
them (Sudworth, 2014). Even if the growing number of Confucius Institutes can be 
considered as a success in promoting soft power, how they are received in Western 
universities can be very different.  
Similarly, following President Ma Ying-jeou’s cultural policy plan, Taiwan has also 
established Taiwan Academies in the United States to ‘promote Traditional Chinese language 
 72 
and Taiwanese culture’ (Taiwan Academy, 2011). There are Taiwan Academy contact points 
in various universities to help the promotion of scholarships for study in Taiwan. The first 
Minister of Culture of Taiwan, Ms Lung Ying-tai (in office 2012-2014), emphasises that the 
Taiwan Academies are for purely cultural diplomacy reasons without political intention (Chiu, 
2014). It is interesting the statements Ms Lung made, specifically, the dynamics of Taiwan 
Academies and their self-differentiation from Confucius Institutes. I would interpret her 
statement as attempting to make the Taiwan Academy apolitical, and to refrain from casting 
doubt on the Confucius Institutes. I also suggest that she does not wish to oppose the Chinese 
government. However, despite the attempt by the Taiwanese government to demonstrate a 
softer appeal in its cultural diplomacy by promoting culture and making friends, whether this 
approach is feasible remains in question. It may be challenged when there are conflicts of 
cultural diplomacy. Notably, at the European Association for Chinese Studies (EACS) in 
Portugal, in July 2014, Xu Lin, the Director-General of the Confucius Institute Headquarters, 
issued a mandatory request regarding the removal of pages from the Conference Programme 
as it presented information about the long-term EACS conference sponsor Chiang Ching-kuo 
Foundation from Taiwan (Greatrex, 2014). It was reported that the Mainland Affairs Council 
of Taiwan protested to China over this dispute (Tsou, 2014). This is a case of conflict in 
cultural relations. When it comes to funding and sponsorship, the political factor can remain 
regardless of how ‘soft’ a cultural relations activity can be. Nonetheless, it is questionable 
whether measures are available to the Taiwanese government other than expressing 
discontent to the Chinese government if similar clashes are unavoidable.   
Furthermore, Minister Lung Ying-tai (Wang, 2012) stated that the setting up Taiwan 
Academies was not to compete with the Confucius Institutes. However, I would argue that 
comparisons are unavoidable especially when both education centres intend to promote 
Chinese culture and employ similar strategies. For instance, whether to study Chinese culture 
in Taiwan or China can be considered a personal choice, but the resources which a 
government offers can be a decisive element. One example of this unavoidable comparison is 
the recruitment of overseas Chinese students. For scholars interested in studying Mandarin 
and Taiwan Studies, the Taiwanese government advertises the island as a destination. 
Scholarships from the government, through the Ministry of Education (MOE) and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA), are available along with funding from Taiwan’s International 
Cooperation and Development Fund or Chiang Chingkuo Foundation for International 
Scholarly Exchange (Study in Taiwan, 2014). Overseas ethnic Chinese students  (qiaosheng) 
are a special target of recruitment. According to the Taiwanese government’s definition, 
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qiaosheng are students with ROC nationality, who have lived abroad since birth, or obtained 
the permanent residency of another country they have lived in for over six consecutive years. 
Students from mainland China are not categorised as qiaosheng. Students from Hong Kong 
and Macau were considered qiaosheng before 1997, and identified as a separate category 
afterwards. The Overseas Community Affairs Council (OCAC) in Taiwan also set up 
bursaries for these students (Overseas Community Affairs Council, 2016a). According to 
Kurlantzick (2007), the ROC government provided funding for ethnic Chinese students 
across the world attending universities in Taiwan from the 1960s to the 1990s. This became a 
traditional source of soft power as they studied Chinese language, culture and other 
disciplines at Taiwanese universities. However, as Kurlantzick (2007) pointed out, in the 
2000s, the government in Taipei became worried about tight budgets, leading to subsidies for 
foreigners to study in Taiwan being cut. The number of overseas Chinese students enrolled 
annually in the universities and colleges in Taiwan fell between 2000 and 2003. Compared 
with 1999 when over 3000 overseas Chinese students enrolled, the number declined over 
three consecutive years. In 2003, there were only 2,588 students enrolled. However, the 
number started to increase after 2011, to over 4000 in 2015 (Overseas Community Affairs 
Council, 2016b). Compared with the figures provided by Kurlantzick (2007), the decline in 
the number of overseas Chinese students was most pronounced during Chen Shui-bian’s first 
administration. The cut in subsidies could be one reason for the decline.  
In addition to the cut in subsidies, Kurlantzick (ibid) suggested that, with the 
economic emergence of China, the current generation of overseas Chinese would probably 
choose to study in Beijing and Shanghai rather than Taiwan. Thus, arguably, the decline in 
Taiwan’s economy weakened the strength of its soft power. However, economic reasons are 
not the only reason for cutting funding for ethnic Chinese students. Damm (2011) argued that 
Chen Shui-bian’s administration made a distinction between overseas Taiwanese and 
overseas Chinese. The OCAC had a ‘three grade theory,’ which distinguished, first, the 
overseas Taiwanese, who held an ROC passport and emigrated from Taiwan, secondly, the 
overseas students who had studied in Taiwan, and, thirdly, the traditional Chinese overseas 
who had ethnic Chinese lineage. Damm (ibid.) pointed out that the developments in policy 
and the attempt to distinguish between the overseas Chinese communities raised criticism 
from traditional overseas Chinese organisations. Instead of transferring loyalty to the DPP, 
these organisations were attracted to China with its improved economic prospects. 
Shambaugh (2013) observed that winning the hearts of the Chinese diaspora, and further 
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garnering political support for the regime and for the ‘motherland,’ has long been the case in 
Beijing and Taipei’s diplomatic war.  
Although a ‘diplomatic truce’ was proposed in 2008 between both sides, that Beijing 
would not poach Taiwan’s allies and Taiwan would not seek new ones (Alexander, 2011), 
there remains competition in terms of the recipients of their soft power, such as seeking 
cooperation with higher education institutions abroad and the recruitment of ethnic Chinese 
students. Whilst the Chinese government tries to attract students from other countries with 
larger grants, Taiwan is gradually losing the ability to support foreign students financially. I 
suggest that the link established through overseas study could last over several generations. 
There will be profound consequences, thus further weakening the link between Taiwan and 
students from overseas, although the impact may not be felt in the short term. In addition to 
the strategies practised internationally, the Taiwanese government introduced programmes in 
cross-Strait communications in the hope of exercising soft power. In the next section, I 
illustrate the issues that the government faced in the process.  
     
4.4 The hard and the soft issues in cross-Strait cultural relations 
Despite the growing cultural exchange, tourism and trade, the close relationship with China is 
not without concern in Taiwan. Since 2008, when Taiwan opened its doors to Chinese 
tourists and, subsequently, to Chinese students in 2011, the cultural exchange from both sides 
has intensified. The communication of culture, business and trade is frequent between both 
sides of the Taiwan Strait, despite political and territorial disputes. Regarding soft power 
strategies on both sides, Hu Jintao declared his intention to develop China’s soft power whilst 
reorienting China’s cross-Strait policy from reunification to anti-secession (deLisle, 2010; 
Nye, 2011). Taiwan remains the issue on China’s soft power and broader policy agenda, 
which is clearly not in favour of the status quo (deLisle, 2010). For the Taiwanese 
government, the goals of soft power practice are to encourage exchange and enhance trust on 
both sides. However, intensive communication does not necessarily bring mutual trust. As 
China and Taiwan have been separated for nearly seventy years, the differences in ideas and 
lifestyles are difficult to ignore. The existing disputes between the two governments and 
potential hostility cannot be eliminated overnight. 
Cross-Strait cultural relations were considered optimistic by Taiwanese scholar 
Yun-Han Chu (2011), who noted several resources of Taiwan’s soft power in cross-Strait 
relations. He asserted that these were exercise of democracy, cultural heritage and linguistic 
affinity with the mainland. In terms of the current policy, Chu (ibid.) stated that the Ma 
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Ying-jeou government had recognised the importance of soft power, but still chose not to 
take an explicit role in coordinating cross-Strait cultural exchange. The preservation of 
Chinese social customs and culture was interpreted as an example of the blending of 
modernity and tradition in Taiwan. Nonetheless, Chu (ibid.) warned that the relationship 
between both sides must remain smooth, as the attraction of Taiwan might gradually decrease 
if it continues to estrange itself from China both culturally and politically. This type of 
argument supports President Ma Ying-jeou’s strategy of seeking a closer relationship with 
mainland China. However, Taiwan faces a difficult task when projecting its soft power – 
maintaining ties with and, at the same time, being differentiated from the PRC. To borrow 
Rigger’s (2011) description again, it is the confrontation of both ‘the China outside’ and ‘the 
China inside.’   
To deal with ‘the China outside’ relationship is not easy for Taiwanese authorities. 
Since direct flights between China and Taiwan began in 2008, bilateral ties have been 
strengthened in economic and cultural terms. Chinese tourism and the student recruitment 
programme are two examples of the development of cross-Strait relations. As Taiwanese 
scholar Su Chi (2009) argued, if the cross-Strait relations are roughly divided into five 
categories – military, diplomacy, politics, economy and culture – the last two are considered 
‘soft,’ whereas the rest are harder. An unprecedented phenomenon has materialised in 
cross-Strait relations since 2000. Su (ibid.) illustrated that the hard measures became harder 
and the soft measures became softer. In terms of ‘soft,’ he pointed out that the economic and 
cultural exchanges in the private sector intensified immensely. On the other hand, the military 
and diplomatic standoff also deepened. He considered this inner contradiction as the 
first-ever in this bilateral relationship, and also rare in modern international relations. I agree 
with this observation that the economic and cultural exchanges in the private sector have 
intensified. Since the open-door policy started in 2008, some significant cultural differences 
have been revealed between the Chinese and Taiwanese. Other than governmental or 
institutional contacts, Taiwan's open-door policy towards mainland Chinese tourists has 
provided not only business, but also communication opportunities for the public. The number 
of Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan increased rapidly. In 2008, there were only 329,204 
Chinese visitors; the number grew to 972,123 the following year, over 1 million in 2010, and 
2 million in 2012. By 2014 and 2015, the number had grown to over 3 million (Tourism 
Bureau, 2016).  
Although the number of Chinese tourists soared, the Taiwanese government 
welcomed them with caution. The similarities between mainland China and Taiwan in 
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ethnicity, culture, language and religion significantly influenced cross-Straits tourism (Chung, 
2012; Guo, Kim, Timothy, & Wang, 2006). The excursion tours in Taiwan are carefully 
designed so that Chinese tourists enjoy the scenery and shopping experience. However, 
tourists need to meet strict criteria in terms of finance guarantees, budget and itinerary plans 
for visa approval from Taiwan. These regulations reveal the specific concerns about the 
security risks from mainland China. It was not until 2011 that the Taiwanese government 
loosened the regulations for Chinese tourists. Strict visa regulations are still in place, but 
tourists from Beijing, Shanghai and Xiamen can travel independently in Taiwan (Foster, 
2011). I would suggest that the cautious welcome is inevitable as long as the political tension 
between Taiwan and China exists. Although the students and tourists are welcome, the strict 
criteria for visa approval are revealing of the government’s suspicion. The numbers of 
Chinese tourists from 2008 to 2015 increased over thirty-fold and brought business to Taiwan. 
However, the situation started to change after the DPP administration came to power in May 
2016. According to a news report in June 2016, group permit applications from the mainland 
fell 18 percent year-on-year in May 2016, after dropping 23 percent year-on-year in April, 
and this downturn were expected to continue in the next few months (Lin, 2016).  
Furthermore, Taiwan welcomes students from China in its universities. According to 
statistics published by the Ministry of Education in Taiwan, there were 7,813 Chinese 
students enrolled for degree courses in Taiwan’s universities and colleges in 2015, and 
34,114 students for short courses or exchange programmes in the same year. The total 
number of Chinese students taking degree courses from 2011 to 2015 was over 20,000 
(Department of Statistics, 2016). The welcome is not without conditions. These students are 
restricted to receiving public funding from the Taiwanese government or to working 
part-time (Liu, 2011). Compared with other destinations for overseas study, it is doubtful 
whether Taiwan remains a popular choice for Chinese students. Additionally, there were 
disputes about whether Chinese students were eligible to be covered by the National Health 
Insurance system in Taiwan. For overseas students in Taiwan and those resident more than 
six months, they are eligible to take health insurance. This includes overseas Chinese students 
(qiaosheng), who hold dual nationality of the ROC and another country, and international 
students (waijisheng), who are not nationals of the ROC. For students from mainland China, 
their obligations and rights are defined in a special bill – the Act on Government Relations 
Between People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area’ – but they are neither 
categorised as international students, nor overseas Chinese students. There were 
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disagreements in government and publicly about whether students from mainland China have 
the same obligations and rights as other international students. The situation started to change 
in 2016 as the legislative caucus of the ruling DPP moved to revise the National Health 
Insurance Act (Yeh, Chen, Hsu, & Wu, 2016). However, this case shows the problem facing 
the Taiwanese government in relation to mainland Chinese students. If it wants to attract 
more students from mainland China to study in Taiwan, the fairn treatment of non-Taiwanese 
students is an important issue that it should consider carefully. The young generation can be 
the best recipients of soft power and maintain links with the countries they have studied for a 
long time, as, for example, the overseas Chinese students in Taiwan in the 1960s. Their 
connection with Taiwan may last for a lifetime. The limitation imposed on Chinese tourists 
and students arguably undermined the efforts to attract them to Taiwan.  
With increasing opportunity to interact with Chinese people, it would be interesting to 
determine whether this changes Taiwanese people’s view on China. In research by Wang and 
Cheng (2017), based on surveys in 2013 and 2014, the empirical results show that casual or 
random encounters with Chinese tourists have no effect on Taiwanese citizens’ general 
perception of China. When Taiwanese have serious interactions with Chinese citizens in the 
form of friendship, it moderates their unfavourable feelings towards them, but has no effects 
on their perception of a hostile Chinese government. The authors suggested that frequent 
interactions do not have transformative effects on individuals’ political views unless these 
contacts elicit genuine feelings and social bonds. To elaborate, arguably, it takes a long time 
to change people’s views, and personal contact does not necessarily negate negative feelings 
towards a hostile government. Furthermore, in the case of cross-Strait relations, I suggest that 
the negative feelings could affect citizens’ attitudes towards government strategies. 
The negotiation of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) can 
serve as an example of how negative feelings towards the Chinese government were not 
changed by citizens’ contacts. The ECFA is a preferential trade agreement between Taiwan 
and China signed in 2010. In this agreement, both governments agreed to reduce gradually or 
eliminate barriers to trade and investment and further advance cross-Straits trade and 
establish a cooperation mechanism beneficial to economic prosperity and development 
(Bureau of Foreign Trade, 2010). The signing and honouring of the agreement particularly 
raised controversy in Taiwanese society. The scepticism regarding cross-Strait cultural affairs 
stems not only from political disputes, but also from the lack of confidence in the Taiwanese 
government. Following the ECFA signed in 2010, the governments in China and Taiwan 
initiated the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA, also dubbed the Trade in 
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Service Agreement, TiSA). The CSSTA was negotiated by representatives from both 
countries in 2013, and awaits confirmation from Taiwan’s legislature, the Legislative Yuan. 
In the pact of this agreement, Taiwan opens several service industries to Chinese investors. 
Printing, publishing and the management of entertainment venues are in the categories of 
cultural and creative industries in Taiwan. They are also the most controversial businesses in 
the agreement. One of the major concerns is censorship in China, and the CSSTA could 
potentially undermine the freedom of speech in Taiwan. Also, it is questioned whether the 
agreement would attract economic growth as the government claimed.  
When the Taiwanese government failed to provide an assessment of the impact of the 
CSSTA, concerns were raised among academics and opinion leaders from different walks of 
life, which, consequently, triggered a massive demonstration, the Sunflower Movement. On 
17 March, 2014, the Legislative Yuan was scheduled to review the CSSTA. However, 
legislators from the KMT Party tried to force the confirmation despite breaching the 
procedure regulations in the Legislative Yuan. On the following day, university students and 
social activists gathered at the Legislative Yuan and further occupied the main legislature 
chamber. The protest aroused Western media attention and the movement lasted 23 days. 
Taiwanese students studying abroad also supported the demonstration by organising 
demonstrations in New York, London, Brussels and Paris. The Sunflower Movement is 
symbolic of the cross-Strait relations in terms of its scale and the attention received. 
Furthermore, I suggest it showed that the dissatisfaction of the grassroots cannot be ignored. 
Following the demonstrations, the negotiation of the CSSTA was suspended. By the time of 
completing this thesis in 2017, the CSSTA had not been enforced.  
 
4.5 Challenges in the cross-Strait cultural exchange   
Despite the unsolved political issues in the China-Taiwan relations, the cultural similarities 
enhance communication on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. As previously mentioned, it was 
not until martial law was lifted in 1987 that Taiwanese people could visit mainland China for 
family reasons or tourism. These changes in cultural exchange affairs in cross-Strait relations 
can be seen embodied in Taiwan’s cultural policy. Cross-Strait cultural exchange was 
included in the 1998 White Paper for Culture. The CCA stated in the White Paper that it was 
considered appropriate to start from culture and education exchange to enhance the mutual 
understanding between the people in China and Taiwan. Therefore, the CCA subsidised 
private foundations to host cultural exchange activities. The government wished to loosen 
gradually the restrictions on cultural exchange. Based on the principles of rationality, peace, 
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equality, and reciprocity, the government wished to establish a democratic and prosperous 
society in the unified China (Council for Cultural Affairs, 1998). At this stage, government 
officials were more passive and encouraged cultural exchange between private actors by 
providing funding. Furthermore, the goal of enhancing mutual understanding through cultural 
exchange was to prepare for future unification.  
Consequently, in the DPP administration between 2000 and 2008, the CCA took a 
more proactive approach to cross-Strait cultural exchange. Rather than just being a grant 
provider, the CCA decided to seek actively opportunities to contact the sub-organisations of 
China’s Ministry of Culture. In the 2004 White Paper for Culture, it was stated that only 
through face-to-face contact between government officials that the barrier, which has existed 
between both sides for over half a century, could be demolished. The aim of these 
interactions was to express Taiwan’s democracy and human rights. In the 2004 White Paper, 
it was claimed that cultural diversity could only exist in a democratic country. Culture could 
provide leverage in cross-Strait affairs (Council for Cultural Affairs, 2004a). A transition in 
the discourse of cultural identity was evident in this era. To conduct cultural exchange 
between China and Taiwan was not based on the similarities of culture. Rather, it was 
emphasised the subjectivity and the political values in Taiwan. Thus, this approach was to 
identify the differences between the cultures of China and Taiwan instead of the similarities. 
In addition, it was expected that the government would gain more right to speak if actively 
engaging with Chinese government officials.  
 After President Ma Ying-jeou’s inauguration in 2008, official cultural exchanges 
reached an unprecedented level since the PRC government was established in 1949. First, in 
2010, the Chinese Minister of Culture, Cai Wu, visited Taiwan to meet with then Chairperson 
of the Council for Cultural Affairs, Emile Sheng. Although the proposal from China for a 
‘Cross-Strait Cultural agreement’ was postponed, the event represented a high level of mutual 
cultural exchange. Cultural affairs were considered the next important agenda in cross-Strait 
relations after the signing the ECFA (The China Post, 2010). Another significant occasion 
was the reunion of two halves of the ancient painting ‘Dwelling in the Fuchun Mountains’ at 
the National Palace Museum in Taipei in 2011. It became an iconic event that demonstrated 
improvements in cross-Strait cultural relations (Jacobs, 2011). ‘Dwelling in the Fuchun 
Mountains’ is a work of the Chinese painter Huang Gongwang (1269-1354). The painting 
was burnt into two pieces in 1650, one belonging to the National Palace Museum in Taipei, 
and the other to Zhejiang Provincial Museum in Hangzhou. The reunion of the two pieces in 
2011 was the first time since their separation over 350 years ago. It not only attracted a 
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considerable number of visitors to the Museum, but also marked a new form of official 
cultural collaboration between Taiwan and China. Further collaboration was proposed after 
Taiwan’s National Palace Museum Director Feng Ming-chu’s visit to the Palace Museum in 
Beijing. Although the Palace Museum in Beijing has shown great interest in borrowing 
artefacts from Taipei, two conditions are required to be fulfilled. First, the title of the 
National Palace Museum needs to be displayed in full. Secondly, China needs to pass laws 
regarding the Immunity of Judicial Seizure of artefacts (Tsai & Wu, 2013). For the Chinese 
government, the term ‘national’ in certain state-funded organisations is particularly sensitive, 
as Taiwan is always claimed as part of its territory. As long as the word ‘national’ is required 
to be omitted upon request from China, this compromises cross-Strait relations, and makes it 
nearly impossible for the National Palace Museum in Taiwan to loan any of its collection to 
its counterpart in Beijing. This asymmetric relationship remains an obstacle for further 
cultural exchange.  
Furthermore, the postponed cross-Strait cultural agreement was expected to bring 
both sides together, whilst the Chinese government wished to promote Chinese culture 
together with Taiwan. It was not the first time that a cross-Strait cultural agreement was 
proposed. In 1997, the CCA convened the second National Cultural Conference and invited 
recommendations and opinions nationwide. Signing a cultural agreement between Taiwan 
and China was first mentioned in this conference. The proposal was based on the agreements 
signed after the Wang-Koo summit in 1993; a cultural agreement could regulate cultural 
exchange and possibly normalise the relationship between both sides (Council for Cultural 
Affairs, 1997). However, a cultural agreement between Taiwan and China is yet to be 
realised. I would suggest two reasons for this: first the changing of the political landscape in 
Taiwan that further influenced cross-Strait relations, as the DPP administration (2000-2008) 
had a different approach towards cultural affairs; secondly, the constraints imposed by this 
cultural agreement needing to be signed in circumstances in which both sides were regarded 
as having equal status. 
In fact, the ECFA can be a means to engage with the Taiwanese government’s 
existing cultural and creative industries policy to stimulate new modes of cultural production 
(Chung, 2012). Former Chairperson Sheng confirmed that the CCA was seeking the 
possibility of establishing a semi-official office or private organisation in China (Ko, 2010). 
An intermediary organisation can facilitate cross-Strait collaboration, especially in 
commercial television programmes and pop music. Although there were plans to host a 
forum on cross-Strait cultural affairs in 2014, these were later dropped. If the forum had been 
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realised between both governments, the MOC in Taiwan was expected to formalise some 
regulations for creative and cultural industries. However, it was reported that the National 
Security Council in Taiwan had concerns over the content of the potential agreement that 
would be signed after the forum. According to the news reports, the National Security 
Council cautioned that this agreement could help the PRC to unify Taiwan through shaping a 
common cultural identity of Chinese culture (Chiu, 2014). It may be suggested that cultural 
affairs between Taiwan and China could hardly be apolitical when there are concerns over 
national security. 
For Taiwanese cultural professionals, cultural communication between Taiwan and 
China has become more frequent since direct flights began in 2008. The convenience of 
direct flights significantly decreased the cost of travelling time. Whilst Taiwan wishes to 
develop the creative and cultural industries exports, the advantages of a shared language 
makes China or overseas Chinese communities the primary target market. The Chinese 
market is massive, but to negotiate its regulations and hidden rules can be challenging. One 
of the most significant examples was in 2000, when the aboriginal singer A-mei sang the 
National Anthem at the inaugural ceremony of President Chen Shui-Bian (of the DPP). Soon 
afterwards, A-mei was blacklisted in China and the reason was because her performance at 
the ceremony suggested that she was an independence supporter (Guy, 2002). This case 
demonstrates that politics remains a sensitive topic, and might have an impact on cultural 
business. 
In addition to A-mei’s case, similar controversies have surrounded theatres, especially 
under the PRC government censorship. Based on their shared language, China is a 
prospective market for Taiwanese theatre companies. With the aim of encouraging cultural 
exchange, the MOC in Taiwan has also provided grants for theatre companies to tour in 
China – the ‘Classic China Tour.’ From 2009, a selection of works received public funding to 
tour mainland China. However, despite the potential revenue of touring, there are 
bureaucratic drawbacks. The ‘administrative examination and approval system’ (shenpizhidu) 
in China is a regulation that all theatre productions must have approval from the government 
before staging a performance. Theatre companies must be aware that sensitive topics (e.g. sex, 
violence and politics) are prohibited. The ‘administrative examination and approval system’ 
censors performing arts productions and issues permission for ticket-selling performances. 
Failing to obtain permission prior to the ticket sale could result in a loss of revenue. However, 
the ‘administrative examination and approval system’ is often a mystery for Taiwanese 
companies, mainly because the Chinese government does not provide a reason for banning 
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certain works (Lin, 2012a). The approval is not merely based on legal regulation, but also on 
unspoken consensus (‘hidden rules’). Despite the potential revenue that can be generated 
from touring in China, passing the ‘administrative examination and approval system’ has 
become part of the business risk that companies need to consider when entering the Chinese 
market (Wu, personal communication, 31 May, 2013).  Censorship has become a major issue 
for opening the Chinese market for theatre companies. How to abide by the rules and not risk 
financial loss is a problem.  
Consequently, the approval system has also raised issues of self-censorship among 
Taiwanese artists. For instance, when in 2012 Performance Workshop was touring its play 
The Village in China, an actor went on strike and protested the company’s decision to amend 
the script to omit a scene in which the national flag is raised and the national anthem of the 
ROC sung (Chao & Ling, 2012). The case of The Village also raised concerns that the 
market-driven cultural exports to China would eventually damage the creativity and freedom 
of speech in Taiwanese cultural industries. Freedom of speech was also one of the main 
issues raised in the protest against the CSSTA in March 2014. In this proposed agreement, 
funds from China can be invested in Taiwan’s theatres, but restricted to less than half of the 
share. In the official statement from the Taiwanese government, Chinese investors are not 
allowed to control the programming. Nonetheless, the promise from the Taiwanese 
government did not convince Taiwanese artists and social activists.   
The difficulties that Taiwanese theatres face reflect the dilemma of cross-Strait 
cultural exchange. First, the sensitivity of governmental communication resulted in a lack of 
official regulation and support. Even if there is a shared culture and language, touring a show 
in China still requires insider knowledge and an understanding of the ‘hidden rules’ in its 
bureaucracy. Secondly, censorship in China challenges the freedom of speech that Taiwanese 
companies have enjoyed since the lifting of martial law. This also creates a barrier to  
cultural exchange. Despite the desire for better understanding, the ideological disagreements 
remain important issues. When up against strong government in China, it raises doubts that 
soft power can make up for the shortcomings of Taiwan’s hard power. 
The legalisation of cross-Strait cultural exchange reflects the sensitive political issues 
in Taiwan-China relations. The primary agents have been Taiwan’s private actors, 
influencing mainland China with little assistance and much less guidance. This is unlike the 
typical public diplomacy conducted by the state (Chu, 2011). Additionally, in comparison 
with normal state-to-state relations that are always lateral arrangements, neither Taiwan nor 
China is empowered to conduct public diplomacy when dealing with relations across the 
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Strait, and the primary agents influencing the Chinese public are Taiwan’s private agents 
(ibid). This similarly applies to the negotiation of cultural affairs in cultural exchange. 
However, an official representative office is yet to be established in either China or Taiwan, 
and, in 2011, the government-funded platform ‘bravo.net’ was set up by the Quanta Arts 
Foundation to support arts companies running businesses across the Taiwan Strait. The 
establishment and maintenance of the platform were commissioned by a private foundation.  
The website also responded to a growing demand for information on the cross-Strait cultural 
industry. For example, essential information such as regional regulation and China’s 
‘administrative examination and approval system’ was provided to Taiwanese companies. 
However, the project was discontinued after three years. This, nevertheless, seems hasty 
when the existing information was not properly stored. 
During fieldwork, my interviewee, who works for the Taiwanese government and 
wished to remain anonymous, shared a personal view that even if the government did not 
offer funding to Taiwanese performing arts companies to tour China, the companies would 
go anyway (Anonymous#1, personal communication, 2 July, 2014). In the past, the 
Taiwanese government encouraged theatre companies to engage in cultural exchange; 
nowadays, they would go because of the potential business revenue in the Chinese market. 
Whether to subsidise the theatre companies to tour China is an interesting issue. If the 
government considers touring a profitable business that does not require public funding, then 
it leaves the companies to assume the financial risks. Thus, they may choose to take the path 
of least resistance. In this context, it can mean avoiding anything that might be intimidating 
to the Chinese authority, and this may not be beneficial in the long-term. My interviewee also 
mentioned that self-censorship can be found among Taiwanese filmmakers to avoid being 
barred from working in the Chinese film industry. This could mean that a more 
market-leaning approach for cross-Strait cultural relations might undermine Taiwan’s soft 
power in the process, if the freedom of speech cannot be observed in these cultural 
productions.   
Another issue concerned formalising regulation to solve problems brought about by 
bureaucracy in China, such as the potential financial loss due to failing to obtain permission 
prior to ticket sales. If the Taiwanese government wishes to negotiate with the PRC, then it 
must be conducted on equal terms, which is difficult. The dilemma of the lure of a large 
market and lack of regulation is a risk for Taiwanese cultural professionals to consider when 
wanting to operate their business in China. This remains a grey area and awaits future 
negotiation between the two governments.  
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For both governments in Taiwan and China, soft power practice has become essential 
in external relations and cultural relations. From commercial to official communication, 
cross-Strait cultural exchange has reached a peak since 1949, under Taiwan’s Ma 
administration. The examples of cultural exchanges in the context of theatre and museum 
exhibits show that several problems need to be solved before further collaboration is possible. 
From asymmetrical political relations to bureaucratic constraints, there are several unsolved 
issues in cross-Straits cultural relations. For official and non-governmental actors from both 
sides, knowledge and experience are essential. In terms of official agreement, cultural affairs 
appear to be more delicate to deal with for the Taiwanese government. Moreover, the 
Taiwanese government faces objections domestically regarding disagreements in the CSSTA 
and the welfare of Chinese students. Although the strength of a shared language has made 
China a major market of opportunity for Taiwanese cultural productions, politics still poses a 
barrier to further development. However, the lack of credibility of Chinese bureaucracy still 
brings difficulty to cross-Strait cultural relations, such as the operation of the ‘administrative 
examination and approval system.’ The potential for cultural exchange between both sides of 
the Taiwan Strait is not as great as it might appear. In the next chapter, I discuss the 
Taiwanese government’s cultural diplomacy strategy and how it has changed over time.   
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Chapter 5: Research Findings: Placing Taiwan’s Cultural 
Diplomacy in Cultural Policy 
 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the historical background and contextual issues of the 
China-Taiwan cultural exchange. In this chapter, I present the findings on the Taiwanese 
government’s policy development regarding cultural policy and cultural diplomacy. It 
consists of six sections analysing how cultural diplomacy has evolved in relation to changes 
in cultural policymaking by the Taiwanese government. Subsequently, I examine different 
regional strategies of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. Furthermore, I investigate the outreach of 
cultural centres. In the final section, I consider how other public cultural institutions can 
contribute to the development of Taiwanese cultural diplomacy and maintain international 
cultural networks despite little official recognition of the country internationally. Finally, I 
discuss the combination of cultural products and nation branding, which is aligned with the 
cultural and creative industries policies in Taiwan. 
 
5.1 The central government strategy of cultural diplomacy prior to the 
period 1981-1990 
In this section, I present my findings on the central government’s cultural diplomacy strategy. 
The programme content reflects the changes of cultural identity and policy in the 
Taiwanese/ROC government. Hosting a successful artistic overseas tour can improve 
significantly a country’s reputation among both domestic and foreign audiences. The 
introduction of performing arts tours and arts exhibitions abroad predates the ROC 
government’s loss in the civil war against the Communist Party in 1949. One notable 
example was Mei Lanfang’s tour in 1930 to the United States. Mei Lanfang, the legendary 
Peking Opera actor, was famous for his unique style and interpretation of female characters. 
As a result of his extensive performances abroad, and especially his tour of the United States, 
Peking Opera obtained international recognition. Government officials soon started to 
explore the potential diplomatic uses of this art form and, consequently, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) hosted private performances for foreign guests and dignitaries (Guy, 
2001). Furthermore, as Guy (ibid.) pointed out, Mei Lanfang’s tour was significant as it was 
launched at a time when traditional culture was under attack in China. China was perceived 
as weak at home and abroad. Improving China’s international reputation was among the 
fundamental aims of this tour, suggesting the long-term engagement and functional aspect of 
performing arts in cultural diplomacy and propaganda. The performing arts continued to play 
an important role after the ROC government retreated to Taiwan. 
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The case of Mei Lanfang and Peking Opera illustrated how the performing arts could 
communicate with a foreign audience and serve as a supplement to traditional diplomacy. A 
critic of the New York Times, J. Brooks Atkinson, described his reaction: ‘[y]ou can 
appreciate something of exquisite loveliness in pantomime and costume, and you may feel 
yourself vaguely in contact, not with the sensation of the moment, but with the strange 
ripeness of centuries’ (as cited in Carter, 1930, p. 832). Mei Lanfang had an unexpected 
success at the box office and defied the prediction of not being able to fill a theatre for even a 
week in Broadway. He was also enthusiastically received because of the universality of the 
art form, which the foreign audience could appreciate (ibid.). In addition, the function of 
intermediate actors, such as the cultural broker (Guy, 2001), played an important role in the 
process of communicating the art form. In Mei Lanfang’s case, I suggest that the cultural 
broker might have taken risks when the local audience was less familiar with the art form. 
Acknowledging the attraction of Peking Opera, the ROC government took advantage of Mei 
Lanfang’s popularity to showcase Chinese performance to diplomatic circles (ibid.). The 
practice of employing the performing arts remained a government strategy, which I discuss 
later.  
Mei Lanfang’s example highlights how Peking Opera was selected to showcase one 
art form to represent Chinese culture. Both Taiwanese and Chinese governments supported 
the Peking Opera companies in the 1950s, and sanctioned overseas tours. This also 
demonstrated how the performing arts communicated with foreign audiences. The China 
National Peking Opera Company established in 1955, and which Mei Lanfang served as 
director from 1955 to 1961, was fully funded and supported by the Chinese government and 
had frequent tours abroad (China National Peking Opera Company, 2011). On the other side 
of the Taiwan Strait,  the Kuomintang (KMT) government continued its support for Peking 
opera especially after its popularity. After retreating to Taiwan, the KMT government was 
keen to earn recognition from the international community through various forms of 
propaganda to project the ROC as the authentic and legitimate guardian of traditional Chinese 
culture. Through extensive international tours, the KMT government portrayed itself as the 
guardian of traditional Chinese culture, in order to support its claim over the whole of China. 
The government-supported Peking Opera troupes’ overseas tours can be traced back to 1957 
(Guy, 1999). Peking Opera had such ‘ancient’ and ‘traditional’ characteristics that the KMT 
regime recognised the potential benefits of manipulating these symbols to promote itself 
worldwide (ibid.). This represented the competition over cultural authenticity between PRC 
and ROC regimes. At the height of the Cultural Revolution, as Guy (1999) illustrated, the 
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KMT  government’s self-portrayal as ‘the preserver of Peking Opera’ was persuasive as it was 
banned in China. I argue that both governments chose Peking Opera not only because of its 
unique art form, but also the established reputation the company enjoyed overseas. Both the 
PRC and ROC regimes believed that they could obtain greater recognition of their claim to 
cultural authenticity. For the KMT government, the success that Peking Opera tours enjoyed 
was particularly important in domestic politics. Despite the diplomatic deficiency, the 
exhibition of cultural authenticity and the success of Peking Opera troupes was beneficial for 
nation-building.  
National cultural affairs in Taiwan were not centralised at a ministry-level 
government department until the establishment of the Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA). 
Relevant cultural diplomacy programmes were introduced by different ministries or 
departments, such as the Government Information Office (GIO), which was responsible for 
international film promotion. The Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement Committee and 
the Bureau of Cultural Affairs in the Ministry of Education closely collaborated to promote 
Chinese culture worldwide. In Szu-Ching Chang’s (2006) study of international tours of 
Taiwanese dance companies between 1949 and 1973, she argued that under martial law, it 
was difficult for Taiwanese people to obtain permission to travel overseas unless for study 
abroad or business. Dance companies could only apply for permission to travel either by 
receiving an invitation from overseas Chinese communities or other performing arts 
companies, or being chosen to do so by the government. As the author also pointed out, there 
were groups that applied for permission to travel overseas only for the purpose of tourism. 
Thus, the Taiwanese government set up committees to ensure that those who applied for 
overseas tours met artistic standards in accordance with government policy. Furthermore, to 
perform ‘authentic’ Chinese dance and to present the national characteristic were the mission. 
Also, it was essential to establish the identity of the ROC as the cultural motherland of the 
overseas Chinese community.  
It can be argued that the cultural diplomacy programme was highly orchestrated and 
functional at this stage, and the overseas Chinese community was the target audience. 
However, at the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, the need for overseas promotion was 
greater, but more difficult to accomplish. I suggest that one of the reasons was because the 
ROC lost its seat in the United Nations to the PRC. Due to the diplomatic isolation, many 
Taiwanese cultural tours were restricted to local community centres, university halls, or local 
gatherings. This brought into question the impact the programmes could have (Chang, 2002). 
As official diplomacy changed, gaining recognition from the Chinese community overseas 
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and maintaining visibility in other countries through cultural progammes became more 
important. This was a strategy to compensate the disadvantages of diplomatic isolation that 
the Taiwanese government faced.  
Subsequently, the government noticed the unexpected exposure of professional arts 
companies who received invitations to tour overseas. Privately funded arts organisations 
began to receive invitations to tour overseas in the 1970s, whilst fewer performances were 
government-orchestrated to promote Taiwan (Chang, 2002). The success of private arts 
companies was based on their merit rather than state promotion. It is also notable that private 
arts companies’ engagement in cultural exchange mutually enhanced Taiwan’s cultural 
identity. The ‘Taiwanese awareness,’ which emerged in the 1970s, inspired more artists to 
search for their own identity. Thus, the works they presented showed new phases of 
Taiwanese culture. One example is the Cloud Gate Dance Theatre of Taiwan. Established in 
1973 as the first professional dance company in the country, the company had its first 
overseas tour in Singapore in 1975 (Cloud Gate Foundation, 2013). The company is a pioneer 
of cultural diplomacy, which first carried out overseas tours and developed a systematic 
professional administration. In addition to the Cloud Gate Dance Theatre, American 
conductor Henry Mazer founded the Taipei Philharmonic Orchestra (TPO) in 1985. The 
Orchestra was privately funded by enthusiastic music-lovers. Since their first overseas tour to 
North America in 1990, the TPO has travelled extensively throughout Europe, Russia, the 
Baltic countries and Scandinavian countries. As an experienced conductor, Mazer’s expertise 
in orchestra management helped to establish the orchestra’s administration and international 
reputation. Even after his death in 2002, the existing professional network has remained 
active in TPO’s international connections (Yu, 2010). The participation of these arts 
companies as private actors in cultural diplomacy is analysed in Chapter 6. 
The emergence of professional arts organisations gradually shaped the cultural 
exchanges that were not fully government-orchestrated, and relevant public subsidy or policy 
enhancement appeared afterwards. A dedicated division for cultural exchange was set up in 
the new Council for Cultural Affairs in 1981. The first Chairperson of CCA, Dr Chen Chi-lu 
(in office 1981-1988) laid the foundations and working focus of this organisation (Chang, 
2002). Although during Chen Chi-lu’s administration the CCA did not propose cultural 
policy orientation, cultural affairs had gradually shifted to the development of arts and culture 
from the function of social education or political purposes and propaganda (Su, 2001). The 
framework of a cultural diplomacy strategy started to be realised in the 1990s. The first 
National Cultural Conference (Quanguowenhuahuiyi) convened in 1990, in response to the 
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rapid growth of the economy and the need for development of culture. The government 
recognised this issue and sought recommendations from society (Council for Cultural Affairs, 
1991). In the conference, then Chairperson of CCA, Kuo Wei-fan (in office 1988-1993), 
raised the issue that products made in the ROC had been exported worldwide, but not the 
culture of the ROC. He suggested this distorted the image of ‘free China’ and neglected the 
need to enhance understanding and support from international society (ibid.). It is evident that 
to promote the ‘ROC’ instead of ‘Taiwan’ was the main theme of cultural diplomacy, and 
seeking support and recognition of ‘free China’ internationally was the policy goal. A 
blueprint of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy was included in the proposal of the Six-Year 
National Development Plan in 1991. Objectives included establishing overseas Chinese 
Information and Cultural Centres (CICC) and cultural institutions, to encourage international 
cultural exchange exhibitions and performances (e.g. International Performance Troupe 
Cultivation Plan), and plans to translate Chinese works into foreign languages. The proposal 
represented the authorities’ ambition (Su, 2001). Consequently, following the passing of the 
Culture and Arts Reward Act in 1992, the government could subsidise cultural organisations 
(Council for Cultural Affairs, 1992). The earliest plans for subsidising arts exhibitions and 
performances, and establishing cultural centres were initiated in the 1990s, and continued 
even after the CCA upgraded to the MOC in 2012.   
In the 1990s, notable Taiwanese private arts organisations, which had gained 
professional recognition and invitation internationally, represented change in the country’s 
cultural diplomacy. As Taiwanese artists became more visible, their talents were more easily 
recognised by professional networks, such as curators, critics and festival programmers. 
Subsequent invitations for further tours followed, which turned into more opportunities. In 
addition, compared with the performances in community centres and local gatherings, those 
in professional venues are usually ticketed events with more critical audiences. This brought 
cultural diplomacy to another stage as artists could engage with a larger number of people in 
the host country, whilst at the same time earning a professional reputation overseas. That is to 
say, the audiences are not restricted to diplomatic circles or overseas Chinese communities. 
Potentially, such cultural activities could reach a wider public in the host countries, and their 
artistic achievement recognised by cultural professionals. Publications, such as media 
reviews, could also enhance artists’ reputation. For these art companies, gaining exposure 
could draw attention to Taiwan. 
Despite recognition of where artists come from, and the impressions that foreign 
audiences have of Taiwan, it remains uncertain whether consuming a cultural product leads 
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to an increase in support or sympathy for the source (Rawnsley, 2012). In other words, even 
if the audiences know where the arts companies come from, this does not necessarily 
translate into support for Taiwan. Although the problem of insufficient formal diplomatic 
relations remains, a new approach in cultural diplomacy has developed. Unlike the Peking 
Opera, which toured overseas in the 1950s, and was fully funded by the government, the 
international tours of these private arts organisations received only partial public subsidy. 
Their participation in cultural relations encouraged other types of performing arts and 
enlarged the cultural network of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy.  
Examination of the trends in cultural diplomacy before and in the first decade of the 
CCA provides the trajectory of government funding policy, and the beginning of private arts 
companies’ activities. Several characteristics remain in the current cultural diplomacy 
programmes of Taiwan. First, the performing arts constitute one of the predominant art forms 
that receive government support in cultural diplomacy. It is important in policy 
implementation as the government support continues in the form of subsidy or international 
co-productions. Secondly, recognition from professional culture networks, including media 
reviews, is still considered a major achievement. This is discussed further in Section 5.6. 
  
5.2 Cultural diplomacy strategy in 1998, 2004 and Ma Ying-jeou’s 2008 
White Papers for Culture  
In this section, I trace the discourses of cultural diplomacy in Taiwan’s White Papers for 
Culture. There are three relevant documents examined in this section, which are the 1998 and 
2004 White Papers for Culture of the CCA, and the 2008 White Paper for Culture published 
in Ma Ying-jeou’s presidential campaign. The 1998 White Paper for Culture was published 
during the Lee Teng-hui administration (1988-2000) of KMT, and the 2004 White Paper for 
Culture was published in the first term of Chen Shui-bian’s administration (2001-2004) of the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Although the CCA (later MOC) did not officially 
publish a new White Paper for Culture during the Ma Ying-jeou administration, the vision of 
cultural diplomacy that Ma Ying-jeou proposed in his presidential campaign had an influence 
on the subsequent strategy-making in cultural diplomacy. Other than the White Papers for 
Culture, policies for cultural diplomacy in Taiwan commonly materialise into ad hoc grant 
programmes, which are generally more flexible and can be easily stopped if the government 
changes policies. I discuss below the core policy plan of the White Papers for Culture. 
Important discourses regarding cultural exchange and promoting Taiwanese culture 
can be found in both White Papers for Culture published in 1998 and 2004. In 1997, the CCA 
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convened the second National Cultural Conference with the aim of finding consensus of 
cultural construction between government and society (Council for Cultural Affairs, 1997). 
Following the second National Cultural Conference the previous year, the 1998 White Paper 
for Culture stated that the principle of the Council for Cultural Affairs should be to ‘nourish 
new culture, establish the new Central Plain, re-construct new society’ (Council for Cultural 
Affairs, 1998). The slogan ‘establish the new Central Plain’ (jianlixinzhongyuan), created by 
then president Lee Teng-hui, refers to the lower areas of the Yellow River, which is 
considered the cradle of Chinese civilisation. This slogan demonstrated enduring recognition 
of Chinese culture. In terms of ‘cultural exchange’ (wenhuajiaoliu), the CCA also claimed 
that the arts and culture should be the means to participate actively overseas. Therefore, the 
main objective was to introduce Taiwanese culture to international audiences, and foster 
understanding among Taiwan’s allies. The aim of cultural exchange in the 1998 White Paper 
for Culture was to speed up and fulfil the overall objectives of national development. Its 
vision was also to strengthen Taiwan’s ‘national competitiveness’ by ‘fostering international 
cultural exchange and enhance cultural diplomacy’ (ibid.).  
At the end of the 1990s, cultural exchange was embedded in the context of the 
Six-year National Development Plan proposed by the government in 1991. To showcase 
Taiwanese fine arts and performing arts on the international stage was one of the main 
objectives of the cultural exchange strategy. As mentioned earlier, the International 
Performance Troupe Cultivation Plan (1991-1996) was an important programme of the CCA 
that encouraged performing arts companies to tour nationwide and overseas. In the 1998 
White Paper for Culture, the CCA broadened the existing plan and created a new Outstanding 
Performance Troupe Award Plan for nourishing more performing arts companies (Council 
for Cultural Affairs, 1998). However, the vision of the 1998 White Paper for Culture to 
establish Taiwan as a so-called ‘cultural hotspot in Asia-Pacific’ region might not have 
materialised as expected, and it has not been restated in other official policy documents. The 
rhetoric of ‘national competitiveness’ mentioned in the 1998 White Paper for Culture implied 
that culture could be an asset enabling Taiwan to ‘compete’ with others. I suggest that 
although the term soft power was not used in this document, the government recognised 
culture as an important asset. The rhetoric of ‘competing with others’ was similar to the 
intention to use power over them. The idea of soft power was visible in this document.  
A significant transition occurred after the presidential election in 2000. In that year, 
KMT lost the presidential election to the DPP. The cultural policy in Taiwan shifted to 
recognising the importance of establishing Taiwanese cultural identity. With increasing 
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Taiwanese self-awareness in the 1990s, the discourse of Chinese culture lost its favour in 
government cultural policies. The DPP government called the third National Cultural 
Conference in 2002, and addressed the challenges and opportunities to cultural industries, 
such as film and television, after Taiwan joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
(Council for Cultural Affairs, 2002a). The 2004 White Paper for Culture was published near 
the end of the first term of the Chen Shui-bian government (2000-2004). There were three 
aspects of the DPP’s cultural policies: emphasis on the economic value of the culture 
industries, the theorisation of Taiwanese subjectivity and branding Taiwan as a cultural 
product (Chang, 2004). These were apparent in the 2004 White Paper for Culture and were 
mutually related.  
First, the promotion of ‘cultural and creative industries’ (CCI) was included both in 
the 2004 White Paper for Culture and the overall national development project (Council for 
Cultural Affairs, 2004a). In addition, the 2004 White Paper underlined the need for arts 
companies to expand overseas due to the limited market size of cultural activities in Taiwan. 
This statement encapsulated the major national project, which commenced in 2002, to 
develop cultural and creative industries in Taiwan (The Executive Yuan, 2003). Thus, the 
goal of promoting Taiwanese culture overseas was not only to increase recognition of 
Taiwanese culture, but also to add economic value to the cultural and creative industries. 
Secondly, in terms of theorising Taiwanese subjectivity, it can be found that instead 
of ‘Chinese culture,’ the term ‘Taiwanese culture’ is commonly used in the 2004 White Paper. 
In this document, the formation of cultural identity was from the perspective of Taiwan. The 
wording was significant, indicating that Taiwanese awareness had become an official notion. 
Compared with the slogan ‘establish the new Central Plain’ in the 1998 White Paper for 
Culture, the transition of cultural identity was highlighted in the 2004 policy document. Ms 
Tchen Yu-chiou, the first CCA Chairperson in the DPP government (2000-2004), was 
especially enthusiastic to establish the discourse of subjectivity in Taiwanese culture. She 
believed that it was difficult to identify the essence of Taiwanese culture before 2000. During 
her administration, from 2000 to 2004, a study was undertaken to re-interpret the history of 
Taiwan (Tchen, personal communication, 28 May, 2013). This research on Taiwan’s music, 
fine arts, theatre, history, literature and traditional art was later published to enrich Taiwanese 
culture (Tchen, Lin, & Fang, 2013). The CCA also provided materials for further study. 
Yu-chiou stressed the importance of cultural diplomacy for Taiwan, since the country is not a 
member of the United Nations, and thus does not have opportunities to make its voice heard.  
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Thirdly, according to Yu-chiou’s plan (personal communication, 28 May, 2013), it is 
essential to promote ‘Taiwanese subjectivity.’ This is to establish and prioritise Taiwanese 
cultural identity. She suggested that cultural diplomacy is crucial in this regard. After 
stepping down from her position as chairperson, she continued to work in other cultural 
institutions, such as Chairperson of the Board in National Chiang Kai-Shek Cultural Centre 
(National Theatre and Concert Hall, NTCH). This also influenced the strategies of 
international productions of the NTCH (see Section 5.7). From the work carried out at the 
CCA in the following years, Yu-chiou published various materials, and produced DVDs, 
documentaries and movies, which were completed during her duty as the ambassador-at-large 
from 2004 to 2008. In addition, cultural diplomacy in the DPP administration aimed at 
proactively promoting Taiwanese performing arts companies abroad and encouraging 
collaborations among artists. The initiative intended to gain more exposure for Taiwanese 
culture and balance the ‘import’ and ‘export’ of cultural works. I consider the awareness of 
balance as partly in response to Taiwan’s new membership of the WTO. The need to 
establish the subjectivity of Taiwanese culture was not merely to counter Chinese culture, but 
also indicative of another wave of globalisation. Entering the WTO opened the Taiwanese 
market to more cultural products from other countries, and so nourishing the 
newly-established Taiwanese cultural identity and local cultural industries was a challenge 
for the DPP government.  
After the 2004 White Paper for Culture, neither the CCA, nor the upgraded Ministry 
of Culture published a White Paper for Culture. The leadership of the CCA was also unstable 
as four chairpersons served in the position, but none of their terms of office lasted more than 
two years. In 2008, when the KMT president Ma Ying-jeou ran his first presidential 
campaign, he prioritised the cultural diplomacy strategy as part of his proposed cultural 
policy White Paper. This document provided a policy outline for Ma Ying-jeou’s 
administration. In his ‘pragmatic diplomacy’ (wushiwaijiao) strategy, culture is the prime 
asset of foreign policy (Liau, 2012). It is considered the key asset of Taiwan. In Ma 
Ying-jeou’s White Paper for Culture, it was stated that Taiwan must strive to be seen as a 
cultural exporter instead of a troublemaker. This was an attempt to turn ‘chequebook 
diplomacy’ into ‘viable diplomacy,’ which focused on culture. Also, in the White Paper for 
Culture, it was asserted that ‘by employing culture as soft power, Taiwan can be a part of the 
international society’ (National Policy Foundation, 2008, p. 1). This assertion can be 
problematic. Ma’s statement stressed the importance of employing soft power in Taiwan’s 
international relations despite the lack of formal diplomatic relations. Furthermore, it was 
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declared that cultural exchange would play a central role in cultural policy. He proposed to 
strengthen relations with Europe, Southeast Asia, South Korea and Japan (National Policy 
Foundation, 2008). However, in this document, he did not explain how and why these regions 
and countries should be prioritised. In terms of policy plans, Ma proposed to set up a 
‘Cultural Diplomacy Endowment’ dedicated to cultural diplomacy for Taiwan’s participation 
in international cultural organisations, international scholarship and artistic activities. The 
plan to set up the endowment was postponed due to low financial interest rate (Central News 
Agency, 2011), and when Ma Ying-jeou ended his presidency in 2016, it was yet to be 
realised. The establishment of the Taiwan Academy was also in Ma Ying-jeou’s blueprint of 
cultural policy. Compared with the 1998 and the 2004 White Papers for Culture, the 
designated endowment and Taiwan Academy were two of the new policy proposals in 
Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy.  
Culture in Taiwan’s diplomatic strategy was prioritised to accompany the intended 
‘diplomatic truce’ with China and to ease the tension over official recognition. Despite Ma’s 
‘pragmatic diplomacy’ strategy, it would be false to expect cultural diplomacy to compensate 
fully for the shortcomings of Taiwan’s formal diplomacy. The proposal to promote culture as 
an element of soft power and a further means of participating in the international community 
might be a step too far.  
In addition, I suggest that the expansion of the Confucius Institutes of China was also 
the main device of Ma’s proposal to promote Taiwanese culture actively. The establishment 
of the Taiwan Academy was also in the blueprint of cultural policy. It was reported during his 
presidential campaign in 2008 that Taiwan Academies would be set up to ‘contend’ with the 
Confucius Institutes (Li, 2008). Through the establishment of the Taiwan Academies, the 
government would be able to promote the Traditional Chinese language used in Taiwan, 
which differs from the Simplified Chinese used in mainland China. Thus, the strategy 
attempted to place Taiwanese culture within the broader context of Chinese culture and to 
differentiate between them. Ms Lung Ying-tai, the first Minister of Culture in Ma’s 
administration, later clarified Ma’s statement. She reiterated that the establishment of Taiwan 
Academies was not intended to ‘compete’ with the Confucius Institutes (Lin, 2012b). 
Nonetheless, comparison between the Confucius Institute and the Taiwan Academy was 
probably unavoidable despite Minister Lung’s effort to downplay the tension.  
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5.3 The new Ministry of Culture and the Global Outreach Action Plan 
The upgrade from the Council for Cultural Affairs to the Ministry of Culture (MOC) 
has long been suggested in both White Papers for Cultures (1998 and 2004). It was first 
proposed in 1987, in the plan of re-organisation of the Executive Yuan, the central 
government of the ROC. The legislation process eventually finalised in 2011 (C.Chu, 2011). 
It was not until 2012 that the Ministry finally inaugurated and proposed a new policy strategy. 
There was no White Paper for Culture published with the upgrade. However, four core policy 
objectives were declared in 2012 (cited from the English website of the MOC) (Ministry of 
Culture, 2014): 
 
1. To ensure that every village and township in this nation, regardless of its geographic 
remoteness, has an equal chance to achieve its full cultural potential. (Nituhua) 
2. To contribute to the nation’s soft power by promoting Taiwan’s unique blend of 
modern and traditional cultures on the international stage. (Guojihua) 
3. To enhance the overall output and value of the nation’s cultural and creative sectors. 
(Chanzhihua) 
4. To offer the nation’s citizens equal accessibility to cultural resources by harnessing 
the power of cloud computing. (Yunduanhua) 
 
These four government policy objectives covered the trends of cultural policies, including 
perspectives of cultural citizenship, cultural diplomacy, creative economy and digital 
development of cultural industries. In terms of ‘internationalising,’ the policy statement 
described Taiwanese culture (Guojihua) as a unique blend of ‘modern and traditional 
cultures.’ However, the statement itself does not specify what exactly the uniqueness of 
Taiwanese culture is and leaves plenty of room for interpretation.  
      To achieve the goal of internationalising Taiwanese culture, the Ministry further 
explained its strategy (cited from the English website of the MOC) (ibid.):  
 
The Ministry will strive to achieve this goal through its international promotion 
policies — i.e. to create more opportunities for Taiwan-based artists and groups to 
showcase their works to a global audience. By offering consultations and sponsorships 
as well as tapping into overseas networks, the Ministry hopes to continue nurturing 
Taiwan’s growing cultural influence in the international sphere.  
 
In terms of the MOC’s strategy for its international promotion policies, the statement 
illustrates that it plays the role of facilitator offering consultation and sponsorships and 
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assistance in overseas networks. The MOC acted as a platform and adopted a rather passive 
strategy by offering consultation. It did not specifically indicate what kind of consultation it 
could offer in the process, while maintaining government subsidy of artists and companies. It 
also raises the question of what kind of consultation the government can provide in cultural 
diplomacy, and whether this should be a main aspect of the strategy. However, other than 
sponsoring artists, the MOC’s role is ambiguous. While private actors can also fulfil the job 
of networking and sponsorship or similar functions, such as foundations and artistic agencies, 
the MOC should reconsider its role in cultural diplomacy. All in all, the Ministry as 
policymaker has the power of governance, which is to control the laws and affairs of state. 
Therefore, I argue that using the power of governance should be the central role of the MOC 
in cultural policymaking and practice. It should utilise this power to act beyond the roles of 
offering consultation and sponsorship. 
As mentioned above, the government intended to offer consultations and sponsorship, 
and thus to tap into overseas networks. Analysis of the historical view of government 
involvement in cultural diplomacy clearly indicates that the ROC government has shifted 
from heavy-handed diplomatic push to a more passive role of grant giving. However, this is 
not the most important function of the MOC. In terms of cultural diplomacy, the government 
has a role providing a legal framework by signing treaties and agreements with foreign 
governments. In addition, the government can exercise its state power in multinational 
organisations as part of cultural diplomacy. 
However, the function cannot be fully practised by the Taiwanese in, for example, 
cultural relations with China, as the two governments cannot negotiate as equal partners (see 
section 4.5). Additionally, in relation to Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy with non-allies, 
agreements for cultural collaboration cannot be signed with full official status. Negotiating 
and signing formal agreements with other governments are often conducted by the 
Representative Offices, the de facto embassy of Taiwan. For example, the Taipei 
Representative Office in the UK signed the Agreement on Educational and Cultural Matters 
with the British Trade and Cultural Office (BTCO, now British Office), the de facto embassy 
of the UK in Taiwan in 2005, and renewed it with a Memorandum of Understanding on 
Collaboration in Education in 2011. The British Council has been assigned to implement the 
Agreement on Educational and Cultural Matters between the British Trade and Cultural 
office in Taipei and the Taipei Representative Office in the United Kingdom (The British 
Council Taiwan, 2015). This example shows the constraints of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy 
when it comes to signing agreements and treaties, and the legal status of the Taiwanese 
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government remains a sensitive issue. Furthermore, the role of the British Council in the 
cultural relations between Taiwan and the UK provides a potential framework to implement 
cultural diplomacy. A designated cultural institution may be established following the model 
of the British Council – a non-departmental public body operated according to “the arm’s 
length” principle, which allows this public body to receive state funding, but operate 
independently without the perceived disadvantages of direct control (Hetherington, 2017). 
This would probably be a solution to the diplomatic difficulties that Taiwan faces in cultural 
diplomacy. 
Although the issues on government representation remain, agreements and 
memorandums are beneficial for developing mutual collaboration between Taiwan and its 
counterparts. For instance, the memorandum mentioned above can serve as a foundation for 
further collaboration between Taiwan and the UK (Anonymous#1, personal communication, 
2 July, 2014). An effective memorandum can prevent the collaboration from being 
interrupted when ministers step down or government changes. These agreements are more 
powerful than project-based collaboration and leave more legacy than short-term one-off 
programmes. Such legacy can be found in the agreement signed during Tchen Yu-chiou’s 
term of office (2000-2004) for cultural collaborations between Taiwan and France. For 
example, the annual Malraux Seminar invites French cultural experts to Taiwan to broaden 
cultural professional networks and provides an opportunity for professional training. Since 
2001, the CCA (now MOC) has collaborated with the French government (Ministry of 
Culture, 2015). For Tchen Yu-chiou, signing agreements should be the most important job 
when a minister conducts a foreign visit, and is a factor in the evaluation of his or her 
performance. Thus, the most efficient way to build connections is not to carry out foreign 
visits per se. Staff in the Ministry should implement the negotiation and the drafting of 
agreements before embarking on the actual visit. When the minister visits foreign partners 
and officials in person, the meetings should not be an occasion to initiate a negotiation for 
agreements. On the contrary, the agreement should be finalised and signed (personal 
communication, 28 May, 2013). Of course, an official’s foreign visit and face-to-face 
encounter can be symbolic. However, as regards an institution’s personnel, signing 
agreements would help to maintain the relationship even if the leadership changes. Thus, 
instead of establishing connections through foreign visits, the most important task should be 
to formalise cultural diplomacy in legal documents with other countries.    
Furthermore, there are more issues with the MOC’s stated strategy in cultural 
diplomacy. To begin with, Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy was more a one-way ‘promotion’ of 
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Taiwanese artists and groups, instead of creating dialogue with others. As earlier noted, 
Cummings (2003) emphasises cultural diplomacy because of the mutuality of ‘exchange’ and 
‘mutual understanding.’ The so-called cultural promotion and ‘Taiwan’s growing cultural 
influence’ focused on promoting Taiwanese culture per se. The mutual understanding from 
other members of the international community was not prioritised in the strategy.   
The ambivalence in the MOC statement may also cause confusion, whether the 
Ministry of Culture deems ‘cultural diplomacy’ equivalent to ‘artists diplomacy,’ as in the 
statement of its strategy offering opportunities for Taiwan-based artists and groups. When 
‘cultural diplomacy’ includes, especially, other cultural assets in its definition and practice, 
the specific reference to artists could raise doubt about narrowing the scope of cultural 
diplomacy. The exclusiveness of focusing on artists may originate in the old mission of the 
CCA. The CCA was formerly responsible for cultural affairs in fine arts, performing arts, 
literature and cultural heritage. The statement did not mention cultural heritage and museums, 
but specifically the arts. Neither did it include the film industries, which were formerly 
overseen by the GIO, but currently under the MOC. By offering sponsorship, the strategy 
facilitated existing programmes by providing grants for performing arts troupes touring 
abroad. Certainly, the MOC can continue to sponsor arts organisations; however, this 
statement raised questions as to whether the MOC overlooked other aspects of Taiwanese 
culture when designing its overseas strategy. 
 The strategic statement, moreover, has prioritised the artists, especially those based in 
Taiwan, as the means to showcase works to a global audience. However, there are doubts on 
this particular strategy-making. For instance, in the Guidelines for Subsidising Cultural 
Exchange Overseas and in Mainland China, the eligible applicants are either ROC nationals 
or organisations registered in Taiwan (Ministry of Culture, 2005). There are several issues 
related to the statement. First, ‘global audience’ as a collective term appears to be too general 
to be reached through the policies. Secondly, is it necessary to restrict grantees to Taiwanese 
nationals or Taiwan-based artists? In a time when artists can develop their mobility through 
overseas study and immigration, lifting the restriction might further enhance the network 
internationally. Although the government prioritises Taiwan-based artists in its policy, 
paradoxically, the restriction does not seem to accomplish the policy objective of showcasing 
their works to a global audience and nurturing Taiwan’s growing cultural influence globally. 
Following the policy strategy, the MOC launched its first integrated policy plan on 
cultural diplomacy since its upgrade in 2012. The four-year ‘Global Outreach Action Plan,’ 
from 2013 to 2016, aimed to enhance Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. According to the 
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Ministry of Culture (2013a), the Action Plan was based on President Ma Ying-jeou’s White 
Paper for Culture when he campaigned for his second-term of presidency (2012-2016). His 
objective was to utilise cultural diplomacy to compensate for Taiwan’s weakness in 
traditional diplomacy. This meant promoting ‘the Chinese culture with Taiwanese 
characteristics’ and strengthening Taiwan’s national image and influences (ibid.). The 
four-year action plan coincided with the second term of President Ma Ying-jeou’s 
administration. However, it was not intended to continue beyond 2016, as the whole cabinet 
would resign and reassemble. In the Prediction of Future Environment in the Global Outreach 
Action Plan, the MOC forecasted that culture would be Taiwan’s special identity in the new 
wave of globalisation. Internally, international cultural exchange would be the driver for 
cultural integration inside Taiwan, especially involving new immigrants (ibid.). The MOC 
suggested that international cultural exchange provided an opportunity to understand 
different communities in Taiwan and to restate the importance of culture in building 
Taiwanese identity. For instance, to establish relations with the home countries of immigrants 
would benefit the integration of Taiwanese society. Cultural diplomacy could also 
compensate for the difficulties in Taiwan’s formal diplomacy and prevent the country from 
being marginalised. In this action plan, the intention was to make Taiwan the ‘cultural 
pioneer’ in the Chinese-speaking world. However, this policy goal is ambiguous. The 
weakness of Taiwan’s external cultural exchanges was identified, including the lack of 
coordination of government strategies, combined with the shortage of staff and outposts in 
the MOC’s global branches. However, the data collection of this research shows that the 
weakness exists in Taiwan’s bureaucracy and it is problematical when the government puts 
its cultural diplomacy plans into practice.   
Furthermore, in the Global Outreach Action Plan, the promotion of cultural and 
creative industries was once again an important strategy in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. This 
Action Plan included promotion and cultural exchange projects, such as literature, heritage, 
crafts and museums. Among them, promoting popular music, television and film industries 
were also important projects. The MOC wished to create channels to introduce these products 
to the global market. The promotion of cultural products overseas is related to the existing 
MOC policy to develop the cultural and creative industries. In Act 20 of the Law for the 
Development of the Cultural and Creative Industries, passed in 2010, the CCA/Ministry 
(2010) stated its objective to open overseas markets (cited from the English version published 
by the MOC):  
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To encourage Cultural and Creative Enterprises to establish their own brands and 
actively cultivate the international markets, the central relevant competent authorities in 
charge of and enterprises concerned may coordinate with each of their overseas offices 
to assist the Cultural and Creative Enterprises in establishing international brand image, 
attending reputable international exhibitions and performances, competitions, 
expositions, cultural arts festivals, etc., expanding the related international markets, and 
promoting sales.  
 
One of the main objectives in the Law for the Development of the Cultural and Creative 
industries is to foster international cultural exchange and collaboration. With the 
development of cultural industries, the activities held abroad can now focus on seeking more 
collaboration through local networks in the host countries. They are also expected to expand 
into international markets and promote sales. Therefore, in addition to promoting cultural 
products and fostering a global exposure, potentially enhancing mutual understanding, 
generating sales of cultural products in foreign markets is also part of the government’s 
action plan. Notably, unlike the performing arts supported by the CCA and the film industries 
previously supported by the GIO, popular music and television industries were not included 
in government cultural diplomacy programmes. This marked a change in cultural diplomacy 
programmes, which started to consider the potential of economic revenue. Although the 
organisational change – the CCA upgrade to MOC – was not yet realised, it reflected 
preparation for the integration of cultural affairs. Nonetheless, it remained unclear as to what 
kind of role the government should play in opening markets for mass cultural products and 
how the MOC could fulfil its policy objectives. 
In addition, whilst indicating the limitations of policy goals in the Action Plan, the 
MOC recognised the uncontrollability of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. Despite the 
government’s effort to export Taiwanese art and culture, there are multiple factors to be taken 
into account for foreign arts organisations to collaborate with Taiwan, such as their own 
programming and funding. The uncontrollability of cultural diplomacy has been identified in 
the literature on cultural diplomacy. As illustrated in Chapter 2, governments cannot gain full 
control of the use of public diplomacy, as the non-governmental actors’ interests may not 
entirely match those of the government. There is also no guaranteed positive feedback 
(Gregory, 2008; Leonard et al., 2002). However, the MOC did not propose solutions to this 
limitation.  
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Interestingly, the Action Plan raised the concerns over the lack of full control when 
collaborating with foreign arts organisations. For example, Taiwan is not distinguished from 
other East Asian countries, e.g. China, Japan, and Korea. This issue is linked to Taiwan’s 
cultural identity. In the Action Plan, it stated that in order to be set apart, Taiwan’s 
programmes must have high standards and strong cultural characteristics of diversity, whilst 
combining tradition with innovation (Taiwan, ROC Ministry of Culture, 2013a). If this 
suggestion were to be taken literally, I would argue that ‘to combine tradition with innovation’ 
does not settle the issue of cultural identity but makes it more confusing. Moreover, when 
collaborating with foreign arts organisations, the organisers are likely to include Taiwan as 
part of their Asian programme instead of singling it out. It would be extremely difficult if the 
MOC’s goal was to have always a designated showcase. I suggest placing Taiwan back in the 
East Asian historical and geographical context, which could be a more effective way to 
present its culture to a foreign audience. I further elaborate this argument in Chapter 7. 
 
5.4 The strategy of the Taiwan Academy 
In addition to the Global Outreach Action Plan, the Taiwan Academy is a current policy 
initiative of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. This policy first appeared when President Ma 
Ying-jeou published the Cultural Policy White Paper during his 2008 election campaign 
(National Policy Foundation, 2008). The first three Taiwan Academies were set up in 2011 in 
New York, Houston, and Los Angeles. In the government strategy, there are three ideas 
regarding the functions of the academies. First, it is a cross-departmental platform 
contributing to Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy, as described in the Global Outreach Action Plan, 
which aims to bring sources from other ministries to coordinate. Secondly, it is a brand name 
for some overseas branches of the MOC. Thirdly, the ‘Taiwan Academy’ is a digital platform 
to be utilised for Chinese language learning. The missions of the Taiwan Academies include 
presenting the cultural diversity in Taiwan, encouraging Taiwan/Sino Studies and promoting 
the Chinese language (Ministry of Culture, 2013a). In addition to the academies, there are 
also several ‘contact points’ set up in collaboration with higher education institutions in 
foreign countries. The Taiwan Academy was considered a special cross-departmental 
platform chaired by a Minister without Portfolio to integrate the resources of several 
departments. However, the platform was not a permanent organisation and did not serve as 
the headquarters of the Taiwan Academy or cultural centres. The MOC remains the main 
ministry in charge of the Taiwan Academy. 
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The multiple layers of meaning of the Taiwan Academies can lead to confusion when 
it comes to understanding the actual tasks and missions. If the MOC attempted to brand this 
new policy initiative, it did not make clear to the potential audience its different functions. 
The mission and operation of the Taiwan Academies remained under construction after the 
reshuffle of cabinet organisations and the establishment of the Ministry of Culture in 2012. 
The first Minister of Culture, Ms Lung Yingtai (in office 2012-14) declared that Taiwan 
Academies would be ‘compact and beautiful’ (xiaoermei), in contrast to the larger Confucius 
Institutes (Su, 2011). As reported, Minister Lung Ying-tai described her ideal Taiwan 
Academy as a salon to introduce Taiwanese culture in host countries. In her vision, the 
academies should be easily connected to public transport, and provide literary talks, 
performances, film screening, etc. The main mission is to encourage foreign audiences to 
appreciate Taiwanese culture (Lin, 2012b). Although Minister Lung Ying-tai expressed her 
intention to name all the overseas branches of the MOC as Taiwan Academies in 2012 (ibid.), 
this was not realised after she resigned from her position. For instance, the Cultural Centre in 
Tokyo opened in 2015 as the ‘Taiwan Cultural Centre’ (Chao, 2015).  
The model of the Taiwan Academy is often compared with that of the Confucius 
Institute. Since the Confucius Institute was established in 2004, the speed of expansion has 
been unparalleled. By the end of 2016, there were already 512 Confucius Institutes in 
universities in 140 countries and 1073 Confucius Classrooms, which are set in secondary 
schools or equivalent educational institutions (Confucius Institute Headquarters, Hanban, 
2017). The PRC Chinese government aims to establish 1,000 Confucius Institutes or 
Confucius Classrooms by the year 2020 (Shambaugh, 2013). Compared with the rapid 
expansion of Confucius Institutes, the Taiwanese government established in 2011 the 
brick-and-mortar Taiwan Academies in New York, Houston, and Los Angeles, three cities in 
the United States. The difference in scale and speed between the two governments is 
significant. The number of Taiwan Academies is considerably smaller and the speed of 
expansion is much slower. It might be considered that the Taiwanese government carefully 
develops this scheme of cultural diplomacy. However, it might also be due to comparatively 
smaller budget and manpower to open more Taiwan Academies.  
Clearly, the Taiwanese government attempted to differentiate the Taiwan Academies 
from the Confucius Institutes. Minister Lung Ying-tai asserted that the Taiwan Academies 
and the Confucius Institutes have different missions, and there is no need to compete (Lin, 
2012b). This, however, is debatable as both aim to promote language. Despite the minister’s  
statement that there is no competition, it cannot be ignored that the Taiwan Academy and 
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Confucius Institute promote Mandarin and attempt to attract foreign students. The emphasis 
on ‘preserving Traditional Chinese character’ was already a preference for students. When it 
comes to language learning, the promotion of the Traditional Chinese writing system has 
been prioritised in the academies. While China’s Confucius Institutes have rapidly become 
large-scale Mandarin language providers, it remains unclear how the Taiwan Academies set 
themselves apart. With shared Chinese cultural heritage and similar missions and strategies, 
competition is very likely to arise between Taiwan and China for authenticity in the 
interpretation of ‘Chinese culture.’ However, as the Traditional Chinese writing system is not 
as widely used as the Simplified Chinese invented by the Chinese government, attracting 
students can be an important task for advertising and marketing. It would provide 
understanding, for promotion purposes, as to what incentivises people to learn the Traditional 
Chinese writing system instead of Simplified Chinese. If the government does not know the 
reasons, then its strategies might not help it reach the intended target.  
In terms of  the different roles in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy, it can be confusing to 
distinguish between the Taiwan Academies and Taiwan Academy Contact Points in Higher 
Education institutions. Whilst the Confucius Institutes are set up in universities overseas, the 
Taiwan Academies also seek to strengthen partnerships with universities. The Taiwan 
Academy Contact Points scheme is mostly based on memoranda of understanding signed 
between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the universities. Although the Taiwan 
Academy is primarily an initiative of the MOC, to establish the contact points was partly 
MOFA’s job. To a certain degree, it caused confusion as regards the cross-departmental 
cooperation of the academies. Unlike Confucius Institutes, the contact points do not have 
premises on university campuses. Their functions are mainly student exchange and granting 
scholarships to study in Taiwan (S. Yu, personal communication, 12 December, 2013). How 
do these ministries coordinate their partnership with the contact points? According to 
interviewee Susan Yu’s account, the main job of contact points is not largely related to MOC, 
but the MOFA or Ministry of Education (MOE). This matches the problem I discussed in 
relation to Mitchell’s (1986) argument in Chapter 2. The development of external cultural 
policy would be restricted by existing problems in internal cultural policy or overall domestic 
politics. The existing problems can be more complicated when it comes to collaborating with 
other government departments, or when cultural representatives work overseas. 
However, in the first years of establishing partnerships with Taiwan Academy 
Contact Points, most of the memoranda of understanding were signed with schools that 
taught Taiwan Studies. In other words, these schools already had some knowledge of Taiwan. 
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As of 2015, there were 213 contact points in 64 countries across North America, Asia-Pacific, 
Latin America, Europe, Inner-Asia and Africa (Public Diplomacy Coordination Council, 
2015). Despite the efforts to establish partnerships with these institutions, the details of such 
collaborations and the full list of contact pointsare not made public. I suggest the fact of not 
making the information publically accessible could diminish the efforts to set up the contact 
points. As the information remains undisclosed, it is difficult to assess whether the 
partnerships fulfil their mission.   
 I suggest that Minister Lung Ying-tai’s effort to distinguish the Taiwan Academy 
from the Confucius Institute was due to the latter’s controversies in North America. She 
emphasised that there is no political agenda as the Taiwan Academy only serves the purpose 
of cultural diplomacy and ‘makes friends with the world in a compact and beautiful style.’ I 
argue that the metaphor of friendship – making friends with the world – is vague and 
arguably naïve when considering the role of cultural diplomacy in international relations. 
Moreover, what does ‘make friends’ mean in the context of Taiwan’s special political status? 
This would unlikely be formal diplomatic relations. To fly the flag of ‘friendship’ can be 
viewed as a colloquial form of promoting soft power in other countries. Minister Lung 
Ying-tai also mentioned that the Confucius Institutes were being criticised for their lack of 
academic freedom in several North American universities, leading, in some cases, to the 
termination of such agreements (Chiu, 2014). This statement can be corroborated as two 
American universities decided to close the Confucius Institute on their campus (Foster, 2014). 
I would suggest that differences between the Confucius Institute and Taiwan Academy were 
asserted to eliminate any possible hostility towards the latter and to reduce confusions about 
the status of the two institutions. However, if there is truly no political intention, it is also 
unnecessary to reiterate the point. The claims that Minister Lung Ying-tai made might serve 
as a disclaimer without provoking competitiveness and sounding intimidating to China. 
To interpret the establishment of Taiwan Academies as an apolitical scheme is 
problematic. Despite emphasising the distinction between the Confucius Institute and Taiwan 
Academy, the defensive character and cross-Strait focus behind the action are unmistakable 
(Chan, 2011; deLisle, 2010). Similar findings were made by Alexander (2011) in research on 
Taiwan and China public diplomacy in El Salvador. He pointed out that ‘[i]t cannot be said 
that a country conducts public diplomacy without an agenda, just that the agenda is not 
publicly revealed’ (p. 281). Likewise, it is unlikely that a government conducts cultural 
diplomacy without an agenda. Following this argument, efforts were to prevent Taiwan 
Academies from appearing intimidating in their presence. 
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Furthermore, I argue that the strategy that Minister Lung Ying-tai proposed was to 
avoid Chinese interference in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. The contents of Taiwan 
Academy’s programme purposed by Lung were literature talks, performances, film screening, 
and sensitive political topics were not included. Interestingly, as Rawnsley (2012) argued, 
democracy could be Taiwan’s unique selling point and may help to distinguish it from China. 
However, this strength is not emphasised enough in Taiwan’s current strategy. Rawnsley 
(2012) stated, ‘one explanation for Taiwan’s reticence in taking advantage of this theme is 
the electoral volatility which dominates the political landscape, and the polarisation of 
political parties which revolves in part on issues of Taiwan’s identity and relations with the 
PRC’ (p.129). I agree with promoting Taiwan’s democracy, but I suggest that there are 
reasons why the Taiwanese government does not emphasise it. Moreover, Liu Shun-ming of 
the MOC (2013) suggested that Taiwan Academies could address more of the issues that 
Confucius Institutes do not currently cover, such as ecology and human rights. This would 
not conflict with promoting Taiwanese culture. Through introducing cultural products, the 
focus on such issues could also provide channels of communication and understanding with 
foreign audiences.  
The strategy that the MOC adopts might be safer if it does not raise identity issues or 
provoke any ideological disagreements with China. Thus, the statement that the Taiwan 
Academies are apolitical may be naïve and contradictory with other official policy plans. It is 
also a fallacy that culture and politics can be perfectly separated, even though Minister Lung 
Ying-tai wished to describe the Taiwan Academy’s main objective as ‘cultural relations,’ 
instead of ‘cultural diplomacy,’ and to downplay its official role to prevent comparison with 
the Confucius Institute.  
Furthermore, what cannot be ignored is the fact that Taiwan Academies are actually 
funded by government. The Government deliberately downplayed the political intention of 
the Taiwan Academies, but, interestingly, there are private actors enthusiastically bearing the 
responsibilities as ambassadors of cultural diplomacy. However, compared with their 
passionate engagement in cultural diplomacy, the Taiwanese government has hidden its 
objectives behind political rhetoric. When promoting the Taiwan Academies as a new 
cultural diplomacy initiative, the government was cautious. This might have been due to the 
sensitive nature of Taiwan’s international relations. In the long term, I suggest this could 
convey mixed messages from the government to the private actors wishing to contribute to 
Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy.  
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After reviewing the proposed strategy for the Taiwan Academy, in the next section, I 
discuss more findings on the regional strategies of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy.  
 
5.5 Geographical priorities of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy and strategies 
for cultural centres 
The geographical priorities to set up the overseas offices of Taiwan’s cultural centres reflect 
the political interests in Taiwan’s foreign affairs and development. North America and 
Europe were among the regions chosen to open the first two cultural centres. Following the 
establishment of the CCA in 1981, the first two cultural centres in New York and Paris 
opened in the 1990s. I suggest the close relation between Taiwan and the United States was 
the primary reason for opening the first cultural centre in New York. Also, Paris was 
considered a strategic location because of its own reputation as a place of culture, and from 
which connections could be made with other parts of Europe (Centre Culturel de Taiwan à 
Paris, 2013).   
Except for economic considerations, the limitations of Taiwan’s foreign affairs further 
reflect external cultural affairs. The disputes over Taiwan’s sovereignty restrict the country 
from joining some super-international organisations as a member state, such as the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Thus, Taiwan does not have the power to speak in the 
international cultural arena, nor to enjoy the resources and network these organisations can 
provide. However, the proactive establishment of state representatives in the international 
organisations is not currently viable. Thus, I argue that the cultural diplomacy strategy 
becomes contingent due to the isolation of international affairs. It is, as a consequence, 
difficult to have a coherent strategy.  
In addition to revealing Taiwan’s foreign affairs interests, the geographical priorities 
also correlate with economic development. For example, in the 1998 White Paper for Culture, 
the government proposed to broaden cultural exchange beyond Europe and North America 
and further expand into Asia-Pacific, which would enable Taiwan to become a cultural 
hotspot in the latter region (Council for Cultural Affairs, 1998). This matched the economic 
and trade policy of the 1990s, which aimed to make Taiwan the Asia-Pacific Regional 
Operations Centre. However, as the economic policy faded, the plan to establish Taiwan as 
the Asia-Pacific cultural hotspot was forgotten.  
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This same pattern of relating cultural development to economic agreements can be 
found in the Economic Agreement between Taiwan and New Zealand in 2013.2  The 
agreement between New Zealand and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, 
Kinmen and Matsu on Economic Cooperation (ANZTEC) was signed under the framework 
of the WTO, which regarded Taiwan as a separate customs territory. In this agreement, 
exports of cultural products and cultural exchange plans were included. For the film 
industries in Taiwan and New Zealand, special preferential treatment was also part of the 
agreement. There were, in addition, planned cultural relations programmes on indigenous 
literature and academic research. In the agreement, it can be seen that cultural relations not 
only enhance mutual understanding, but also provide a visible cultural product as part of 
trade. According to my interviewee in the MOC, the ANZTEC might help Taiwan to gain 
more exposure in New Zealand and potentially benefit Taiwanese filmmakers in their 
post-production. However, it requires further follow-up for evaluation (Anonymous#1, 
personal communication, 2 July, 2014). Despite the Economic Cooperation Agreement 
signed with New Zealand, which included cooperation on the film industry, there is no plan 
to open a cultural centre in either New Zealand or Australia. The choice of location follows 
the policy formulation from the White Paper for Culture in 1998 and 2004, i.e. to have 
cultural centres in global cultural capitals. However, it is arguable that without a MOC 
outpost in New Zealand, it might be difficult to establish new cultural collaboration based on 
the existing ANZTEC agreement. In terms of government administration, it might not be the 
most efficient way to foster bi-lateral cultural relations.       
Interestingly, there are no cultural centres in Taiwan’s 22 country allies. This reveals 
a specific strategy-making consideration. I suggest that one of the reasons is the Taiwanese 
government’s attempts to maintain cultural presence in the powerful countries with which it 
does not have official diplomatic relations. In comparison, public diplomacy, including 
foreign aid and student exchange, are the activities in Taiwan’s allies. From existing research, 
it is evident that cultural diplomacy was not the main objective in the relationship between 
Taiwan and its allies, as the Taiwanese government’s presence can be perceived from other 
policy initiatives. Alexander (2011), who studied both Taiwan’s and China’s diplomatic 
efforts in El Salvador, illustrated that the maintenance of diplomatic ties with as many states 
as possible has two benefits. On the one hand, Taiwan’s formal allies help to keep 
discussions of Taiwan on the agenda of the UN and other international bodies; on the other 
                                                            
2 The	details	of	ANZTEC	can	be	found	here:	http://www.nzcio.com/webfm_send/59
 108 
hand, it remains popular among Taiwanese voters, as they believe it ensures the island’s 
sovereign legitimacy and boosts national self-confidence. Alexander (ibid.) also traced the 
history of Taiwan’s public diplomacy in Latin America back to the 1960s. Through the 
Operation Vanguard project, Taiwan exported agricultural technology to African and Latin 
American countries. Alexander (ibid) also pointed out that the legacy of the Operation 
Vanguard project remains despite the fact Taiwan has expanded its operations over the years 
to include medical missions, aquaculture, handicrafts, highway construction and other aids. 
Cultural programmes are curated in some state visits as part of the formal diplomatic 
relations rather than independent programmes.  
In terms of promoting the arts, the Ministry of Culture (MOC) and its cultural centres 
are the key actors overseas. Besides the two long-established cultural centres, new branches 
of the MOC overseas were established in the 2010s, as part of the re-organisation and 
upgrade of the Council for Cultural Affairs to the MOC. The majority of the new offices were 
branches of the Government Information Office (GIO) previously responsible for foreign 
communication and propaganda, which were split up and merged into the Ministry of Culture 
and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The expansion following the upgrade of the MOC could 
extend the reach of Taiwanese culture overseas.  
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Table 5.1: Overseas offices of the MOC   
(as of June 20173) 
 
Region Location Name Setup in Established by 
United States 
New York 
Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in  
New York Taipei Cultural Center  
(TECO) 
1991 CCA 
Houston 
Taiwan Academy Taipei Economic and Cultural 
Office in Houston 
 
2011 CCA 
Los Angeles 
Taiwan Academy Taipei Economic and Cultural 
Office in Los Angeles 
 
2011 CCA 
Washington, D.C. Taiwan Academy in Washington, D.C  2016 MOC 
Europe 
Paris 
Taiwan Cultural Centre in Paris (Centre Culturel 
de Taiwan à Paris) 
 
1994 CCA 
London 
Cultural Division, Taipei Representative Office 
in the U.K. 
 
2012 MOC 
Berlin 
Kulturabteilung der Taipeh Vertretung in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Cultural Division 
in Taipei Representative office) 
2012 MOC 
Madrid 
Oficina Económica y Cultural de Taipei, 
Madrid, España 
 
2012 MOC 
Moscow 
Cultural Division of the Taipei-Moscow 
Economic and Cultural Coordination 
Commission 
 
2012 MOC 
Asia 
Hong Kong 
Information Division Taipei Economic and 
Culture Office  
(Kwang Hwa Information and Culture Center) 
 
1991 GIO 
Tokyo Taiwan Cultural Center in Tokyo  2010 CCA 
Kuala Lumpur 
Cultural Division, Taipei Economic and Cultural 
Office in Malaysia 
 
2012 MOC 
 
 
Currently, the cultural centres are not known by one name despite former Minister 
Lung Ying-tai’s hope that all overseas offices of the MOC would be ‘Taiwan Academies’ (S. 
Yu, personal communication, 12 December, 2013). In order to open a new cultural centre, the 
Taiwanese government must obtain permission from the host country, including the name of 
the cultural institution. The MOC must cooperate with the MOFA in terms of overall 
                                                            
3 The table is based on information accessed from the MOC and Cultural Centre’s website. 
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budgeting and staffing. The de facto embassies are set up in countries without official 
diplomatic relations, where Taiwan has a Taipei Representative Office or Taipei Economic 
Cultural Office. Similarly, cultural centres are not set up in the official name ‘Republic of 
China.’ The Taiwanese government does not have sole power to decide the name of its 
overseas cultural institutions.  
The need for compromise and negotiation resulted in naming inconsistency. Even if 
the foreign cultural centres are all under the authority of the Ministry of Culture, their names 
vary. For instance, it is called the Taipei Cultural Center of Taipei Economic and Cultural 
Office in New York, whist in Paris the name is Centre Culturel de Taïwan à Paris. The 
cultural centre in Paris joined the Forum des Instituts culturels étrangers à Paris (the forum 
for foreign cultural institutes), and it was necessary to change its name to distinguish it from 
the Chinese cultural centre. The latest cultural centre in Tokyo was originally named Taipei 
Cultural Centre (台北⽂化センタ) when the preparatory office was set up in 2010. When the 
Cultural Centre in Tokyo opened a new office in 2015, the name changed from Taipei 
Cultural Centre to Taiwan Cultural Centre (台湾⽂化センター) and under the affiliation of 
the Taipei Representative Office in Japan. At the launch of the Taiwan Cultural Centre in 
Tokyo, because it was reported that the former name could be mistaken for the Cultural 
Centre established by the Taipei city and not Taiwan, the Ministry of Culture negotiated with 
the Japanese government for the new name (Chao, 2015). 
As overseas branches of the Ministry of Culture, the different names of the cultural 
centres and the newly established Taiwan Academies could be confusing. However, there 
might be less controversy over the name ‘Taiwan’ in cultural centres in China, so this could 
be an opportunity for the Taiwanese government to acquire an identity to differentiate itself 
from China and not be confused as a sub-organisation of the Taipei City Government. 
Moreover, whilst the de facto embassies are mostly named after Taipei instead of Taiwan, the 
overall external image of Taiwan could remain confusing when communicating with foreign 
countries. When naming the overseas cultural institutions, Taiwan still faces the restrictions 
of a diplomatic conundrum. From the viewpoint of organisational identity, the naming does 
not project to visitors a consistent image. To use the name ‘Taipei’ to represent Taiwan is a 
diplomatic compromise, and to use the name ‘Taiwan’ when placing culture in foreign affairs 
can be considered as a small breakthrough. However, it is not yet known whether the MOC 
will eventually unify the names of the cultural centres. If the MOC can achieve a uniform 
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label for the promotion of Taiwan abroad, this can create a consistently recognisable image 
for foreign audiences.  
When it comes to promoting an image of Taiwan, one of the limitations identified in 
the Global Outreach Action Plan is the difficulty of being distinguished from other East 
Asian cultures, especially when the curating and programming are decided by the arts 
institutions in the host countries. According to my interviewee (Anonymous#1, personal 
communication, 2 July, 2014), an integrated national image is absent. In the Global Outreach 
Action Plan published by the MOC, an appeal was made for an integrated and more efficient 
approach with limited resources. There was a call for a special committee to develop an 
overall strategy with consultation involving professionals, the third sector and representatives 
from civil society (Ministry of Culture, 2013a). However, it remains unclear whether the 
committee was created or the opinions of civil society taken into account in government 
policymaking. It is a common practice to include Taiwan as part of Asian cultures. Therefore, 
individual art works from Taiwan would be understood within the context of Asian culture. It 
is easier to gain publicity by being part of ‘Asian Culture,’ but it also makes it difficult to 
stand out. Director Yu (personal communication, 12 December, 2013) of the New York 
Cultural Center reflected on Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy on the macro level and noted 
differences between several Asian cultures: 
 
From the macro-perspective, the South Eastern Asian countries may have similar 
cultures, and Japanese culture is unique. We have many parts (of culture) overlapping 
with mainland China because of the shared roots. Although there might be some 
difference in the development of contemporary art, when you use the Taiwanese 
element, that’s pretty much the same, especially in traditional arts. For example, the 
difference between your folk dance and their [Chinese] folk dance, the foreigners could 
not tell. When we promote Taiwanese dance, this is an obstacle. That is to say: what’s 
our speciality? […] except for cases like Cloud Gate, they already became a Taiwanese 
brand, that’s fine. So what I meant was…we need to strongly persuade them, why we 
are better than mainland China. For example, the ink and wash painting…in what way 
is Taiwan better than China? In contemporary arts it might be different, but in terms of 
traditional arts, it’s pretty similar. Especially when China is rising; they are rich, and 
they spare no effort to create a soft image of a cultural nation. 
      
Director Yu is clearly anxious about the challenge of finding and promoting the unique 
strengths of Taiwanese culture. The challenge can be traced back to the formation and 
 112 
reinterpretation of Taiwanese cultural identity. Despite the Taiwanese awareness movement, 
the anxiety of distinguishing Taiwan from China, or the rest of Asia, still exists. It is 
particularly interesting when Director Yu mentions the need to persuade others ‘why we are 
better than mainland China.’ The competitiveness might be deliberately underplayed in the 
official statements that Minister Lung Ying-tai made, but they remain in the mind of some 
government officials. Furthermore, what does it mean to ‘be better’ in the arts? It is also 
worth considering whether Taiwanese culture could be understood out of context. Another 
interviewee shared her perspective (Anonymous#2, personal communication, 17 December, 
2013): 
 
For example, I know the Taiwan History Museum in Tainan, they would like to have 
international collaboration, too. But, I can’t see the possibility. Because……if we do 
things like marine culture, indigenous culture, we need something very specific. 
Themes like this in foreign museums, they would not just focus on Taiwan. For them, 
they would like to set the topic to Asia-Pacific, and Taiwan is just a part of them. [The 
opportunity] to just focus on Taiwan is something which can only be found, not 
pursued.  
 
These concerns not only imply the cultural contexts within which to position 
Taiwanese culture, but also identify its uniqueness. It is essential to examine how Taiwan can 
position itself in the global cultural context. It may also be the reason why cultural diplomacy 
would be difficult for Taiwan before a clearer cultural identity emerges. If the anxiety of 
being distinguished from others no longer existed, then the Taiwanese government could 
confidently present Taiwanese culture. Therefore, the real question is: could this confidence 
be established in Taiwanese culture? This might explain why gaining cultural presence is 
important for Taiwan. That said, probably the only way to establish confidence in culture is 
to see oneself through the eyes of others. The existence of Taiwan is confirmed through the 
process of ‘being seen’, and the anxiety would probably be alleviated. 
The uncontrollability in cultural diplomacy is apparent. In the attempt to collaborate 
with local arts organisations, the cultural centres may not have the final decision. This raises 
the question of whether government should be more prescriptive. Whilst collaborating with 
foreign cultural organisations, the content and approach of an exhibition are the decision of 
curators or other cultural professionals, depending on the results of negotiation. Can the 
cultural centres have a voice? Or should they simply be funding providers? Furthermore, it 
may be questioned how much freedom cultural centres can operate in the host country. There 
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is a balance to be maintained by the government should it engage with arts and cultural 
organisations, and this represents the fundamental difference of mindset and intention of 
cultural diplomacy (Holmes, 2012).  
These are key questions for the overall operational strategy of the centres. Of crucial 
importance are the objectives of collaborating with cultural organisations in the host 
countries. The centres introduce Taiwanese artists, provide them with funding and resources 
and usually sponsor the events. However, the centres might not have the desired outcome of 
promoting Taiwan’s cultural image. If that is the case, to what extent can the cultural centre 
negotiate with the artists and their partners? This can be a question of bureaucracy in Taiwan, 
and how cultural officials understand their role in cultural diplomacy. 
The operation and vision of overseas cultural centres were also mentioned in the 1998 
White Paper for Culture. Both cultural centres in New York and Paris were regarded as a 
window to showcase Taiwanese culture (Council for Cultural Affairs, 1998). In its early 
stages, the New York Cultural Center consisted of two cultural institutes: Taipei Gallery and 
Taipei Theatre. The two venues rented space and operated in the Rockefeller Center as 
theatres and galleries between 1991 and 2002. From my fieldwork, I discovered that the 
projects had been discontinued, as the CCA decided not to renew the tenancy when it expired 
in 2002. In the report Sounding the Horn of International Cultural Exchange: a record of 
Chinese Information and Culture Centre in New York, published by the CCA in 2002, it was 
stated that the space could not fulfil the needs of large-scale arts activities, and human and 
financial resources were required to maintain the two venues (Council for Cultural Affairs, 
2002b). The Taipei Gallery hosted six to seven exhibitions every year in its 2,800 square foot 
venue, and the Taipei Theatre hosted 10 to 12 programmes annually (Council for Cultural 
Affairs, 2004b). Taking the figures published in a report for the period May 2000 to June 
2001 as an example, the average number of audience members was 200 in each performance 
in the Taipei Theatre, and 68 visitors each day for the exhibitions in the Taipei Gallery 
(Council for Cultural Affairs, 2002). The 2002 CCA report on the work of the Taipei Theatre 
included in the appendix a newspaper clipping of a review of the Chinese opera production 
Rashomon: the Musical in the New York Times. In the review of Tuesday 26 February, 2002, 
James R. Oestreich praised the performance of Huang Yu-Lin as being ‘lovely, fetching and, 
when necessary stouthearted, a worthy fall to the villain.’ He also wrote about the audience 
that night: ‘[…] the small house was full, and the audience was largely English-speaking, a 
shift from a few years ago, when audiences were mostly Chinese. New Yorkers of all stripes 
have evidently been drawn to Chinese opera, in part by the Taipei Theatre’s high quality 
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presentations over the last decade’ (ibid.). This review article not only publicised the 
performance, but also recognised the quality of production of the Taipei Theatre. As the 
cultural centre did not include demographic information about the audience members, this 
observation provided only a glimpse into Taipei Theatre’s work and audience. The fact that 
audience members were not simply Chinese was an achievement recognised by the author. 
That is to say, the cultural centre’s work reached beyond the overseas Chinese community; it 
was not merely a case of preaching to the converted. The inclusion of this review from the 
New York Times in the published report further suggests that the cultural centre valued 
recognition from reputable media, which could help project Taiwan’s cultural image. 
Following the closure of the two venues, the New York Cultural Center took a 
different approach to cultural diplomacy. Whilst renting space was not considered 
cost-efficient, the cultural centres chose to function as a platform and collaborated with local 
organisations. Instead of renting separate spaces, they shared the office building with the 
Taipei Economic Cultural Office (TECO), which is the de facto consulate on 42nd street, near 
Fifth Avenue. The building is the property of the Taiwanese government in New York City. 
The centres hosted film screenings, small-scale performances and talks. Interestingly, the 
function of Taiwan Academies proposed by Minister Lung Ying-tai as salons to host 
small-scale activities echoed the idea of a cultural showcase on the premises. With the space 
and equipment to host small-scale activities, I consider the cultural centres and Taiwan 
Academies to have more say in the contents of the programmes they wish to present. 
However, they may still face challenges to attract audiences. 
The cities chosen to set up foreign offices represent the strategic geographic planning 
in different regions. As for regional strategies, Director Susan Yu (personal communication, 
12 December, 2013) of the New York Culture Center explained their tasks. Besides the two 
Taiwan Academies in Houston and Los Angeles, the MOC has three offices in the United 
States.4 Among these offices, the boundaries are divided by longitudes. For example, the 
Taiwan Academy in Los Angeles also covers some activities in Vancouver, Canada. 
Although the Taiwan Academy in Houston should cover the cultural activities in Central and 
South America, it lacks resources and manpower for such vast areas to strengthen cultural 
connections with Taiwan’s allies. Furthermore, due to the physical distance and huge travel 
expenses, few Taiwanese performing arts companies tour in Central and South America. For 
                                                            
4 In late 2016, the MOC established the Taiwan Academy in Washington, D.C. Due to the scope of the present 
research, the establishment and operation of this MOC outpost is not included. 
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performing arts, there is also insufficient information for Taiwanese companies about cultural 
activities in those countries (Ping, personal communication, 17 June, 2013). 
In terms of the cultural diplomacy in the United States, the New York Culture Center 
still covers the majority of policy delivery. With its vibrant arts scene, New York is a city 
where cultural relations could take place at every street corner. It is also the headquarters of 
the United Nations. This could be competitive in cultural relations practice. As Director Yu 
(personal communication, 2013) observes, South Eastern Asian countries are particularly 
ambitious newcomers in New York. She also indicated that it is not easy to find audiences as 
there are too many cultural activities in New York. This again is indicative of the 
uncontrollability of cultural diplomacy. It is true that the audience has many choices in such a 
big city, which made the promotion of cultural programmes difficult. From another 
perspective, it also means that the cultural centres need to know their target audience. As 
Rawnsley (2012) argued, it is necessary to define with whom one wishes to communicate, 
why and how. If this is not done, the promotion of cultural programmes can be a random 
exercise and not efficiently executed. The same may also apply to other cultural centres in 
megacities where there are tremendous choices of artistic activities. I argue that this is an 
inevitable dilemma of setting up cultural centres in megacities. Although there are huge 
populations in New York, Paris and London, there are also various entertainments. The 
cultural centres are among the cultural institutions that compete for people’s attention and 
participation. If the cultural centres do not have sufficient knowledge and an effective 
strategy, it is not easy to establish a presence in these cities. 
The function of cultural diplomacy as a facilitator is particularly visible in the New 
York Cultural Center. As Director Yu (personal communication, 12 December, 2013) stated, 
government officials in the United States would not visit the physical premises of the TECO, 
and cultural activities could serve as an occasion for informal meetings. Whilst hosting the 
receptions for cultural activities, it is easier to invite officials and diplomats. For the TECO, 
these are opportunities for Taiwanese diplomats to meet important diplomats. As Mitchell 
(1986) noted, in analysis of the significance of cultural relations, activities arranged by 
cultural agencies create a favourable impression on foreigners in leading positions. In this 
case, the cultural programme works as a supplement to traditional diplomacy. The practical 
function largely serves as a networking event for diplomats. The practice follows the example 
of the ROC government, which promoted the Peking Opera with diplomatic purpose (see 
section 5.1), and partly compensates for the disadvantages of lacking official diplomatic 
relations.  
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The main mission of the New York Cultural Center is to promote Taiwan’s 
performing arts and visual arts, which follows the function of the CCA. With limited funds 
and manpower, the centre aims to build and maintain a local professional network. In the 
interview with Director Susan Yu (2013) of the Taipei Cultural Center in New York, she 
presented the main strategy as follows:  
 
The centre’s strategy is to become a platform, a bridge. We go out and look for 
institutions, bring DVDs of previous [collaborated] companies, or some documents of 
the artists. That is to say, based on connections. Either we invite guests to visit Taiwan, 
for example, someone in Lincoln Center, or Joyce Theater, or curators in Queen’s 
Museum. We invited the key person in institutions to visit Taiwan. Then, Taiwan 
[institutions] would make arrangements to see some exhibitions, visit artists’ studios, or 
watch rehearsals and performances of arts companies. When they return, they might 
have some ideas, and we can select some [programmes] for their reference. So, we 
make strong contacts. Someday, they might think of inviting a certain company to tour, 
or to curate an exhibition. This is one of the modes. Others, like someone we had 
invited or we know, could be able to introduce someone else, or some organisation 
might be interested. Thus, we expand the network.  
     
It can be understood that the main strategy of the New York Cultural Center is to be a 
facilitator and seize opportunities for collaborations. The main strategy is to build 
connections and networks with local cultural professionals. This marked a change in the 
centre’s strategy after closing the Taipei Theater and the Taipei Gallery. With limited budget 
and manpower, rented space is not cost-efficient, especially when the centre would like to 
attract a larger audience. Maintaining the network is the key to potential collaboration and to 
reach new audiences. When collaborating, the local cultural institutions usually organise 
these projects, whilst the cultural centre plays a more supportive role. I learnt in my fieldwork 
that Cloud Gate 2, the associate company of Cloud Gate Dance Theater, which targets a 
younger audience, went to New York and performed in the Joyce Theater; the Taipei Cultural 
Center provided a list of all Chinese schools in the New York area for promotion, along with 
the resources for advertising, hosting a press conference and lectures by the choreographer. 
This promotion helped to push ticket sales and introduced the less-known choreographer 
Bulareyaung Pagarlava to the audience in New York. Although the cultural centres have 
provided funding and support for networking for programmers and curators, further contacts 
still need to be made by the administrative staff in each company.  
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Despite making invitations for cultural professionals to visit Taiwan, there are no 
guaranteed follow-up offers or collaborations. For example, one of the collaborations 
between the New York Cultural Center and Joyce Theatre was initiated partly due to 
serendipity. One of the curators in the Joyce Theater was invited by a Taiwanese arts 
foundation to be part of its judging panel for an arts competition in Taiwan and was 
impressed by the choreographer. The cultural centre took this opportunity and collaborated 
with the Joyce Theater. All involved benefitted: the Joyce Theater, the New York Cultural 
Center and the choreographer. The work was recognised by the curator, and with support 
from the cultural centre, it was performed at the Joyce Theater. This was an opportunity to 
present Taiwanese culture in a well-known venue and to increase its reach. Although due 
partly to serendipity, Director Yu (personal communication, 12 December, 2013) explained 
that it was also owing to one of the cultural attachés in the centre, who was keen to maintain 
the network and connection. Thus, I argue that serendipity is not purely luck; it requires 
someone to take the initiative. 
It was also a case of serendipity when the Asian Cultural Council (ACC) collaborated 
with the New York Cultural Center. This project was mentioned by Director Yu (ibid.). The 
ACC, one of the foundations established by the Rockefeller family, is dedicated to promoting 
cultural exchange between East Asian and Southeast Asian countries. Several Taiwanese 
artists are Asian Cultural Council grant recipients and reside in the United States. Based on 
the existing link with Taiwanese artists, the New York Cultural Center supported the 
presentation of their works at the ACC’s fiftieth anniversary programme (see section 6.5). 
This can serve as an example of collaboration between the Cultural Centre and private 
foundations. 
The analysis of New York Cultural Center’s strategy reveals limited staff numbers 
and budget, and suggests that its role as a facilitator is probably the most effective way to 
engage with the local community. However, the project-based partnerships might be ad hoc 
and difficult to continue in the long term. It depends on whether there are Taiwanese artists 
whose works are good enough for local arts institutions. Only when they are repeatedly 
invited to collaborate with these organisations will their works be seen and a vivid impression 
made.  
Like the New York Cultural Center, the platform-making and bridge-building strategy 
is also applied in the Paris Cultural Centre. Taiwan enjoys close links to France established 
by former Minister of Culture, Tchen Yu-chiou. As a Paris-trained pianist herself, Tchen 
already has personal ties to France, which enabled her to cooperate with the French 
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government. In her administration as Chairperson of the CCA between 2000 and 2004, she 
signed several agreements to facilitate exchanges between scholars and government officials 
(Tchen, personal communication, 28 May, 2013). In other words, the close relationship 
between Taiwan and France is partly an outcome of her personal connections. The 
agreements signed between the CCA and the French government formalised the cultural 
exchanges, which was beneficial for maintaining the collaborations after Tchen Yu-chiou 
stepped down from the job. 
The directorship of the Paris Cultural Centre was significant among all the cultural 
outposts of the CCA/MOC. The directors of the New York Cultural Center are mostly 
government officials assigned by the CCA, but this is not the case in Paris. The CCA often 
sought scholars or professionals who had close personal connections with France to work as 
directors of the Paris Cultural Centre. The ability to speak the language and familiarity with 
French culture were among the main selection criteria. This provides an interesting example 
of appointment for overseas cultural centres. Whilst the term of directorship can be as short 
as four years, knowledge of culture and personal links in the host country further benefit the 
operations of cultural centres. 
My fieldwork also reveals that the Paris Cultural Centre is more creative in promoting 
Taiwanese culture and enhancing cultural exchange. Former Director of the Taiwan Cultural 
Centre in Paris, Dr Chen Chih-cheng (personal communication, 29 November, 2013), stated 
its vision to create a ‘three-tier of excellence platform for international exchange.’ On the 
first platform, he focused on some ‘spotlights,’ namely, cultural institutions in France and the 
European Union. On the second platform, he highlighted the arts festivals and biennials. 
These events are not affiliated to a certain institution. Finally, the director suggested creating 
a third platform for schools, artistic residencies and young artists. In summary, the three 
platforms link industry and enable the centre to understand and arrange their works 
accordingly. Dr Chen Chih-cheng (ibid.) mapped out the centre’s strategy in the European 
Union as France is at the centre, and covers the Francophone area. He considered Western 
Europe is the ‘hinterland’ because of the existing cultural industry chain. If opportunities 
appear, the centre can collaborate with Central European and Scandinavian countries. 
However, it would be very difficult for the centre to cover Eastern Europe, or the countries 
close to Russia. One activity per year and roll-out in the long term, as well as closer 
partnership is more viable for the centre. Given the various cultures and languages in the EU, 
it is difficult to reach out to all countries with equal administrative support and resources. 
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Although Dr Chen Chih-cheng indicated that the Paris Cultural Centre had projects in the 
majority of EU countries, its presence could not have the same impact due to the manpower 
and resource issues. However, with the forthcoming opening of the cultural centres in Berlin, 
Madrid and London, I expect the outreach of Taiwanese culture to be enhanced in a few 
years.   
The Paris Cultural Centre has significantly benefited from continuous participation 
with other foreign cultural centres, which is notable among Taiwan’s cultural outposts. The 
Forum des Instituts culturels étrangers à Paris consists of over 50 foreign cultural institutes 
and organises annual events. As Dr Chen Chih-cheng observed, the collaboration and 
competition between the member institutes is beneficial for the Taiwan cultural centre’s 
development. Since its establishment in 1994, the Paris Cultural Centre has been the only 
CCA overseas office in Europe before the MOC was created in 2012. To promote Taiwanese 
films in the major European film festivals is another project of the Paris Cultural Centre. In 
addition, an important annual project is to assist Taiwanese performing arts companies to 
participate in the OFF Avignon festivals. In relation to promoting Taiwanese culture in 
Europe, Dr Chen Chih-cheng suggested that the CCA could recruit more cultural attachés in 
more countries. It is difficult for other departments to cover cultural projects in representative 
offices. The cultural attaché could be based in the representative office to lessen the cost of 
separate premises. For Dr Chen Chih-cheng, this person can act as a ‘cavalryman’ in each 
country for project programming and maintaining connections. However, the Council did not 
accept his idea, and he assumed that this was because of accounting constraints and personnel 
regulations.   
Compared with France, the cultural relations between Taiwan and the UK have not 
developed as well as its education exchange, and I raised this issue during my interview with 
Tchen Yu-chiou in 2013. Whilst the cultural diplomacy with France enjoys strong personal 
links and formalised treaties in cultural affairs, I found that the CCA’s work in the UK was 
more ad hoc. Tchen Yu-chiou (personal communication, 28 May, 2013) stated that she also 
made an official visit to the UK during her administration and tried to initiate collaboration, 
but it did not develop as she expected. In view of the limited resources and her personal 
connections with France, priority was in that country instead. The CCA, moreover, did not 
seek to enhance cultural diplomacy with the UK after Tchen Yu-chiou stepped down as 
chairperson of the CCA in 2004. In terms of educational affairs, the Taipei Representative 
Office in the UK signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Collaboration in Education 
with the British Council in 2005 and renewed it in 2011. In this Memorandum of 
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Understanding on Collaboration in Education, language teaching and educational exchange 
are identified as the main activities that both parties promote. However, arts activities are not 
among the listed cultural activities. Furthermore, it is the Cultural Division (now Education 
Division) of the Taipei Representative Office in the UK that enforces the MoU. The CCA 
was not involved in this agreement. Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy in the UK, as opposed to 
France, was not formalised in treaties or agreements between the governments. 
Thus, I suggest that the lack of formalisation and continuous cultural exchange made 
it difficult for the MOC to expand further its cultural diplomacy in the UK. The plan for 
establishing a new cultural centre was in the spotlight again in 2013, when former Minister of 
Culture, Lung Ying-tai, visited London. With new offices in Berlin and London under 
preparation, the Paris Cultural Centre could expect to share some workload with the new 
offices. In the press conference held in London prior to Minister Lung Ying-tai’s departure, 
she stated that the Taiwan Academy would not provide language-learning. It would be a 
not-for-profit organisation and serve as a salon to promote all genres of Taiwanese art. 
However, to set up a Taiwan Academy, including the finalisation of its title requires consent 
from the UK government. Before that, the Ministry will continue to seek partnership with 
local arts organisations in London (BBC Chinese, 2013).  
Despite administrative limitations in finding a property and delayed opening, staff 
members at these centres seek to develop initiatives with the resources available to them. 
Whilst the opening of a cultural centre is uncertain in the immediate future, the preparatory 
office in London is active in seeking collaboration opportunities. The London office invites 
universities to become Spotlight Taiwan project partners (see section 6.4) and participate in 
film festivals hosted by Asia House or the British Film Institute. In addition, the London 
preparatory office organised a Taiwanese showcase at the Edinburgh Fringe Festival in 2014, 
following the Paris Cultural Centre’s example of promoting Taiwanese performing arts 
companies in the OFF Avignon festival. This enables Taiwan to continue to engage with 
foreign audiences and thus maintain a presence in key cultural and political contexts.   
As one of the newest offices, the preparatory office in London takes part in the 
cultural diplomacy programmes of the MOC. This includes organising showcases in festivals 
in the UK. From my observations, it would be beneficial for staff in the preparatory office to 
familiarise themselves with the local networks. Apart from the showcasing of performing arts 
at the Edinburgh Fringe Festival and the OFF Avignon festival, the MOC subsidised music 
bands to attend international music festivals and started, in 2014, to promote Taiwanese 
music bands under the name ‘Taiwan Beats’ at events such as at the Glastonbury Festival. As 
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Chia-Chen Chang (2014) indicated, the showcase is part of the government’s international 
promotion programme, the Popular Music Industry Development Action Plan (2010-2015), 
and the GIO (now part of the MOC) has hired agencies to help promote Taiwanese 
independent music overseas. Through these agencies, Taiwan’s music troupes can participate 
in overseas music festivals without worrying about the cost and gain publicity. In Taiwanese 
scholars Miaoju Jian and Kai-Tong Cheng’s (2012) research on the international promotion 
of Taiwan’s independent music, they questioned the strategy, as the impact is hard to 
evaluate, and the reach is also limited since the subsidy has been allocated to only a few 
music troupes. The largest beneficiaries are arguably the cultural intermediaries (e.g. the 
agencies hired by the MOC), but not the musicians. Furthermore, Jian and Cheng (ibid.) 
argued that being funded by the government would impact their independence from 
government. In other words, independent musicians should remain distant from government 
and public funding even for the sake of attending international festivals. Whether such 
funding has really helped is difficult to judge, and the aim to promote cultural industries 
abroad through government support would eventually undermine the strength of the arts. 
Nonetheless, the strategy of promotion of cultural products needs to accommodate the 
economic logic. There might be quantifiable outcomes related to increased sales, but this 
does not necessarily translate into soft power or resources. 
After discussing the cultural centres and their strategies in North America and Europe, 
I now turn to the centres in Asia. Compared with the long-term establishment of cultural 
centres in North America and Europe – where gaining recognition for Taiwanese culture is a 
priority – the MOC did not engage as much in countries close to home. In Asia, the CCA set 
up a preparatory office in Tokyo in 2010. The cultural centre shares a space with the Taipei 
Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Tokyo. Director Chu Wen-Ching of the 
Taipei Cultural Centre in Tokyo stated that there is great understanding of Taiwan’s film, 
music and fine art because of the historical ties between Japan and Taiwan (Chiang, 2014). 
Taiwan was Japan’s colony from 1895 to 1945, and Japan remains a popular travel 
destination for Taiwanese. For instance, Japan was the most visited country by Taiwanese; in 
2015, the total number was 3,797,879.5 I suggest the historical connection and the colonial 
legacy are among the main reasons for Taiwanese interest in Japanese culture. Despite the 
relatively recent establishment of the Cultural Centre in Tokyo, the cultural exchange 
between Japan and Taiwan has a long history. As an illustration, the influence of Japanese 
                                                            
5 Source:	National	Statistics,	R.O.C	(Taiwan):	http://www1.stat.gov.tw/	(Accessed	14	December,	2016). 
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drama, popular music and manga is most significant in Taiwan. Although there are still 
territorial disputes between China, Taiwan and Japan regarding the senkaku/diaoyu islands, 
relations between Japanese and Taiwanese people remain frequent and friendly. One example 
was the generous donation of Taiwanese people after the North-eastern Japan earthquake in 
2011. To a degree, it is revealing of ubiquitous cultural relations and citizen diplomacy in 
both societies. The Taiwan Cultural Centre in Tokyo officially opened in June 2015. The use 
of Taiwan in the name was agreed by the Japanese government with goodwill during the 
negotiation, as then Minister of Culture Hung Meng-chi revealed (Chiang, 2015). However, 
the issue of naming inconsistency of cultural centres remains, which does not help the 
Taiwanese government to establish a brand for promoting Taiwanese culture overseas. This 
serves as an example that disadvantages in conventional diplomacy have an impact on 
cultural diplomacy. 
One of the significant efforts of the MOC was to strengthen the cultural connection 
with Southeast Asia after its upgrade in 2012, and the establishment of a new cultural centre 
in Malaysia. Historically, overseas Chinese students are entitled to study in Taiwan. Students 
from Malaysia, Myanmar and Indonesia constitute the majority of the overseas Chinese 
students. Taiwan has already built connections with overseas Chinese students from these 
countries and they have become valuable links in cultural relations with Southeast Asia. 
Additionally, Malaysian-Chinese literature is a specific genre of Chinese literature, and 
covers a range of topics of the diaspora. Based on existing foundations, Taiwan can develop 
closer ties in cultural exchange with Southeast Asian countries. On account of familiarity 
with the Chinese community, there were successful exports of Taiwanese culture. My 
interviewee in the MOC took the 2001 privately-produced Taiwanese television soap opera 
Meteor Garden as an example. It was popular among the overseas Chinese community, 
especially in Southeast Asia. After seeing the success of Meteor Garden, the MOC planned to 
promote more Taiwanese television in Southeast Asia (Anonymous#1, personal 
communication, 2 July, 2014). Therefore, the potential market for exporting Taiwanese mass 
communication products plays an important part in the MOC’s Southeast Asia strategy.  
Another significant link is created by the migrant workers from Southeast Asia who 
have been working in Taiwan since the 1990s. In addition to cultural industry exports, the 
most important task is to extend beyond Chinese communities and foster mutual 
understanding. Migrant workers from the Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam work in 
domestic care and the construction industries in Taiwan. There are also immigrants from 
Southeast Asia settled in Taiwan through marriage. The ‘New children of Taiwan,’ that is, 
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the children of Southeast Asian immigrants, were included in former President Chen 
Shui-bian’s ‘Multicultural Taiwan’ (Wang, 2004). Despite the intention to include the 
Southeast Asian migrants in Taiwan’s cultural identity discourse, it was not in the CCA’s 
priority to work with Southeast Asian countries. It was until 2013 that the MOC launched 
projects to strengthen cultural exchange. The project Emerald Initiative: Taiwan x Southeast 
Asia aims to invite artists from Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, 
Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia. The invited artists can collaborate in curating, performance, 
playwriting, fieldwork, etc. (Taiwan, ROC Ministry of Culture, 2017). In my opinion, this 
initiative in cultural relations with Southeast Asia is long overdue, as the government should 
have recognised the cultural links between the immigrants and their countries of birth earlier.  
There are several reasons for this delayed cultural relations initiative. First, cultural 
and artistic affairs were not the priority of the government in terms of migration. It was the 
Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Interior that were in charge of the Mandarin 
language teaching for immigrants. Secondly, whilst the marriages conducted by agencies are 
often commoditised and transnational, most of the female immigrants are married into 
families of lower social class. Thus, it became a priority to help immigrants learn Mandarin 
and integrate into Taiwan society. There are fewer resources allocated to the cultural 
exchange with the immigrants’ home countries. As transnational marriages became common 
two decades ago, and the ‘New Children of Taiwan’ are now adults, more attention should be 
paid to their link with the countries where their mothers are from.  
The late start building cultural exchange between Taiwan and Southeast Asian 
countries was indicative of a new strategy to engage with less privileged audiences. As 
Rawnsley (2012) illustrated in his research on Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy strategy, this may 
attract the elite who already know something about Taiwan, its history and culture, and with 
whom Taiwan already enjoys soft power success, especially in terms of political lobbying. 
The Emerald Initiative: Taiwan x Southeast Asia collected the stories of immigrants in 
Taiwan and gained further awareness of their cultures. Nonetheless, the forms of cultural 
relations are limited to the domains of literature and performing arts. It remains to be seen 
whether these projects reach the target audience and empower the immigrants. 
Furthermore, the Kwang Hwa Information and Culture Centre in Hong Kong provides 
a model for programming and collaboration with local cultural organisations. Since its 
sovereignty transferred from the UK to the People’s Republic of China in 1997, Hong Kong 
has been the ‘Special Administrative Region’ of the PRC. The political system of Hong Kong 
was established under the principle of ‘One Country, Two Systems,’ which was agreed prior 
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to the transfer of sovereignty. Compared with people from mainland China, residents in Hong 
Kong can enjoy more freedom travelling to Taiwan. With relations between Hong Kong – 
including ethnic Chinese students – and Taiwan and the long history of cultural 
communication, the Taiwanese Kwang Hwa Information and Culture Centre (KHICC)  
enjoys more strengths compared with other cultural centres. The common language, in 
particular, makes it is easier to promote Taiwanese literature. The KHICC was a former 
branch of the Government Information Office (GIO) of the Taiwanese government. Several 
of its directors were writers and cultural professionals in Taiwan instead of civil servants. As 
the GIO merged into the new Ministry of Culture in 2012, the KHICC also became one of the 
overseas cultural centres of the MOC. Since 2008, the KHICC has showcased every year 
Taiwanese art, film and literature in the programme ‘Taiwan Cultural Festival.’ The KHICC 
also invites Taiwanese cultural professionals to give talks in Hong Kong. As Hong Kong is 
an international hub, the KHICC could target international audiences without being restricted 
to Hong Kong citizens. From my interviews, I learnt that the reputation of the Taiwan 
Cultural Festival has enabled the KHICC to establish successful partnerships with local 
venues to host events (Anonymous#1, personal communication, 2 July, 2014). The 
operational model is ideal for overseas cultural promotion, as the KHICC has established 
partnerships with local organisations and engaged with the local communities. Furthermore, a 
continuous cultural festival can help in building the brand image of the cultural centre and 
further maintain its exposure in the host country. 
To explore KHICC’s programming, the promotion of Taiwanese literature can serve 
as an example of the MOC’s different regional strategies. Inviting writers for a talk or a book 
signing session can be the most achievable for literature-related programmes. As indicated by 
my interviewee (ibid.), the KHICC regularly hosts literature events and introduces Taiwanese 
writers to Hong Kong audiences. From her observation, some Taiwanese works are published 
in Hong Kong, and several directors of the cultural centre are famous Taiwanese writers. The 
development of the programme has been facilitated by the relative advantages of a common 
language. Traditional Chinese is widely used in Hong Kong and the encumbrance of 
translation is minimised. As a consequence, the cultural centre is able to promote more 
literature. The case of the KHICC shows that the existing strengths and knowledge in the host 
countries can affect the cultural centre’s programming and development. Also, the expertise 
and reputation of the cultural centre’s director can be beneficial for promoting Taiwanese 
culture.   
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However, in non-Chinese speaking countries, promoting Taiwanese literature presents 
challenges. One of them is insufficient high-quality translations. The government has 
recognised the importance of translation, and the CCA (now the MOC) has allocated funding 
for the Plan for the Translation of Taiwanese Modern Literature into Foreign Languages 
since 1990. After the CCA upgraded to the MOC, the sub-organisation National Museum of 
Taiwanese Literature continued the translation project. It launched the Taiwan Literary 
Translation Centre in 2012. Besides English, translations in French, Japanese, Korean, 
German, Russian, Dutch, Swedish and Czech are available from the Translation Centre. 
Nonetheless, there are not many books available and the budget is tight. Except for the 
overseas Chinese-speaking market, Taiwanese literature does not have as wide a readership 
in other languages. Compared with the long-established reputation of the performing arts, 
Taiwanese literature is considered difficult to promote in non-Chinese-speaking markets. 
Taking the United States as an example, Director Yu (personal communication, 12 December, 
2013) of the New York Cultural Center highlighted several factors that make literature 
promotion difficult. First, there are few high-quality translations. There are also few 
Taiwanese writers well known in the United States, and even if they live in the country, their 
works are mainly written in Chinese, and not many are available in English. Director Yu 
(ibid.) noted that in non-Chinese speaking countries, it is rare for Taiwan’s overseas cultural 
centres to host relevant programmes for Taiwanese literature. For example, unlike the 
performing arts, literature is not a priority of the New York Cultural Center.  
It is interesting to consider whether literature translation projects achieve their goals. 
There are two important features of this in cultural policy. On the one hand, they are exports 
of culture for ideological purposes; on the other hand, trade is initiated through image 
development and management. The two contexts overlap, and translated literature was 
generally included in the first (von Flotow, 2007). From the perspective of government 
funding allocations, I consider the two contexts have a purpose and audience. In terms of 
exporting cultural products, I argue that translated literature can be a starting point for further 
cultural product output. For instance, fiction can be used to attract a foreign readership, and 
an audience can be found for theatre and film production. The most successful stories include 
Harry Potter in the UK. In the case of promoting Taiwanese literature and subsidising 
translation projects, it reveals an incompatibility between Taiwan’s cultural policy 
programmes. Ideally, the translated works can be promoted in overseas markets where the 
cultural centres can provide assistance in promotion. However, from the research findings, it 
reveals that the translated works of the Taiwan Literature Translation Project are not widely 
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publicised and the cultural centres do not find works available for promotion. This reveals a 
mismatch in the MOC’s strategy.  
Furthermore, to make literary works widely available requires knowledge of overseas 
publishing markets. Although the public-funded translation centre could fill the gap not 
covered by the market, certain efforts should be made to make translated literature more 
accessible. Nevertheless, it still relies on professional networks and channels of publishers to 
introduce works into copyright trades and make them available to a foreign readership. To 
unlock the potential of literature translation and achieve ideological objectives and trade 
initiatives, the MOC allocated funding for both. Despite this, the current working model 
limits its impact to intellectuals and academics. The translated works vary from novels to 
poetry and have only a small circle of readers. However, in 2011, circumstances began to 
change. One of the examples is Wu Ming-Yi’s novel The Man with the Compound Eyes. As 
in the pamphlet published by the Ministry of Culture, Books from Taiwan, Sterk (2014) stated 
that unlike previous English translations of Taiwanese fiction, which mostly circulated 
through university or boutique presses, Wu Ming-Yi’s work was the first to be taken on by a 
major English language trade publisher. This case represents a new method of promoting 
Taiwanese literature. However, I also question whether the government’s role in the 
translation of Taiwanese literature needs to change. Simply providing subsidy to encourage 
publishers to translate and introduce Taiwanese literature overseas might be a more efficient 
strategy. I continue the discussion of non-governmental organisations’ engagements in 
cultural diplomacy in section 6.5.  
 
5.6 An administrational perspective on the cultural centres 
Having discussed the issue with naming, which, as a consequence, is of diplomatic 
disadvantage to Taiwan, I now turn my attention to operations in the cultural centres in this 
section. I examine the administration in the MOC and these cultural centres to determine 
whether the policy objectives are realised. First, I explore the methods of communication, 
including information and knowledge collection on cultural exchange. Secondly, I discuss the 
training and professional skills that cultural attachés receive in the current bureaucracy to 
fulfil their job. In order to understand the role of cultural attaché personnel, interviews were 
conducted in the MOC and Cultural Centres. The questions focused on their personal career 
path and the training they received. Several interviewees who work in management also 
shared their thoughts on the characteristics of a cultural attaché. By analysing these questions, 
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I aim to show how Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy is practised on the frontline and the 
challenges it faces. 
To illustrate this, I examine the case of the long-anticipated cultural centre in London. 
However, the opening has been long overdue. In addition to obtaining agreement from the 
host country to establish a cultural centre, there are more administrative restrictions in 
Taiwan. The legislators in Taiwan are critical of the high rental cost of newly established 
cultural centres (Chen, 2013). As the rental and maintenance costs are high, the amount of 
money left for subsidies and activities is comparatively small. Thus, concerns are raised that 
not enough Taiwanese cultural programmes could be presented despite London’s strategic 
location. 
This issue of the Cultural Centre in London is not unique. In fact, it is relevant to 
cultural centres in other megacities. In the ideal plan, the location needs to be strategic with 
easy access, convenient public transportation and, preferably, with links to other tourist spots 
to attract footfalls. The strategic location could benefit from attracting both casual visitors 
and audiences to the cultural centre. A location that meets these criteria is likely to be 
expensive in an international city. Moreover, property renovation may be required as not all 
venues meet the standards for professional artistic performances. Whether it is worthwhile to 
maintain a physical office for a cultural centre with limited budget is still debated. It remains 
a complicated challenge to utilise a space, attract audience, and engage with the local 
community.  
Nonetheless, finding a location is not the only challenge in preparation to open a 
cultural centre. As the Taiwan’s Government Procurement Act regulates public expense, 
service providers for the public sector must be decided via public procurement. Take the 
Cultural Centre in London as an example. The estate agent for property management in 
London needs to be chosen based on Government Procurement Act regulation. This makes 
the process even more complicated to find an appropriate agent, who is familiar with the 
housing market in London and Taiwan’s Government Procurement Act. Given that the 
brick-and-mortar cultural centre has been delayed, it provides an opportunity to think of 
alternative methods of operation. I suggest following the examples of New York and Paris, 
by acting as a bridge-builder and collaborating with local curators. This may be the most 
efficient way in London as well, and would allow the Cultural Centre in London to be more 
flexible to tap into the vibrant and diverse local cultural network. 
These administrative limitations and challenges raised questions about the best 
organisational structure of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. Currently, as the cultural centres and 
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Taiwan Academies are outposts of the MOC, its finance and personnel apply the same 
regulations of expense and recruitment in the Taiwanese government. Under the restraints of 
bureaucracy, it might result in unnecessary waste of time in administration and inflexibility 
and inefficiency. The challenges of policy implementation are further discussed in Chapter 7.  
Another important aspect is the cross-departmental collaboration in Taiwan’s 
overseas cultural offices. The main government department that is responsible for cultural 
diplomacy is the MOC. Moreover, the primary responsibilities of the Public Diplomacy 
Coordinating Council and Department of International Information Services in the MOFA are 
media relations and publications. Compared with countries like France and Austria, where 
the MOFA directs international cultural relations, the structure in Taiwan is different. In this 
case, the main ministry taking the lead in cultural diplomacy is the MOC, which is closer to 
the model in Singapore, where the Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts 
(which includes the National Arts Council) handles international cultural promotion and 
exchanges (Wyszomirski, 2003). Despite the fact cross-departmental collaboration was 
expected when the Taiwan Academy was launched, it remains unclear as to how it can 
function as a platform to operate among departments. 
In the Taiwanese representative offices or embassies, the representatives or 
ambassadors in each country are in charge of the expatriates appointed by different ministries. 
When it comes to promoting Taiwanese culture abroad, the ambassadors or representatives 
play a crucial role in deciding which area to prioritise. Thus, the priority can be exchanges in 
higher education, tourism, or Taiwanese cuisine (Anonymous#1, personal communication, 
2014). Cultural attachés appointed by the MOC are either under the authority of the cultural 
centres or the cultural divisions in representative offices. This is similar to France and 
Mexico, where the cultural attaché is housed within the embassy structure. The focus is on 
long-term relationship building, not trouble-shooting particular policies (Schneider, 2007). In 
Taiwan’s larger embassies and representative offices, there is sufficient staff allowance for 
most government departments to send their staff to cover different areas of work of the 
Taiwanese government. Therefore, the division of work can be clear and the ministries can 
directly communicate with their staff appointed to the host countries. Several government 
departments deploy officials to representative offices to cooperate with the MOFA. For 
instance, the Ministry of Education (MOE) is responsible for recruiting foreign students and 
collaborating with other international higher education institutions. Additionally, the 
Overseas Community Affairs Council (OCAC) works with Taiwanese and Chinese emigrants. 
These departments promote Taiwan’s public diplomacy through mass media and the 
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Taiwanese communities overseas. Government officials are under the same roof of 
representative offices. As Rawnsley (2000) observed, as regards government practice, the 
representative offices have a confusing structure; it is their respective head offices in Taipei, 
rather than the representatives themselves, who control the different divisions. In 2012, a new 
government regulation was passed allowing the ambassador or representative to supervise the 
expatriate officials from different government departments. In this way, the act enabled the 
ambassador or representative to have more power over all affairs in the host country. This 
can potentially reinforce an integrated cultural diplomacy strategy. 
However, cultural diplomacy projects are not exclusively realised by cultural attachés 
due to staff shortages and the limited numbers of cultural centres. In a smaller embassy or 
representative office, diplomats from the MOFA would need to cover projects initiated by 
other governmental departments. Whereas different departments need to negotiate with each 
other across the platform in Taipei, the ambassador or representative in the host country 
oversees the work of each cultural centre as part of the embassy. According to one of the 
interviewees, the ambassador is the most important person to decide the strategies in each 
country, thus building on local knowledge (Anonymous#1, personal communication, 2014). 
The cultural attachés that the MOC deploys to each overseas office are also under the 
authority of the embassy. Therefore, the cultural attachés need to report to both the 
ambassador and the MOC in Taipei. I also learnt from my interviewee (ibid.) that when the 
government officials work in the embassy or representative offices, the ambassador or the 
representative oversees their administrative work in the host countries. In smaller 
representative offices, the cultural officers may need to share more day-to-day administration 
rather than focus on cultural projects, and this increases their workload. Therefore, it 
becomes a challenge for cultural attachés to manage thoroughly their projects. That is to say, 
the officers need to report to both the ambassador/representative and the MOC. Regarding 
project management, the current organisation is inefficient in terms of project execution.  
The complicated administration structure to execute cultural diplomacy may result in 
presenting a confused national image overseas. Take gastrodiplomacy (see section 5.9) as an 
example; the effort to promote Taiwanese food was undermined by the food safety scandals. 
There is no integrated cross-departmental action for crisis management. Whilst the MOC 
only has 12 overseas offices (as of June 2017) and not in all the embassies, policy initiatives 
may not necessarily be carried out by the cultural attachés that it appoints. This also limits the 
efficiency of policy implementation and is unhelpful for to the MOC’s aim to broaden its 
reach in more countries.  
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Discussion of the challenges facing the implementation of cultural diplomacy abroad, 
serves as a context for examining similar administrative challenges in Taiwan. Even inside 
the MOC, there was a major change in cultural diplomacy personnel during the 
re-organisation in 2012. Subsequently, the rapid expansion in the number of overseas offices 
presented new challenges, especially for the staff that were transferred from the Government 
Information Office to the new cultural centres. First, the main objective of Taiwan’s 
diplomacy shifted from propaganda to cultural representation (as mentioned in section 1.1), 
which caused clashes between organisational cultures. Whilst the GIO was responsible for 
media relations and propaganda, the practice in CCA and GIO were distinctly different. For 
new cultural attachés who had previously worked in the GIO, the transition meant needing to 
acquire knowledge and skills for their new role. The core function of the GIO was 
international advertisement and propaganda, and the office works closely with central 
government in Taiwan. Although there was some overlap in cultural diplomacy work 
between the GIO and the MOC, such as communication with the media, their strategies were 
essentially different. From my fieldwork, I learnt that instead of contacting media for 
advertising, the new cultural attachés from the former GIO may need to build connections 
with museums, galleries, and theatres. To introduce a new artist from Taiwan to a gallery in 
the host country, they need to familiarise themselves with the local culture and have some 
knowledge of arts administration. In the Ministry of Culture, the Department of Cultural 
Exchange is responsible for communications with the cultural centres. The Department also 
needs to incorporate former GIO officers and CCA staff, in order to expand its professional 
skills during the employees’ service in the cultural centres. The employees appointed abroad 
would need to spend some time on a placement in the Department of Cultural Exchange in 
Taipei prior to their service overseas (Anonymous#1, personal communication, 2014). This 
also relates to the question of what professional knowledge and skills a cultural attaché 
should possess to fulfil his or her job, and whether the training from the MOC meets these 
requirements.  
Despite the large number of staff in the MOC, the problems of language deficiencies 
were identified. Whilst it is relatively easy for the MOC to find English and French speaking 
employees, it is difficult to find candidates in other languages. As the number of cultural 
centres expanded in 2012, there were challenges to fill the new vacancies. As a result, the 
Taiwanese government included senior vacancies in the civil service examination with the 
aim of recruiting cultural affairs officers specialised in other languages, such as German and 
Spanish. I also found in my fieldwork that the numbers of local staff in the cultural centres 
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are few and mainly responsible for subordinate functions (Yu, personal communication, 12 
December, 2013). It was suggested by Mitchell (1986) that local language skills would be 
strength in representation. However, such strength was not deployed in Taiwan’s cultural 
centres. To have the Taipei-appointed staff perform representational duties and seek 
collaboration and partnerships is the usual practice in the cultural centres. This work model 
can be less effective when engaging with the local community in the host countries, as there 
may be gaps between the staff rotation. The continuity that local staff provide can be 
beneficial for maintaining networks and compensating for the disadvantages of staff rotation. 
The media exposure of cultural activities plays an important role in the validation and 
evaluation in cultural centres. Staff members collect and archive newspaper or magazine 
clippings of reviews. In a list provided by the New York Cultural Center during my fieldwork 
in 2013, I noted several interesting facts. For instance, media coverage for each activity, 
including television reports and interviews, is categorised by language. Some prestigious 
media outlets are highlighted in the report, such as the New York Times and Financial Times. 
Take the opening of the Taiwan Gallery in the Queens Museum as an example. The New 
York Cultural Center recorded that there were over 20 news items in both Chinese and 
English media. In a clipping of the review by Holland Cotter in the New York Times, he 
praised the Taiwanese artist Chou Yu-Cheng as the ‘stand out’ in the exhibition – and this 
was highlighted by the staff (Cotter, 2013). I suggest that media relations and information 
gathering are important activities in a cultural centre’s daily work, not only to gain exposure, 
but also to establish a record of the work completed. It can also be observed that opinion 
leaders, such as reputable media, receive more attention from cultural centres. Their reviews 
and coverage carry more weight than others, and they represent recognition and a wider 
readership.  
Whilst receiving positive reviews for cultural activities overseas is important, it 
should also be reported in Taiwan. The news is not only collated by the cultural centres, but 
also released by the MOC in Taipei. For instance, in a press release published on the MOC 
website, it was reported the triumph of the Taiwan Season showcase hosted by the MOC in 
the Edinburgh Fringe Festival (Ministry of Culture, 2016). Particularly, Judith Mackrell of 
the Guardian recommended the Taiwan Season as one of the ‘three of the best……dance 
performances of this week,’ and commented ‘[t]he once insular culture of Taiwan is 
beginning to fizz with interesting dance energies’ (Mackrell, 2016). Again, it shows that 
reviews from reputable newspapers are much valued. In addition to the article in the 
Guardian, positive reviews from the British Theatre Guide and the Scotsman were also 
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mentioned. The news released by the MOC helped the cultural centres to publish their works 
in Taiwan. This not only creates a sense of participation for the Taiwanese audience, but it is 
also beneficial for the companies involved in the showcase to enhance their reputation back 
home. 
The communication between the MOC and cultural centres is crucial in their work 
promoting Taiwanese artists overseas. It is also essential for cultural attachés in the overseas 
cultural centres to keep up to date with Taiwanese cultural news. When the cultural centres 
operate abroad, regular meetings are held with the MOC in Taipei to familiarise both with the 
projects. For example, Director Susan Yu (personal communication, 12 December, 2013) of 
the New York Cultural Center revealed that the MOC would collate news and pass the 
information to them. However, the materials are often from traditional media, such as 
newspapers. As regards the Internet and social media, it often relies on individuals, especially 
younger staff members’ motivation and ability, to gather information and familiarise 
themselves with Taiwanese domestic cultural news.  
However, it also raises the question of whether the MOC provides sufficient 
information for directing and suggesting strategies for cultural centres. Director Chen 
(personal communication, 29 November, 2013) of the Paris Cultural Centre stated that the 
MOC should focus more on policy and strategy-making, especially based on scientific 
research. I would suggest the relations between the MOC and cultural centres can be more 
dynamic. Other than providing assistance to the day-to-day operation, the MOC can be more 
active in data collection and analysis for framing strategies. Also, it would be ideal for the 
cultural centres to build a database for further research. However, in the case of the Paris 
Cultural Centre, Dr Chen revealed that the manpower is insufficient to maintain a database. 
I found that in order to understand the artists and networks, the MOC relied on 
traditional journalism as the main source of information. The newspapers gathered by the 
MOC staff in Taipei remain the main source of information transmitted to cultural centres. As 
for social media, it depends on individual staff members’ own interests to facilitate the 
interaction with artists and companies (Yu, personal communication, 12 December, 2013). 
Thus, the cultural centres have not fully utilised social media. There is no evidence of official 
accounts on Facebook or Twitter engaging with existing and potential audiences. I argue that 
the inability to facilitate this interaction fails to respond to the need for immediate 
communication. If audience participation in certain cultural diplomacy activities can extend 
to discussion exchanged on social media, the effect can last longer, even after the programme 
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ends. There is further assessment of how social media can motivate individuals to participate 
in cultural relations in Chapter 6. 
Further to the operation in the cultural centres, I now turn to the issues of recruitment 
and the training of cultural attachés. In linking two cultures and fostering mutual 
understanding, the cultural attaché can serve as an inter-mediator, and such a job can be 
challenging. I would identify the key role of cultural attaché as an actor knowledgeable of 
cultures in both the home and host countries, and willing to build long-term relationships 
(Schneider, 2007). Therefore, he or she should have a vision not limited to short-term 
benefits or troubleshooting policies. However, it is important to determine whether the 
current recruitment and training procedure of Taiwan’s cultural attachés is able to identify 
and provide the skills needed. In the Global Outreach Action Plan, the shortage of ‘cultural 
translators’ and interpreters was considered a problem in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. It was 
illustrated the importance of ‘cultural translations,’ as it is important to render the content of 
Taiwanese culture into languages that foreign audience can understand and relate to in their 
daily lives. Therefore, I argue, to be a ‘cultural translator’ requires skills in cultural 
diplomacy with knowledge and vision. Although some diplomatic training might be helpful, 
such as acquiring knowledge on international relations, the job of cultural attaché is more 
complex. 
In the day-to-day job, the cultural attaché can be more like an arts administrator 
coordinating and negotiating between artists, partners and the institution he or she represents. 
Whilst the cultural attachés are serving in overseas cultural centres, they are expected to 
increase their work skills and competences. However, due to the rotation of cultural attachés 
and diplomats, there may not be sufficient time for them to become familiar with the host 
country. However, the interviewee in the MOC raised the concern that staying abroad for too 
long might result in becoming distant from domestic culture in Taiwan. Thus, a posting back 
in Taipei is better for cultural attachés’ professional skills (Anonymous#1, personal 
communication, 2 July, 2014). To be closer to Taiwanese artists and cultural professionals 
can help the cultural attachés understand how to introduce them overseas. Careful 
consideration of their deployment is therefore needed. 
To review the professional skills required by a cultural attaché, the recruitment 
process should first be considered. In the foreign cultural centres, the job vacancies and 
appointments for cultural officers from the MOC need the approval of the MOFA. The 
MOFA also decides the number of head counts allocated to each cultural centre to recruit 
cultural attachés. However, the MOC alone could not resolve the shortage in staff numbers. 
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Dr Chen Chih-cheng, the Director of the Paris Cultural Centre, expressed the view that the 
shortage was problematic for them to improve the administration process. For instance, he 
suggested the insufficient head count staffing results in work overload (Chen, personal 
communication, 29 November, 2013). The work overload prevents staff members from 
working to their full potential and leads them to follow a path of least resistance. Gradually, 
motivation for innovation withers. Nonetheless, this problem cannot be solved solely by the 
MOC and requires cross-departmental negotiation. 
Discussion of the recruitment criteria of cultural attachés reveals the knowledge that 
the MOC expects in the institutionalised process of staff training. To be qualified as a cultural 
attaché for appointment by the MOC to a cultural centre, the candidate needs adequate 
knowledge of the bureaucracy. First, he or she needs to have worked in the MOC over a set 
period (at least one full year as of 2015). The candidate can either be a civil servant, who has 
passed the civil service examination, or a contract employee with relevant academic and 
professional background. Candidates who hold an academic degree in the same language of 
the host country are preferable. Upon applying for the job, the candidates must have 
satisfactory work performance and language skills to work in the host country. The 
successful candidates will have placements in the Ministry and its sub-organisations, such as 
the National Museum of Taiwan History and National Museum of Taiwan Literature, to 
familiarise themselves with each department’s projects, along with language courses in 
Taiwan’s Institute of Diplomacy and International Affairs. Ideally, it is an opportunity for the 
candidates to discover potential projects of cultural exchange. However, the placements in 
the MOC’s sub-organisations are only for one day each; hence, this only provides an 
impression of these organisations and building connections.  
It is noteworthy that the training courses provided are mainly for understanding how 
the MOC and its sub-organisations operate. The knowledge of Taiwanese arts organisations 
and the culture in the host countries are not included in the course, nor is it required in the 
selection criteria. In other words, it is down to the individual candidates to gather information 
to prepare for their new job (Anonymous#2, personal communication, 17 December, 2013). 
As a result, how the cultural attachés perform in their job depends on motivation to engage 
with the culture in the host country. The training provided is at best elementary. The training 
in the MOC, I would argue, is not sufficient for cultural attachés.  
In addition to the MOC designed training sessions, the professional background of the 
cultural attachés and self-motivation are also important. Dr Chen Chih-cheng (personal 
communication, 29 November, 2013) recognised the benefit of the placements that the MOC 
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arranged, but he commented that it still depends on individual cultural attachés to ultilise the 
training they have received. He stressed the need to understand the context of history and 
culture when carrying out the job (ibid.). Former Director Ping Heng of the National Theatre 
(personal communication, 17 June, 2013) also addressed this problem of not contributing 
beyond administrative roles. The assistance provided by the Taiwanese government’s 
overseas offices is sometimes criticised as mere icing on the cake. This, she observed, is 
mostly due to the neglect of individuals’ strength and potential. Except for the familiarity 
with the MOC, to inspire cultural attachés in their mission can be an important task of 
training.  
To establish relationships, information gathering and research skills are often essential. 
However, not all government officials are capable. Director Ping further suggests that the 
cultural attaché needs to play the role of an arts administrator or curator to make cultural 
diplomacy work. For the desired characteristics to fulfil the job, establishing a personal 
knowledge base and networks are also important (Tchen, personal communication, 28 May, 
2013). It is also essential to link other resources, such as networking with people and venues, 
which requires proactivity and imagination (personal communication, 17 June, 2013). Ping 
further remarked: 
 
I think in terms of arts administration, it is at least 30 per cent ‘art’ and 70 per cent 
‘administration.’ You cannot work without the perspective of art. You probably work 
merely as ‘getting things done’ if you do not have it at all. Because in arts 
(administration), it means you need to work with people. Therefore, I think the 
understanding towards the company and to the person decides whether you have a 
successful collaboration or not. So imagination is important. If you talk to people and 
have in-depth understanding, it is very important. 
 
An ideal cultural attaché should have professional knowledge besides the 
requirements set by the MOC for selecting candidates. I was intrigued to realise the degree of 
autonomy a cultural attaché could have in the bureaucracy, their influence and how proactive 
they can be. Despite the limited number of staff and the workload of each employee, it also 
enables the cultural attaché to work closely with the director and to have more freedom to 
take initiatives on new projects with local organisations (Anonymous#2, personal 
communication, 17 December, 2013). In other words, the smaller organisation provides more 
flexibility to take initiatives. Once the project is approved by the director, the cultural centre 
reports back to the MOC and requests a budget allocation. This example illustrates the role a 
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cultural attaché could play to realise a project. Furthermore, such freedom and flexibility 
could further enhance confidence, whilst working on projects in cultural centres can be 
relatively organic compared with the projects in the MOC. Personal qualities are very 
important in staff members’ evaluation. The right person with passion, vision and 
professional skills could act as translator and connect two cultures together. 
 
5.7 Controversies surrounding the Flagship Production of the NTCH and 
Taiwan Pavilion at the Venice Biennial  
As a de facto sovereign country, Taiwan has limited access to participate in international 
cultural organisations as a member state. Nonetheless, the sub-organisations of the MOC, or 
other government-funded arts organisations, can still participate in professional networks as 
an institution. For example, the National Theatre and Concert Hall (NTCH) is a member of 
the Association of Asia Pacific Performing Arts Centers (AAPPAC), and the National Palace 
Museum is a member of the International Council of Museums (ICOM). Generally, these 
institutions enjoy more freedom in professional networks and festivals. Their presence is 
sometimes regarded as national representation. Examples of this are the Taiwan Pavilion at 
the Venice Biennial and the NTCH, both promoting Taiwanese art worldwide. Nonetheless, 
they provoked disagreements among artists, especially regarding their interpretation of 
Taiwanese culture. On the one hand, the two examples above have revealed concerns over 
public resource allocation. On the other hand, whether these institutions should decide how to 
represent Taiwanese culture became the focus of debate. 
The public funded or subsidised organisations can, nevertheless, be actors of 
international cultural engagement, either on their own or through participation in networks. 
The NTCH in Taipei participated in several major arts markets and networking, such as the 
Association of Performing Arts Presenters (APAP) in the United States, and helped to 
promote Taiwanese performing arts productions. Professional networks provide 
understanding of the latest trends in the arts market. Professional performing arts agencies 
and theatres facilitate the exchange of information and opportunity to seek potential 
programme buyers. This increases the cultural presence of Taiwan through professional 
networks. For instance, such programmes can be staged at local arts venues and thus reach 
greater audiences.  
The Taiwan Pavilion at the Venice Biennial has differed from other national pavilions. 
Taipei Fine Arts Museum (TFAM), the municipal arts museum of the Taipei City 
Government, has curated the Taiwan Pavilion since 1995. After the first participation in the 
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Venice Biennial in 1995, Taiwan was added to the official pavilions under the name of ROC 
Taiwan-Taipei. However, due to China’s objections, the Taiwan pavilion was forced to 
abandon national pavilion status and was listed as a ‘Collateral Event’ in 2003 (P. Lu, 2013). 
I found that even in international cultural activities, the disputes over Taiwan’s sovereignty 
remain. Although the Taiwan Pavilion was curated by the municipal government instead of 
central government, the use of Taiwan’s official name and the pavilion’s status were objected 
to by the Chinese government. 
This special status of the Taiwan Pavilion also related to its curation. Schoeber (2009), 
in a study of the curating of the Taiwan Pavilion in the 1990s, pointed out that unlike other 
single nation pavilions, which tried to present the strongest or at least most famous artist of a 
given country, the Taiwan Pavilion had a tendency to recreate a complex microcosm of 
Taiwanese identity within each show. The model of national representation established in the 
mid-1990s at the Venice Biennial represented a mix dictated by local political correctness. 
That is to say, the curating deliberately included a mix of artists from the south of the country, 
and artists representing different trends and media. This pattern continues to be applied in the 
new millennium. Pei-Yi Lu (2013) also observed that ‘Taiwan’ had been highlighted at the 
three Taiwan Pavilions of the Venice Biennial in 1995, 1997 and 1999. She further pointed 
out that the Taiwan Pavilion used artworks to illustrate the characteristics of Taiwanese 
culture and society. Thus, as Pei-Yi Lu (ibid.) suggested, the Taiwan Pavilion is also meant to 
recall the consciousness of Taiwan and to construct the imagined community of the ‘New 
Taiwanese’ for domestic audiences in Taiwan. To extend Pei-Yi Lu’s analysis, I regard the 
national pavilion as constructing channels of Taiwanese cultural identity. For the external 
audience at the Venice Biennial, the Taiwan Pavilion has served as a showcase for curated 
Taiwanese art. Also, through this presentation, the government delivers the message to a 
domestic audience that part of Taiwanese culture can be visible and recognised in the 
international cultural arena.  
However, as a public-funded pavilion, there are some responsibilities of curating. The 
representation of an impartial image of Taiwan requires a subtle political correctness in the 
curating of the Taiwan Pavilion. The political correctness observed by Schoeber (2009) could 
be analysed from several perspectives: the distribution of public resources and the idea of 
creating a widely-approved cultural identity. The former can be the budget allocation and the 
latter can be interpreted as the image of Taiwan. To select only a single strongest artist as the 
representative of the national pavilion would not be the image that TFAM wants to project, 
and might be criticised as too partial for government funding allocation. 
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The burdens of political correctness and funding distribution were significant aspects 
of the controversy of the Taiwan Pavilion at the Venice Biennial in 2013. The curator, Esther 
Lu, who proposed the title ‘This Is Not a Taiwan Pavilion,’ attempted to incorporate the 
ambiguity of the Taiwan Pavilion in its content. As Pei-Yi Lu (2013, p.43) noted, ‘the 
Taiwan Pavilion shifted its attention from promoting Taiwan via the idea of “Taiwaneseness” 
to displaying its uncertain international status.’ The ambiguity of Taiwan’s international 
status has become the subject of curating. To emphasise the negotiable identity and further 
address the main concerns of the dialectic process of the paradoxes of the ‘stranger and us,’ 
Esther Lu invited foreign artists to represent the Taiwan Pavilion. In a statement on the 
curatorial concept, she indicated that the title of this project suggested a new proposal for the 
Taiwan Pavilion’s repositioning, and a break from incoherent and impotent national 
representation (E. Lu, 2013). Esther Lu confronted the ambiguity of Taiwan Pavilion’s status 
at the Venice Biennale as it had no official account and did not qualify for the Golden Lion 
prize. The hierarchical structure of the Biennale, as she noted, corresponds to the 
international power network. I would suggest this challenged the official strategy to frame 
and present Taiwanese cultural identity internationally, and the curating did not follow the 
pattern of two-way identity construction.  
Esther Lu’s choice confronted the delicate complexity of Taiwan’s cultural identity 
framing. Nonetheless, the choice of artists triggered controversy not only because two of the 
three artists were not Taiwanese nationals, but also the selection and administration process. 
The use of public funding for the Taiwan Pavilion, whether it is a showcase of Taiwanese art, 
still can be examined within the domain of government resource distribution. The question 
‘what is a Taiwan Pavilion?’ can certainly be de-constructed from multiple perspectives, 
aesthetic, ideological, or political. The mission and impact of the Taiwan Pavilion remains 
unknown except for the exposure and participation in the Venice Biennial. My observation is 
that when resource allocation decisions are challenged, there is a tendency for the Taiwanese 
government to be more conservative to avoid controversy. The case of the Taiwan Pavilion at 
the Venice Biennial suggests that the overall operation procedure was restricted to avoid risk. 
Also, the decision-making in public funding allocation can be too superficial by simply 
providing a bursary, therefore failing to engage and communicate.  
The case of the Taiwan Pavilion shows that the relationship between resource 
allocation and the engagement of foreign artists can be sensitive. A relevant example is the 
‘Flagship Production’ of the National Theatre and Concert Hall in Taipei. Unlike Taipei Fine 
Arts Museum or the Ministry of Culture, the National Theatre enjoys more flexibility in 
 139 
finance and personnel decisions. The National Theatre and Concert Hall (NTCH) was 
formerly known as the National Chiang Kai-Shek Cultural Centre, but renamed as the 
National Theater and Concert Hall as part of the National Performing Arts Centre in 2014. 
The NTCH was formerly a government-funded cultural centre established in 1987. During 
the past decades, the National Theatre fulfilled multiple functions as a production house and a 
venue. In its programming, the NTCH often co-produces works with arts companies, or 
simply rents the venue out to arts agencies. Due to the changes of government policy and 
short-term directorship, there were few long and continuous projects. The role of the NTCH 
was often debated. With the aim to increase flexibility in recruitment and programming, the 
cultural centre became the first administrative corporation (xingzhengfaren) in Taiwan when 
it underwent organisational reform in 2004. Financially, the administrative corporation 
system was designed for the organisation to receive partial funding from government and to 
seek sponsorship from the private sector. In terms of programming and project execution, the 
NTCH could adjust its organisational structure and have effective budget control (Tchen, 
2010). Thus, compared with other public arts organisations with full funding from 
government, the NTCH has enjoyed more freedom for programming and curating.  
The key person of the NTCH’s international production was Tchen Yu-chiou. 
Following her position as chairperson of Cultural Affairs, Tchen Yu-chiou became 
chairperson of the board of directors in the National Theatre and Concert Hall in 2007. With 
her professional background as a pianist, she organised large-scale international 
co-productions in the late 2000s. Her strategy was to collaborate with famous Western artists, 
such as Robert Wilson and Suzuki Tadashi, to produce works with local Taiwanese. In her 
opinion, inviting foreign companies to tour in Taiwan or vice versa is nothing more than 
superficial cultural exchange. In order to encourage deeper cultural exchange, she instead 
chose to create opportunities for artists to produce works together. Tchen Yu-chiou 
considered mutual understanding essential when collaborating; this was the key difference in 
changing others’ views. She coordinated the Flagship Production and insisted on 
incorporating elements of Taiwan, either stories or actors. When encouraging collaboration, 
she would show the foreign artists around and let them discover potential collaborators. A 
good working relation is vital, and this could not be spontaneously achieved by simply 
selecting individuals to work together (Tchen, personal communication, 28 May, 2013).  
According to the National Theatre’s report, the Flagship Production aimed at 
producing a large-scale project to enrich cross-national and multidiscipline arts, to present the 
core value of Taiwanese culture, and to establish a Taiwan brand (National Chiang Kai-Shek 
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Cultural Centre, 2010). Whilst collaborating with foreign theatre directors, the Flagship 
Production provided opportunities for Taiwanese artists, arts companies and the theatre itself 
to participate in large-scale international co-productions. Between 2007 and 2011, nine 
productions were staged. The famous artists and the financial scale drew much attention in 
Taiwan’s theatres.   
However, the Flagship Production was not without criticism. The project was 
innovative and ambitious, whilst the nature of international co-production is challenging and 
expensive. It was not possible to predict whether the production would be well received. 
With the hope to ‘establish a brand of Taiwan,’ the ‘Flagship’ was expected to tour other 
countries. The collaboration model between the National Theatre and foreign artists raised 
doubts after the Flagship Production in 2011. The theatre staged La traviata, directed by 
Suzuki Tadashi, in which Taiwanese popular songs were incorporated for the new production. 
This production was fiercely attacked by Taiwanese critic Yang Chong-Heng and received 
unprecedented media attention about the purpose of the Flagship Production and its impact. 
Furthermore, it was questioned whether the Flagship Production absorbed too much of the 
National Theatre’s budget. In response to the criticism, the National Theatre hosted a 
roundtable forum to discuss the future of the Flagship Production. In the forum, several key 
issues were raised. Some questioned the ideology behind the production: Can foreign artists 
help to establish the identity of Taiwanese culture? Do the productions represent Taiwanese 
culture? Some questions focused on the overall theatre management and administration: Did 
the National Theatre favour foreign artists instead of local Taiwanese artists? What kind of 
role should the National Theatre play in cross-cultural production? Did the theatre have the 
capacity to be a production house for the Flagship Production? (Gao & Tsou, 2011). This not 
only challenged the objectives of the Flagship Production, but also raised the fundamental 
question: How can Taiwanese culture be presented? These debates again focused on how 
Taiwanese culture should be promoted. The conflict was between the internal cultural 
institutions of Taiwan. Who has the power to interpret or invent Taiwanese culture? The 
large-scale institutions with power and budget have more chance to frame the discourse, but 
fellow artists may not agree.  
Although the NTCH could achieve its set goals with more financial flexibility 
because of its corporation status, there are challenges in its administration. As long as it 
receives government funding, its spending is under scrutiny from the public sector. In the 
roundtable forum after La Traviata, it was suggested that the process of an 
intercultural/cross-cultural production should count for more than the final work. As an 
 141 
institution, the NTCH could act as a platform, rather than a producer. The Flagship 
Production is considered innovative and experimental, and an opportunity to assemble the 
best practitioners. However, due to their specialisation, it is unlikely for the production to 
tour or to have an extended run. Although business value in the productions might not be the 
major concern of a subsidised theatre, a limited run in the NTCH does not unlock the full 
potential of these productions.   
The discussion above is indicative of what has been achieved, and what it means for 
the artists and arts organisations in the process. First, in terms of cultural exchange, the 
international collaborations between artists have an impact on both sides. For cultural 
professionals working internationally, some distinct advantages include gaining knowledge 
(Nisbett, 2015). These advantages are beyond the economic value of the final product of 
international collaboration. However, it would take long-term and continuous observation to 
evaluate their impact.  
Secondly, while heavily subsidised by the government, the international 
collaborations of the NTCH have more financial freedom to be innovative. To encourage the 
artists from different cultures to collaborate with each other, the NTCH allows them to 
exchange ideas without having financial concerns. I argue that these encounters between 
artists can bring positive changes for both sides, and benefit their creativity. 
Thirdly, the idea of ‘serving as a platform’ has been proposed for the role of Taiwan’s 
overseas cultural centres and the NTCH. Both institutions can provide resources for artists to 
collaborate with each other. Instead of producing one-off productions and events, it is more 
important to establish a network and empower artists and companies. However, if 
international collaborations are deemed as innovative and experimental, the final product is 
hard to predict, and most probably would not please everyone. With the aim to establish 
mutual understanding, it is essential to provide an opportunity for artists to break boundaries. 
Overall, it nurtures Taiwan’s arts and culture, but the effect may not be observed instantly. 
The idea of boundary-breaking was echoed by one of my interviewees. Former 
Artistic Director of the National Theatre and Concert Hall, Ms Ping Heng, shared her views 
on co-producing inter-cultural projects. She argued that the National Theatre could seek more 
opportunities for co-production with foreign artists or arts companies, in which Taiwanese 
artists could participate. Therefore, Taiwanese artists can have more cultural exchange with 
their counterparts. She illustrated the advantages of cross-cultural co-productions (Ping, 
personal communication, 17 June, 2013) as they provided opportunities for artists to 
communicate and try something different. She believed it beneficial for both parties. The 
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important tasks in the process include learning to share ideas and compromising in the 
process. Such a process would be the starting point for new developments and learning.  
Building connections and engaging in networks is important but also challenging. Ms 
Ping Heng (personal communication, 17 June, 2013) observed that collaboration with the 
global networks exist not only between organisations, but also networks. It would be very 
difficult for a single organisation to develop networks by simply reaching out. It takes a long 
time to build trust and further cooperation. An intermediate organisation can provide a 
platform to introduce and recognise opportunities. With this platform, it is easier for potential 
collaborators to know each other and further arrange performances, co-productions, etc. Both 
sides can also benefit from enlarging their networks. 
In addition, it takes time to build and maintain a network, and constantly changing the 
director makes this difficult. In the interviews with Ms Ping Heng and Dr Chen Chih-cheng, 
they both mentioned that in Europe it is common for the directorship in a theatre or cultural 
centre to extend more than a decade; in contrast, it is extremely rare in Taiwan. For example, 
both the term of directorship in the NTCH and overseas cultural centres is four years. Under 
such circumstances, it is a challenge for the directors to maintain or even expand the 
networks within their limited and comparatively short term in office. On the other hand, as 
the directorships are relatively short-term, it is Ms Ping’s observation that senior members in 
the organisation are key to maintaining connections. Therefore, I suggest that the institution 
needs to incorporate networking into its operation planning and further sustain its 
connections. 
As the NTCH and cultural centres aim to serve as platforms, it is worth noting that the 
choice of directors can introduce different approaches to facilitating cultural collaboration. 
Although the short-term directorship has disadvantages, the limited contact with bureaucracy 
can maintain momentum for new ideas and expertise. For example, both Ms Ping and Dr 
Chen worked in academia prior to their appointment to the NTCH and Paris Cultural Centre 
respectively. Combining their academic training and expertise into the operation of these 
organisations was helpful in generating new ideas for cultural collaboration and networking. 
    
5.8 Combining nation branding with the film industries 
In Section 5.2, I briefly discussed the Taiwanese government’s plan to develop the cultural 
and creative industries (CCI) in Taiwan. This is an important policy initiative attempting to 
generate add-on values for Taiwan’s cultural industries. Whilst Taiwan has enjoyed 
economic success in technology and production, to foster and promote its CCI can be 
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considered a transition. Although the performing arts and visual arts have long been 
prioritised in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy, Taiwanese literature and the film industry also 
receive government funding for overseas promotion. However, the two cultural products can 
be more widely distributed and serve as a powerful means of communicating Taiwanese 
culture. In this section, I examine how the strategy of official policy implementation in 
cultural diplomacy has changed with the introduction of CCI policies and the incorporation of 
nation branding. The case of ‘Gourmet Taiwan,’ which promoted Taiwanese food worldwide, 
is illustrated as an example of government policy implementation, combining nation branding 
with food culture. 
In terms of projecting the national image overseas, Taiwan’s international propaganda 
started as early as the 1950s. Different themes featured in external communications reflecting 
how the government wished to be recognised. Established in 1947, the Government 
Information Office (GIO) had been the primary government department responsible for 
international communications and advertisement. Taiwanese scholar Cheng Tzu-Leong (2007) 
studied Taiwan’s overseas propaganda and marketing. Firstly, foreign communications in the 
1950s focused on anti-communism and retaining the ROC’s seat in the United Nations. As 
Rawnsley (2000) noted, during the late 1950s and 1960s, there was an identifiable shift in 
opinion in favour of Beijing worldwide, and support for the People’s Republic of China to be 
the representative of China in the UN. Secondly, in Cheng’s (2007) analysis, consequent to 
ROC’s exit of the UN in 1971, the political message of these campaigns was to project the 
ROC as the ‘Free China’. Cheng (ibid.) also illustrated that maintaining relations with the 
United States was the main goal of the political advertisements in 1970s.  
Besides the political appeals, the perceived image of Taiwan products was not entirely 
positive. For example, in the Hollywood movie Fatal Attraction (1987), the ‘Made in Taiwan’ 
umbrella failed to do its job in a theme in the movie. However, the situation seemed to 
improve in another American movie Armageddon (1998) as Taiwan became the real 
country-of-origin, i.e. where the product comes from, for the machine components of the 
space stations deployed from different countries of the world. Although there were still some 
problems with the machine, it was eventually fixed and the world was saved. In my view, 
these examples from Hollywood movies are interesting because they reflect how Taiwanese 
products were received in the 1980s and 1990s. Also, with its worldwide distribution, it 
helped to shape an image of Taiwanese products for a global audience – although it may not 
have been beneficial for selling products.  
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Nonetheless, from labour-intensive products to the development of Information 
Technology manufacturing, a strong and vivid brand image of Taiwanese products was 
absent. One of the reasons for not having a strong brand was the business model of 
Taiwanese manufacturing. Although Taiwan was renowned for its economic success of the 
1990s, most of the manufacturers are Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM). Rapid 
industrialisation has increased the strength of Taiwan’s small and medium-size enterprises 
(SMEs) and further contributed to the ‘Taiwan Miracle’ (Chung, 2012). The industries fit into 
a business-to-business model rather than business-to-consumer model. By manufacturing and 
providing parts to other brands’ end products, many industries do not need to invest much in 
brand recognition. However, as Anholt (2010) pointed out, Taiwan did not accomplish the 
decades-long task of developing the capacity to produce world-class consumer goods, and to 
distribute and market them worldwide with sufficient customer service capability. It is not yet 
seen as the powerful country of origin of such goods. On the contrary, only a handful of 
Taiwanese firms have ventured into brand-name marketing in Taiwan’s computer 
manufacturing industry (Amine & Chao, 2005). Although technology equipment 
manufacturing represents a large share of Taiwan’s economy, few are international brands 
despite the scale of the industry. In the case of Taiwanese consumer electronics brand Acer, 
Amine and Chao (ibid.) discovered that it is difficult to serve the OEM clients whilst creating 
the brand-name market simultaneously due to possible conflict of interest. In other words, the 
OEM clients would consider the brand-making companies as competitors. Whilst these 
companies prefer to remain as anonymous manufacturers, it is difficult for worldwide 
consumers to appreciate the quality of Taiwanese products. As few Taiwanese brands are 
visible in the global consumer market, it is also difficult to associate them with a stronger 
national image. In addition, the companies may not partner with government to enhance their 
brand image if they choose to stay in the OEM market.  
Campaigning and advertising for business have been part of Taiwan’s international 
communication for several decades. However, there are few, if any, follow-up surveys or 
opinion-polls for understanding Taiwan’s image overseas. To change a nation’s image is 
neither easy nor quick; the process is like ‘a drop in the ocean’ (Anholt, 2003). However, the 
problem of not having the data to understand the perceived image might be worse, as there is 
no evidence for verifying whether the advertisement works. One exception was a research 
project in 2005, which was commissioned by the Taiwanese government with the aim of 
understanding how Taiwan was perceived overseas. The Gallup organisation conducted a 
multinational (United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, France and Germany) survey for 
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Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in New York. The research aimed to find out whether 
Taiwan’s strong participation in the global economy had fostered considerable goodwill 
worldwide towards the Taiwanese. The survey consisted of approximately 1,500 respondents 
and 200 opinion leaders in each country. The opinion leaders were from religious groups, 
labour organisations, government, academia, business and media (Crabtree, 2005). In the 
published report, Made in Taiwan: Positive Global Impressions, it was reported that 
‘respondents in the five countries are most likely to agree Taiwan is "technologically 
developed" and "has good food, interesting attractions, and beautiful scenery”’(ibid.). 
Furthermore, the political relationship between Taiwan and China was included in the same 
survey. The respondents were asked whether they understood ‘Taiwan and China are two 
separate countries’ or ‘Taiwan is part of China’ (Crabtree, 2006). In this report, the original 
set of questions was not disclosed; therefore, it is not possible to know whether questions 
about Taiwanese culture were included, or the respondents were aware of the activities of 
promoting Taiwanese culture overseas. Except for the public report, other documents relevant 
to this survey were not accessible.   
To further promote products made in Taiwan, the Taiwanese government stepped in 
and the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) launched the Branding Taiwan Campaign. 
The MOEA has worked with British business consulting company Interbrand and conducted 
brand valuation for Taiwanese brands (Industrial Development Bureau, 2013). According to 
the MOEA data, ASUS, Trend Micro, ACER and HTC were listed as the top five most 
valuable Taiwanese brands between 2007 and 2014. However, whether these companies 
recognise themselves as a Taiwanese brand is not entirely clear. The founder and Chief 
Executive Officer of HTC, Ms Cher Wang publicly said that HTC is a brand ‘created by 
Chinese (zhongguoren),’ in 2010, when she gave a talk in China. As Wang herself was born 
in Taiwan and HTC is also headquartered in Taiwan, her declaration raised controversy. As 
many Taiwanese companies own plants or sub-contract companies in mainland China, the 
relationship between business and politics is intertwined. Wang’s brand position could be 
interpreted from multiple perspectives: her personal identity, political orientation, the HTC 
brand identity, or simply the rhetorical statement. This was a sensitive issue in Taiwan as it 
raised questions about national identity, and the complicated relations with China.  
The previous discussions reveal that structural issues of corporation scale and industry 
supply chain were weaknesses that prevented national brand-building. As well-known brands 
in Taiwan are mainly in the IT industry, not many products or services are easily related to 
end-users. In addition, most Taiwanese manufacturing businesses are either Original 
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Equipment Manufacturers or small and medium-size enterprises that would not have the 
capacity to manage their own international brand images. Most important of all, there might 
be political or strategic concerns for the companies to avoid self-identification as a Taiwanese 
brand. Although the Ministry of Economic Affairs continuously invests in image advertising 
overseas, the actual impact of the campaign remains uncertain.     
The government’s main reason for commissioning this research was to know more 
about Taiwan’s image in terms of politics and economy. Whether political and economic 
achievements are factors of attraction, or how perception influences respondents’ actions, 
such as choice of tourist destination and consumption, remains unknown from the report. 
There have been no government-commissioned follow-up surveys since this Gallup research 
project.  
Moreover, it is difficult to know whether the government advertisement campaign 
motivated people to visit Taiwan or buy Taiwanese products. Kotler and Gertner (2002) 
illustrated that country names can help consumers evaluate products and make purchasing 
decisions. Despite the scholarly literature in support of the theories of place branding, there is 
little evidence to verify this also applied to Taiwan, or whether the consumers know the 
difference between ‘Made in Taiwan’ and ‘Made in China’. In addition, a country’s image in 
people’s mind can be difficult to change, as they are more likely to pay attention to 
information that confirms their expectations (ibid.). People might not feel inclined to look for 
information about a country, and whether the government can successfully motivate them to 
learn about places requires marketing skills (Anholt, 2007). Therefore, it is difficult to know 
whether the marketing strategy of the Taiwanese government is effective.  
In addition to manufacturing and political campaigns, culture became one of the 
themes of Taiwan’s nation branding in the 1990s. For instance, the government’s promotion 
in 1991 praised Chinese culture preserved in Taiwan (Cheng, 2007). This corresponds to 
other campaigns, such as that concerning ‘the Potential World Heritage Sites in Taiwan,’ 
which began in 2003, and tourism in the 2000s, ‘Taiwan Touch Your Heart,’ which 
emphasised the hospitality of the Taiwanese people towards tourists. Cheng (ibid.) pointed 
out that there were also advertisements featuring technology and culture in Taiwan, which 
matched the policy plan on cultural and creative industries launched in 2002. Tracking the 
changes of government campaigns also shows that the Taiwanese government put more 
emphasis on the promotion of tourism and cultural industry after 2002.  
Besides literature, the government also provided financial aid for content-generation 
in the film industry. Taiwanese films have played a significant role in cultural diplomacy and 
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gained more attention as a cultural product. As an art form, cinema reaches both literate and 
illiterate members of a community as it combines visual images and the spoken word. This 
also makes cinema more exportable across cultural borders (Yip, 2004). In relation to the 
early agenda of cultural diplomacy, Yip (2004) explained that the Taiwanese government 
gave considerable support to films. The film industry, which has been hugely influenced by 
government policy, is an important part of Taiwan’s foreign cultural relations.   
In the early 1990s, Taiwanese films enjoyed success at world-famous festivals and 
nominations for important film awards. One significant change in the GIO grant occurred as a 
result of Ang Lee’s family trilogy (Pushing Hands, The Wedding Banquet and Eat Drink Man 
Woman). Despite the fact that the films were chiefly funded by the Central Motion Picture in 
Taiwan and represented Taiwan in several major film festivals, Lee’s family trilogy had a 
global audience, with a multinational crew, storyline and marketing strategies (Ma, 1996). 
Lee gained opportunities to direct Hollywood films and, consequently, won several major 
awards and generated business revenue. His model of working with a multinational crew and 
global marketing strategies also applied to his later works, despite some films being based on 
Chinese stories (e.g. Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon in 2000 and Lust, Caution in 2007) 
(ibid.).  
To reach communities both locally and globally, moviemakers need to engage in a 
vast array of commercial networks, including arrangements between financial institutions, 
elaborate systems of production, distribution and exhibition. The networking also includes 
the political activities of the nation-state, such as complex international trade agreements, and 
questions of import and export quotas (Yip, 2004). Following the successful award-winning 
period of Taiwanese movies, the GIO and the current MOC still provide funding and 
assistance for film producers who are willing to participate in overseas festivals. One of the 
most recent examples was Hou Hsiao Hsien’s The Assassin, which won the Best Director 
award at the 2015 Cannes Film Festival. Other than film festivals, the MOC designed a 
Taiwanese Film Toolkit for schools and universities to screen films for education or 
not-for-profit uses. The Taiwan Academy in Los Angeles often hosts film screenings with 
talks from the filmmakers. Compared with a large-scale commercial release, this kind of 
screening engages with small groups of audience, who wish to interact with the filmmakers. 
For Taiwanese filmmakers, they are motivated to enter international film festivals not 
simply to raise their profile, but also profits. In terms of international promotion of 
Taiwanese film, the government provides funding and cash awards for award-winning 
produtions as encouragement. The financial support for participating in major film festivals 
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also lowers the entry barrier for film companies to establish connections with foreign 
networks. Notable Taiwanese film directors, such as Hou Hsiao Hsien and Edward Yang, 
have been recognised in international film festivals for years. According to Wei (2008), 
Hsien’s experiences are an example of Taiwan’s film industry. As one of the central figures 
of Taiwan New Cinema (TNC), since its emergence in the early 1980s, Hsien’s Golden Lion 
Award at the 1989 Venice Film Festival confirmed his status both at home and worldwide. 
As Wei (2008) illustrated, to obtain a prize from a major international film festival can be 
important for filmmakers as they receive a reward from the Taiwanese government and this 
increases their chances at the domestic box-office. Although the returns can be unpredictable, 
aiming at overseas markets or film festivals has become normal practice and a profitable 
strategy for some art film directors.  
Despite the number of prizes won by Taiwan films at festivals in the 1990s, the film 
industry did not enter a prosperous era. Although the TNC could not expand its popularity, 
other film directors similarly orientated themselves towards the international art film market 
and freely explored their own artistic objectives, but kept a distance from local audiences in 
Taiwan (Wei, 2005). However, Wei (ibid.) also pointed out a blind spot for promoting 
Taiwanese art films overseas, as international film capitals and markets do not need so many 
art film directors from a single place. In other words, despite the artistic achievement of these 
film directors, they may not enjoy personal popularity in either the art film market or in the 
domestic market in Taiwan. Thus, the strategy has raised the artistic reputation of Taiwan’s 
art films, but not necessarily resulted in business success.  
It can be argued that despite government financial support for filmmakers to 
participate in international film festivals or to make new films, these do not necessarily enjoy 
much market success in Taiwan. There were similar issues, as Davis and Yeh (2008) pointed 
out, in mainland China, Taiwan and South Korea. As government is not immune to the forces 
of globalisation, it is playing multiple roles in the market. It is no longer just a regulator, 
monitoring corporate behaviour and the progress of marketisation. The change often results 
in contradictions and ambiguities. There are two aspects: one is the content of the film itself. 
First, if the film is aimed at film festivals, it may intentionally deal with issues distant from a 
domestic audience. On the other hand, with little or no regulation of the number of foreign 
films shown in Taiwan, locally-made films may not be able to compete with major 
Hollywood productions. The government could not regulate foreign film imports due to trade 
agreements and this fact could undermine its efforts to support Taiwanese film. Since 
Taiwan’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2002, the issue is more obvious. As 
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Berry (2009) showed, the industry has been absorbed and integrated into the global film 
culture and economy. Hollywood’s share of the global box office has risen steadily as the 
result of successful lobbying and breaking down protectionist measures, and Taiwan is no 
exception. With these disadvantages, the Taiwanese film industry faces challenges not only 
in domestic but also global markets. Although there were occasions when Taiwanese films 
enjoyed rare economic success in the domestic market or positive response from the audience 
afterwards, they did not attract much attention in film festivals or foreign markets for selling 
distribution rights.   
In addition to promoting the Taiwanese film as a cultural product, branding cities 
through film has become part of the place-branding strategy. Nation branding is considered 
similar to public diplomacy, as it also communicates ideas to foreign audiences (Melissen, 
2005). However, Anholt (2010) argued that place branding is not about communication but 
policies. He also suggested that in order to enhance reputation, the formation of a national 
image must be coupled with strategy and frequent symbolic actions. In Taiwan, Taipei City 
and Kaohsiung, for example, both hosted large-scale sporting events for self-promotion in 
2009. In relation to the government’s dedicated strategy, Hsien’s A City of Sadness boosted 
the tourism of Jiufen in Keelung County in Northern Taiwan. Jiufen has become a popular 
tourist spot following the release of A City of Sadness in several international film festivals in 
1989. However, Hsien once expressed his guilt at the changes in the city landscape because 
of the film’s success. He lamented that the considerable growth in tourism turned the once 
quiet town into a tourist hotspot and subsequently it lost its beauty (Lin, 2008). Increased 
tourism in Jiufen was not the original intention, but it showed the effect of place branding in 
films.  
A more recent example of city branding in filmmaking was Ang Lee’s Life of Pi, 
which provides a new model of collaboration between government and filmmakers. With 
Lee’s international reputation, the Taiwanese government spared no effort assisting his shoot 
in Taichung. A decommissioned military airport was transformed into a temporary studio for 
the film production. Lee’s Hollywood production team also cooperated with local companies 
in Taiwan (Poon, 2013). The government expected that Lee’s film would attract more foreign 
directors and film companies for shoots and post-production (Hau & Lin, 2015). I argue that 
the example of Life of Pi demonstrates that place branding in films developed as a new 
approach in Taiwan. In addition to tourism, film production is also considered an important 
element in the overall strategy of city branding. 
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Further to the example of Life of Pi, cities also aspire to cultural branding. The 
successful collaboration helped the post-production industry in Taichung. In addition to 
Taichung, the municipal governments of Taipei and Kaohsiung also set up designated 
departments to help film workers and to feature cities in productions. Instead of a top-down 
policy implementation, municipalities have their own city-branding strategies. In terms of 
global cultural diplomacy, cities could have more flexibility, whilst it may be difficult to 
participate as a country. Other than nation branding in different cultural industry categories, 
cities such as Taipei, Taichung and Kaohsiung also aim to promote themselves in major 
events and film productions. The promotion of Taiwan has shifted from ‘through film themes’ 
to ‘through filmmaking,’ which places the country in the global supply chain of the film 
industry. As with other place-branding projects, it is difficult to determine whether the 
strategy brings the desired outcome in the short term. 
However, the strategy of incorporating Taiwan in the film production supply chain 
can be problematic. As reported by Chun-Shao Lin (2012), in Taiwanese magazine Business 
Weekly, one of the strengths of Taiwan has been low cost and efficiency. For instance, the 
scaffolding needed in a production made in Taiwan could reduce cost by one-third without 
compromising quality. This, however, raises doubt about the advantage of cheaper labour and 
whether the film industry is duplicating the manufacturing industry. In other words, if other 
Hollywood film companies would like to move their post-production process to Taiwan 
because of cheaper labour, then the generated job opportunities are not necessarily as great as 
the government expects. For local film workers, it is not beneficial in terms of increasing 
either their skills or income. As regards outsourcing different parts of a film production to 
Taiwan, the filmmakers enjoy the advantages of globalisation, but this may not be an ideal 
practice for related cultural industry workers.  
The incorporation of film production and place branding marked a shift in subsidising 
filmmaking to recognise the economic value of the film industry. From the perspective of 
filmmaking, a film cannot be made without government funding. However, the way in which 
government subsidy is allocated reflects fundamental government policy. To subsidise a 
famous director’s work could help increase its exposure on a larger scale; nevertheless, it is 
debatable whether funds have been allocated to the best recipients. Undoubtedly, providing 
subsidy or equipment would attract filmmakers to Taiwan and potentially generate more job 
opportunities and tourism. However, there is a lack of information to justify this assumption. 
In the context of subsidising film directors, this may have relevance to the Flagship 
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Production of the NTCH (see section 5.7). When it comes to resource distribution, it may be 
argued that instead of providing funding for internationally recognised directors, government 
could give funding to emerging young Taiwanese filmmakers. Although it takes time for 
place branding to take effect, the government still needs to be aware of whether the 
subsidising strategy benefits local tourism and related industries.  
 
5.9 The Gourmet Taiwan food promotion project and its 
counter-advertisement 
In addition to filmmaking, gastronomy has become part of Taiwan’s place-branding strategy. 
With the expectation to promote tourism and boost exports, food has also been used as a 
distinct strategy for branding Taiwan internationally. In 2010, the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs (MOEA) launched the ‘Gourmet Taiwan’ four-year action plan to promote Taiwanese 
food globally. According to the government-released ‘Gourmet Taiwan’ plan, the Taiwanese 
government planned to invest 1.1 billion New Taiwan Dollars (23.5 million pounds) in 
branding Taiwanese food from 2010 to 2013 (National Development Council, 2010). The 
MOEA intended to assist Taiwanese master chefs to further expands their gourmet business 
in the host country. This was a cross-departmental project coordinated by the Executive Yuan, 
including the CCA (now the MOC), to use Taiwanese craft tableware for overall presentation. 
To promote Taiwanese food globally, the diplomats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
would act as the key players to promote food and gastro-diplomacy (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2011). The promotion of Taiwanese cuisine was part of Taiwan’s soft power and 
nation branding. According to the MOFA, these diplomatic activities are to take advantage of 
the nation’s cultural soft power and to boost the positive image of Taiwan. The Gourmet 
Taiwan action plan was expected to benefit the tourism and service industry in Taiwan. Also, 
it was expected to generate revenue from both global and local markets.  
Although diplomats included the gastronomy of Taiwan as part of the overall project, 
I would argue that the over-arching policy goal was to generate economic values and 
stimulate the export of Taiwanese food. The economic-orientated policy can be seen in the 
Gourmet Taiwan action plan. The MOEA stated that the aim was to ‘globalise’ the 
Taiwanese food industry, which involved providing assistance and training for opening shops 
overseas and promoting Taiwanese food (National Development Council, 2010). In the 
original action plan, it was expected to open 3,500 new shops both inland and overseas. Also, 
10,000 new jobs would be created and 50 international food brands promoted. The action 
plan also aimed to host training courses with a total attendance of 1,000. Overall, the plan 
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would match 500 investors and enterprises and invest in total 2 billion New Taiwan Dollars. 
These objectives are quantifiable; however, the number of new shops and brands does not 
necessarily justify the goal to ‘globalise’ the Taiwanese food industry. Furthermore, the 
implication of ‘globalising’ a country’s food is vague. For instance, it remains debatable the 
extent to which a dish, a food company, or a restaurant can be ‘globalised.’ Furthermore, in 
the government action plan, there was no indication of research on consumer behaviour in 
different countries. Therefore, it was questionable whether the strategy proposed by the 
Taiwanese government was feasible in the ‘global’ market.  
Whilst developing strategies for promoting Taiwanese food, there were also some 
existing disadvantages in this government-initiated programme. First, everyday food such as 
bubble milk tea, beef noodle and steamed pork dumplings have become a unique selling point 
for Taiwan. Nevertheless, when put in a global context, Taiwanese cuisine is often confused 
with other Chinese cuisine by those who do not know the difference. Secondly, Taiwan has 
not been at the centre of international cuisine. Most of its well-known brands are mainly 
consumer electronics as mentioned above. It would be interesting to consider whether food 
and tourism could be added.  
The study of Anholt (2003) on national brands is relevant to a discussion of Taiwan’s 
cuisine promotion. He suggested five key elements of national brand strategy: promoting 
tourism, presenting culture, attracting investment, foreign policy and exporting brands. 
Among them, culture plays an important role, enriching a country’s brand image. In the case 
of Gourmet Taiwan, food can be a powerful and effective medium for understanding a 
country’s culture. From how food is consumed to preparing dishes for special occasions, the 
connection between country and gastronomy is strong. Moreover, the food of a country can 
easily encourage its own people to engage in the process of branding. Anholt (ibid.) also 
pointed out that in addition to the external effects, the influence of successful branding can be 
seen from different perspectives. As regards the brand itself, the company can become 
popular at home. If a government is ambitious to promote national brands, it must seize the 
initiative to find domestic products that have the potential to become internationally 
well-known. However, as Anholt (ibid.) pointed out, a hasty approach may not lead a country 
to where it would like to go. In any case, the process takes a long time. 
When promoting food, there is still a missing link between food and culture in Taiwan. 
The gastronomist, Rockower (2010), suggested highlighting exotic tastes and flavours as the 
strategy to incorporating culinary and cultural diplomacy. This would help under-recognised 
national brands to gain more popularity with engagement in non-traditional forms of public 
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diplomacy. Whether to brand the culinary arts and attract investments from the private sector, 
or to engage in gastro-diplomacy, this remains a challenge for government. Gastro-diplomacy 
can be government sponsored food promotions through the embassy, either targeted at the 
general public or in diplomatic circles. It can benefit the investment and food trade. However, 
only if the general public in the host country can easily purchase and consume dishes would 
the ‘Gourmet Taiwan’ campaign be successful. It requires careful marketing to enlarge the 
Taiwanese food and trade industry.  
To promote food culture, it is crucial to identify the uniqueness of Taiwanese food. In 
the government action plan, it was noted that the lack of food identity was the first issue to 
tackle in the project (National Development Council, 2010). Besides tourism, gastronomy is 
an important export, both in terms of products and culture. Throughout history, Taiwanese 
food has been influenced deeply by Chinese culinary arts and Japanese cuisine. In relation to 
everyday meals, Taiwan is not resistant to globalisation. Western food, such as pizza, 
hamburger, can be easily found in the urban areas. Other than global chain restaurants, 
small-scale entrepreneurs in Taiwan also contribute to food innovation. This vital energy can 
be found especially in many night markets in Taiwan. Although the small-scale food 
entrepreneurs often have interesting business ideas and can be very creative when it comes to 
new products, the lack of professional management can be an issue when the government 
wishes to standardise the quality of food and service.    
 However, food scandals resulted in negative publicity for Taiwan’s food and 
led to setbacks for the government. In 2011, British businessman Assad Khan opened the 
bubble teashop ‘Bubbleology’ in London. His love for bubble tea and the growing popularity 
of the Taiwanese-invented drink became news in Taiwan (Central News Agency, 2011). 
Consequently, the opening of the shop helped increase sales of bubble tea in the UK and the 
rest of Europe (Townsend, 2014). Nonetheless, right after the opening of this shop, a food 
safety scandal broke out in Taiwan, as it was discovered that DEHP, a plasticiser for 
industrial usage, had been added to certain beverages including bubble tea. DEHP was used 
as a clouding agent in food and beverages, which caused serious public concerns, as the 
chemical is believed harmful for hormones, especially in children. The scandal was reported 
internationally. In the countries to which Taiwan exported, such as China, Hong Kong, South 
Korea and the Philippines, the contaminated food was withdrawn from supermarkets 
(“Plastic unfantastic”, 2011). Unfortunately, this is not the only case of food scandals in 
Taiwan. In 2013, tainted starch was found in potato starch widely used in Taiwanese street 
food. These poisoned food products were removed from the shelves not only in Taiwan, but 
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also Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong. The food scandals seriously damaged the 
credibility of Taiwan’s food safety control. The concerns over food safety in Taiwan were 
especially serious in 2013 and 2014, from powders used in Taiwan’s famous street food to 
domestic cooking oil. Scandals arose one after another. Due to inadequate regulations and 
inspection, large-scale food manufacturers were involved in unethical production processes. 
Not only were the ingredients not properly disclosed, but also the manufacturing process was 
contaminated with recycled raw materials. If the problems of food safety regulation persist, 
the effort to promote Taiwanese food overseas will probably be in vain.   
At the end of the ‘Gourmet Taiwan’ campaign, according to the government report 
published in the National Development Council, there were over 2,000 attendees for the 
training course on restaurant management, and 4,494 new shops or restaurants opened over 
the timespan of the project from 2010 to 2013. In terms of economic development, the 
government claimed 29,495 jobs were created, 19.63 billion New Taiwan Dollars generated 
and 24 Taiwanese brands promoted in markets internationally (National Development 
Council, 2013). Except for this quantitative performance index, there was a lack of evidence 
to evaluate whether the project helped market Taiwanese food worldwide. In London, the 
most promoted food item remains bubble tea. Although the number of bubble tea vendors 
increased, most of them remain in the neighbourhood of China town. It raises questions about 
what and where the ‘international markets’ are, and how the products were received in the 
target markets.  
The food scandals mentioned above might have undermined the efforts of the 
government’s Taiwanese gourmet campaign overseas, not least because it was necessary to 
ban contaminated food at the same time. Considering the impact of these food safety scandals, 
such as food withdrawn in some countries, it raises doubts about whether the proclaimed 
achievements of the ‘Gourmet Taiwan’ campaign accurately reflected the reality. 
Unfortunately, the government did not publish a more detailed evaluation report or any 
follow-up research. There is an absence of detail of the execution and funding distribution 
and how these numbers were calculated. Even if the government achieved its policy objective, 
I remain doubtful of the beneficiaries of the government action plan. Considering the amount 
of budget spent on this single action plan, I suggest there should be a full evaluation and 
review process on the impact.  
The issues raised in these food safety scandals revealed the difficulties of 
place-branding. There are several actors in the gastrodiplomacy strategy: government, food 
provider and consumer. The actors do not always respond to government initiatives. As 
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Anholt (2007) argued, in developing ‘Competitive Identity’, which he used to describe the 
synthesis of brand management and public diplomacy with trade, investment, tourism and 
export promotion, the strategy might be good but still have no effect. He suggested that 
unlike commercial brands, the ‘Competitive Identity’ strategy was composed of genuine 
people and places. Therefore, branding might fail when the process is not fully democratic, 
transparent and inclusive. Foremost, multiple actors are involved in the practice, and 
government is unlikely to have full control over all the actions taken in the process. In a time 
when media coverage can be easily shared and spread, it is difficult to block all the 
information. Additionally, after losing the consumers’ trust, it is difficult to reestablish a 
reputation. The uncontrollable manufacturers could undermine the efforts of a government’s 
campaign. Arguably, the Taiwanese government underestimated the risk of food safety and 
overestimated food control in Taiwan. 
The Taiwanese government carried out nation branding projects to convey the 
country-of-origin effects and place-branding. These projects included providing assistance in 
film shoots, gastrodiplomacy and manufacturing products in Taiwan. Several difficulties can 
be found as the private sector may not necessarily cooperate with government or have other 
ideas to brand itself as Taiwanese. Despite these government projects, it is still reliant on 
other stakeholders in brand ‘Taiwan’ to make the overall nation branding possible. In the next 
chapter, I discuss how actors from the private sector participate in government policy 
implementation. 
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Chapter 6: Research Findings: Engaging Private Actors in 
Taiwan’s Cultural Diplomacy through Cultural Policy 
 
Following analysis, in the previous chapter, of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy from the 
perspective of governmental and public cultural institutions, I discuss the involvement of the 
private sector. I consider the motivations of various actors, and how the government’s 
cultural policy influences their engagement. Therefore, I start from the perspective of internal 
cultural policy and how it can facilitate the role of the private sector in exporting the arts 
overseas. Relevant policies include government subsidy, organised showcases and incentives 
for corporate sponsorship. In terms of the artists’ participation, I take as an important 
example the government’s support for performing arts companies and the national showcase 
at the OFF d’Avignon organised by the Taiwan Cultural Centre in Paris, as it has been one of 
the longest continuous projects in cultural diplomacy. I trace policy implementation from the 
Ministry of Culture (MOC) to the Cultural Centre. In this chapter, I also explore the 
development of partnerships between private foundations and the MOC and the cultural 
centres.   
 
6.1 Subsidising performing arts organisations in cultural diplomacy and 
the First Lady’s engagement 
Arts organisations, particularly performing arts companies, played an important role in 
Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. As mentioned in section 5.1, their participation can be dated 
back to the 1950s. In addition to the government-funded Peking Opera Theatre (now 
Guo-Guang Theatre) that carries out cultural diplomacy programmes, such as performances 
overseas, several of Taiwan’s large-scale private arts organisations are among the pioneers of 
cultural diplomacy. The Cloud Gate Dance Theatre has been one of the most notable 
examples.  
Two main approaches have been identified in my research on performing arts 
companies’ international engagements. In the first case, companies with an already 
established international reputation are regularly invited by foreign arts organisations. The 
MOC often provides bursaries to make tours possible, but most of the administration is left to 
the event organiser. In the second case, the MOC and cultural centres proactively organise 
national showcases in arts festivals and provide subsidies to companies, enabling them to 
participate. By organising national showcases, the cultural centres assist the artists to connect 
with local networks. The arts organisations’ foreign tours provide an opportunity to raise or 
strengthen their profile and potentially open more doors for further collaboration. The major 
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difference between the two approaches mentioned above is often related to the scale of the 
companies. For large-scale companies, it costs more to tour abroad and, therefore, more 
subsidy is needed. Although the foreign event organisers usually provide fees and 
accommodation for their stay, the large companies in Taiwan, such as the Cloud Gate Dance 
Theatre, still require a government bursary to cover the transportation costs. For 
MOC-supported showcases at festivals, this is particularly beneficial for smaller arts 
companies. Participation in festivals provides an opportunity to be visible; the Festival 
d’Avignon, for example, provides an audience, possibility of recognition by the press and 
touring opportunities (Wehle, 2003).  
Whilst the government encourages cultural exchange projects, the MOC has aimed to 
prevent large companies taking the lion’s share of resources so not to disadvantage the small 
companies. In 2013, the MOC launched a new funding project for ‘Taiwan Brand’ companies 
with large-scale productions (Ministry of Culture, 2013b). The newly allocated budget 
allowed the recipient companies to undertake more international tours or new productions. 
Bigger companies hire more professionals for their production and administration. In turn, 
the companies are more likely to develop new works and establish a brand name. Thus, with 
an established reputation and portfolio, it is easier for these companies to apply for funding 
and have more credibility when seeking corporate sponsorship. However, as the ‘Taiwan 
Brand’ companies have already established their reputation overseas and most of their tours 
are on the basis of invitation by foreign cultural institutions, government subsidy may not be 
essential, but it will help to reduce financial risk. If the government allocates funding to the 
most prosperous companies and expects a larger impact in return, companies may be able to 
accept more invitations and gain greater exposure as ‘the company from Taiwan.’ This policy 
initiative helps to differentiate the government’s policy, matching subsidies to customise the 
arts companies’ needs according to scale.  
From the perspective of public resource distribution, different scale arts organisations 
have an impact on securing grants. It is common in Taiwan for smaller companies to lack the 
financial resources to hire professional administrative staff for the bureaucratic paperwork. 
Thus, these companies are less likely to apply for the grants, which inevitably results in a 
shortage of funds. In terms of their development, this is to the detriment of smaller-scale 
companies. The existing policy of ‘Taiwan brand’ might be considered as a cherry-picking 
strategy in favour of large companies. The argument is that if large companies can afford 
more overseas tours, they would gain greater exposure for Taiwanese culture. However, if the 
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purpose of exhibiting a variety art and culture is considered, then the government needs to 
think of other means of assistance in addition to distributing grants.   
In terms of providing other assistance, it is a common practice for cultural centres to 
host receptions for government supported companies after the performances. For the 
companies, it can be an occasion to tap into local cultural networks and further establish 
connections. For cultural centres and the representative offices, these receptions can be an 
alternative diplomatic occasion. For instance, the involvement of the First Lady Chow 
Mei-ching, wife of President Ma Ying-jeou (in office 2008-2016), is particularly worth 
considering. Whilst President Ma Ying-jeou seldom visited countries with which Taiwan has 
no official diplomatic relations, the First Lady Chow Mei-ching occasionally toured abroad 
with performing arts companies as the honorary president. Her engagement as honorary 
president of arts companies could combine, and reinforce, cultural relations with first-lady 
diplomacy. Several large arts organisations in Taiwan, such as the Cloud Gate Dance Theatre, 
the Ju Percussion Group and the Contemporary Legend Theatre, had Ms Chow as their 
honorary president in their foreign tours. With their established reputation and frequent 
foreign tours, they were also recipients of the ‘Taiwan Brand’ grant. As Director Susan Yu of 
the Taipei Cultural Center in New York (personal communication, 12 December, 2013) 
mentioned, hosting receptions after performances creates unofficial networking opportunities 
for the First Lady or diplomats. In such circumstances, cultural diplomacy serves as a 
supplement to traditional diplomacy enabling the first lady to present herself among the 
diplomatic circle. 
In the pursuit of cultural diplomacy, Taiwanese arts companies often visit countries 
that the president is unlikely to visit officially. Taylor (1997) suggested that cultural 
diplomacy is still worth trying to facilitate the workings of conventional diplomacy. 
Combined with first-lady diplomacy, it could increase the impact of cultural diplomacy. The 
importance of the first lady’s role has been recognised in relevant studies. For example, one 
of Chow’s predecessors, Madam Chiang Kai-Shek (Meiling Soong) charmed a generation of 
Americans in the 1930s and 1940s (Wang, 2014). First-lady diplomacy can serve to create a 
meaningful and supportive context for countries to pursue constructive relationships (ibid.). 
Serving not only as the companion of a president, as Hastedt and Eksterowicz (2006) have 
argued, modern-day first ladies can also develop their own activism. This is determined by 
several factors, such as personal attributes, ambition, vision and ideology (ibid.). To a certain 
degree, it establishes a partnership between the government and the arts organisations. One of 
my interviewees, who works in a performing arts company that once toured with Ms Chow 
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Mei-ching, discussed their partnership with the First Lady. She is a regular theatregoer, and 
the arts companies who have been motivated to engage in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy have 
happily welcomed her as their honorary president. The company’s director invited the First 
Lady to join them. However, these invitations were often kept secret until their departure, and 
the reasons why Ms Chow Mei-ching accepted were not made public (Anonymous#4, 14 
June, 2013). From my interviewee’s account, her participation in their overseas tours was 
initiated by the company and not by the government. The reason for keeping the First Lady’s 
itinerary secret, I would suggest, was to avoid possible intervention from Chinese 
government officials on the company’s tour. Despite the less-official status of the First 
Lady’s engagement in cultural activities, similar intervention occurred during the European 
Association for Chinese Studies (EACS) in Portugal in July 2014. 
Ms Chow Mei-ching’s involvement in cultural diplomacy overseas was described by 
Chinese scholar Xu Qing (2013) as ‘Madame diplomacy,’ and further characterised as 
low-profile visits those which served as ‘ice-breaking’ events. Interestingly, as Xu (ibid.) 
stated, the Taiwanese government claimed that Ms Chow Mei-ching’s foreign tours with 
these arts companies was not for reasons of diplomacy, but were purely for the sake of the 
arts. In other words, the Taiwanese government did not wish to link Ms Chow Mei-ching’s 
company with a political purpose and no press interviews were arranged. Unlike the practice 
of official state visits, the itinerary was kept secret until the performance or the company’s 
departure. Although the decision not to disclose Ms Chow’s involvement can be interpreted 
as ensuring it did not overshadow the arts company’s performance, this was also an awkward 
position for the First Lady in her role as honorary presidency. I would argue that concern 
about overshadowing the touring company would not be an issue if the invitation had not 
been accepted in the first place. However, it is true that the attention generated by the First 
Lady’s involvement might have raised awareness of these arts companies and their work 
among the local audience.  
Arguably, the government contradicted itself about the First Lady’s role in Taiwan’s 
cultural diplomacy. As Ms Chow Mei-ching served as the honorary president of several arts 
companies only when they toured abroad, it is not unreasonable to link her participation to 
other purposes. Furthermore, if Ms Chow’s patronage did not help to raise the profile of the 
arts companies, why would she embark on the trips in the first place? For the sake of 
argument, if there were indeed no political purpose in her involvement, why would she need 
to keep a low profile? However, despite all the necessary protocol to make her journey 
possible, it remains to be seen what ‘Madame Diplomacy’ has accomplished.  
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Despite the government’s effort not to politicise Ms Chow’s honorary presidency of 
arts organisations, her involvement remained an important political gesture. However, a 
controversy arose when the Tokyo National Museum organised an exhibition of ancient 
Chinese artefacts on loan from the Taiwan National Palace Museum in June 2014. The scale 
of the exhibition was unprecedented, as the Jadeite Cabbage, the most famous artefact of the 
National Palace Museum, is rarely on loan for an exhibition abroad. Nonetheless, it was 
reported that controversially the word ‘national’ was omitted from some promotional 
materials by the media in Tokyo, which violated the agreement made between the two 
institutions. The Taipei representative office in Japan protested this omission and warned that 
the exhibition may be cancelled unless the full name of the National Palace Museum was 
used (Kyodo News, 2014). Also, as Ms Chow served as the president of honour, the 
Presidential Office of Taiwan planned to cancel her visit to Japan due to the naming row. 
Although the problematic promotional materials were removed in time before the exhibition 
commenced and an official apology was made by the Tokyo National Museum, the First 
Lady did not attend the opening ceremony as the confirmation came too late (Shan & Wang, 
2014). Whilst the proper timing to address a public institution using its title with or without 
‘national’ could be an issue, unfortunately, it revealed the awkward position of the 
government in international relations. In addition to the case of the National Palace Museum, 
similar problems also surfaced regarding naming in cultural diplomacy events or overseas 
government outposts (section 5.5). As the legal status of Taiwan remains uncertain, it would 
not be realistic to overlook this issue in its cultural diplomacy. 
More importantly in this context, it illustrates that Ms Chow’s honorary presidency 
was essentially tokenistic. For diplomats in the host countries, the effect of her visit was 
limited only to the traditional diplomatic circle. The avoidance of media attention was in 
contradiction of Wang’s (2014) illustration of the First Lady’s role as facilitator of 
constructive relationships. I would argue that the Taiwanese government missed the 
opportunity of powerful public diplomacy to utilise fully her visit. However, the practice of a 
low-profile honorary presidency once again represented the awkward situation that the 
Taiwanese government faced in cultural and international relations.  
 
6.2 Collaboration between cultural centres and artists at festivals  
After discussing the government subsidy and the first lady’s engagement in large companies’ 
overseas tours, in this section I illustrate small companies’ participation in cultural diplomacy. 
The showcases of the Edinburgh Fringe Festival and the festival OFF d’Avignon are 
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particularly relevant to consider as part of the MOC’s promotion scheme for small companies. 
Unlike the Edinburgh International Festival (EIF) and the Festival d’Avignon (the ‘IN’ 
Festival), in which the organiser curates the programme and invites the artists, the Edinburgh 
Fringe Festival and the festival OFF d’Avignon (the ‘Off’ Festival, hereafter, OFF d’Avignon) 
allows the artists to participate as they wish if they can afford to do so. With an audience 
already drawn to the EIF and the ‘IN’ Festival, there are also more opportunities to be seen 
by the press. In other words, the arts companies have more autonomy to join these fringe 
festivals. Nonetheless, with unpredictable box-office income, smaller companies often find it 
difficult to balance the books if they join the fringe festivals without other sources of income. 
Aware of this issue, the CCA (now Ministry of Culture) subsidised companies to participate 
in these festivals. The funding covers partial expenses for participating in the festivals, such 
as transportation, accommodation, venue hire and production costs. The subsidy could ease 
some of the financial burdens of the companies and lower their financial risk. The autonomy 
provided by the fringe festivals also allows the Taiwanese cultural centres to host national 
showcases that promote Taiwanese performing arts to programmers and curators. It can fulfil 
its mission as a platform to enhance cultural relations and promote Taiwanese culture. As the 
MOC covers travel expenses, there are few additional costs compared with companies invited 
by large international festivals. Also, the cultural centres can have more control over the 
selection of arts companies to present Taiwanese culture. 
Furthermore, the government subsidy could motivate more companies to attend these 
festivals as it lowers the financial barrier to their involvement. With theatre directors seeking 
further invitations to other venues and festivals, a trip to Avignon or Edinburgh can bring 
potential business and collaboration opportunities for these companies. In 2014, five 
companies were funded by the MOC to participate in the Edinburgh Fringe Festival, whilst 
another four groups were involved to the OFF d’Avignon. From the experience of 
showcasing Taiwanese performing arts in fringe festivals, there are several benefits. First, 
having a national showcase is an efficient way to provide assistance to and maximise the 
potential of these companies. From the theatre companies’ perspective, they are motivated to 
participate because they have the full support of the cultural centres, whose local knowledge 
can help them become familiar with the festival. Ideally, for ambitious companies who wish 
to gain international experience, this information should be made widely accessible and 
transferable to other companies. The know-how gained from international tours should 
enable them to prepare for future opportunities. I would argue this is the best way to optimise 
the use of public funding. 
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However, the situation is not completely positive for the participating companies. 
Compared with the EIF or the Festival d’Avignon, the Fringe Festival and the Festival OFF 
d’Avignon present a more diversified programme. These festivals are flooded with 
programme choices for tourists from all over the world. To stand out and capture the 
attention of the press, and to avoid competition between Taiwanese companies, the cultural 
centres in Paris and London attempt to create a national showcase. The Paris Cultural Centre 
started its programme at the OFF d’Avignon in 2007 (Council for Cultural Affairs, 2009), 
whilst the London Cultural Centre initiated its Taiwan Season showcase at the Edinburgh 
Fringe in 2014. In addition to the sponsorship that covers transportation and travel expenses, 
the cultural centres chose a more proactive approach to enhance the promotion of Taiwanese 
theatre companies.  
There are several challenges for the participating companies. Based on Director 
Chen’s (personal communication, 29 November, 2013) account of his experience at the OFF 
d’Avignon, language is a barrier. He also recognised the difficulty for companies to stand out 
from all the performances. As for selecting the Taiwanese theatre companies, Director Chen 
pointed out that it is unlikely to collaborate with companies that require high production costs. 
On the contrary, he aimed to make available more resources for young artists and help them 
to link with professional networks for subsequent tours. Furthermore, even if the cultural 
centres have assisted the theatre companies, there are limited places they can offer for each 
year’s national showcase. This makes selection competitive and rules out opportunities for 
some companies.   
Furthermore, the cultural centre works as a curator in the showcase and needs to be 
very clear on its influence in the overall selection and presentation. It may act as a filter in a 
sense, which would not necessarily become censorship. However, the cultural centres should 
choose companies that fit the collaboration model they expect. In the festival OFF d’Avignon 
2015, Taiwan’s Minister of Culture, Mr Hung Meng-chi met Olivier Py, the director of the 
Festival d'Avignon when he visited France. Minister Hung quoted Py’s observation that the 
Taiwan showcase in OFF d’Avignon emphasises too much on tradition and national identity, 
therefore blurring the artistic expression (Yang, 2015). If Py’s observation was correct, then 
it raised the question whether political correctness overrides artistic expression when the 
cultural centre and the MOC select the programmes in the national showcase.  
The national showcase at the Edinburgh Fringe Festival and the festival OFF 
d’Avignon demonstrates problematic issues of cultural democracy. Cultural democracy in 
some societies means everyone should have access and every individual should be 
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encouraged to create (Mitchell, 1986). In terms of external cultural policy, the question is 
how far cultural democracy should be stressed, as to present it as a social phenomenon is 
different from the inclusion of products in a programme of artistic exports. I would argue that 
whilst the Edinburgh Fringe Festival and the festival OFF d’Avignon appear to realise the 
principle of cultural democracy in their strategy, the practice of a national showcase 
somewhat contradicts it. In response to Py’s criticism, former Minister Hung claimed that 
‘Taiwanese identity’ and ‘artistic expression’ are not mutually exclusive, and the Ministry 
has a clear position that artists’ freedom must be guaranteed. The Ministry will ensure 
Taiwan maintains its strength of being ‘the most liberal region in the Chinese-speaking world’ 
and ensure the artists fully unlock their potential (Yang, 2015). Hung suggested that when the 
artists express their creativity through the arts, they express their own culture. This claim 
corresponded to the paradox Mitchell (ibid.) addressed. It is the MOC’s internal cultural 
policy that would ensure the artists enjoy the cultural democracy and freedom of speech. 
However, whether the MOC would be able to embody such principles through presenting the 
arts festivals is another matter.  
Instead of being selective for a national showcase, I argue that it would be better to 
include as many presentations of Taiwanese theatre as possible. These festivals are already 
competitive due to the large number of productions presented there. The MOC could best 
help the theatre companies not by creating another competition among Taiwanese theatre 
companies in advance, but providing general support; for instance, press and public relations 
support for participation in these theatre festivals regardless of funding status. The assistance 
does not have to be financial. It is crucial for the government to facilitate bridge-building and 
to establish platforms for information exchange for all artists who wish to participate in these 
festivals. It seems self-contradictory to have the arts companies compete with each other for 
subsidy, making it difficult to justify the funding distribution, and raising questions as to 
whether this serves the original policy objective. Arguably, if a programme is inferior, should 
the MOC support it anyway? From observations at the Edinburgh Fringe Festival, I would 
suggest that if a show is indeed inferior, then it would not enjoy much success at the box 
office and reviewers can be unsatisfied. In other words, it is not for the MOC to judge the 
programme’s quality.  
For the companies participating in the national showcases, what do they expect in 
return? In addition to the warm reception from audience members, whether a production is 
artistically recognised by potential programme buyers is important to cultural centres. It is 
also understood by the theatre companies that the MOC’s main goal is to establish 
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connections with local theatres and curators in the hope of leading to invitations for tours. 
When Taiwanese theatre companies are presented in showcases at the Edinburgh Fringe 
Festival or the OFF d’Avignon Festival, the cultural centres have a clear procedure in place 
to serve the press and curators that the theatre companies are expected to follow. For example, 
the Paris Cultural Centre collects the professional contacts of the curators or the press. The 
companies must prepare press releases and supplementary information for their reference. 
Therefore, the companies are required by the MOC to keep in contact with the curators 
(Anonymous#5, personal communication, 28 Septermber, 2013). Whilst some of the 
audience members may be just one-off theatregoers at the festivals, maintaining connection 
with press and curators is the focus of the administrative work.  
From the experiences shared by my interviewees, it appears that the work of foreign 
cultural centres largely focuses on opinion leaders (e.g. press) and the professional who has 
power and resources (e.g. producers and curators). Furthermore, it is questionable whether 
the government should host national showcases at these festivals with a market orientation. 
Should the MOC be selective and create a national showcase with generous financial support 
to a handful of companies? I argue that instead of offering financial support to a few 
companies, the MOC and cultural centre should provide assistance to all Taiwanese theatres 
regardless of their public funding status. This is a better way of presenting a more diversified 
Taiwanese culture not confined to a small number of companies. A showcase certainly helps 
to shoulder the financial burden of theatre companies and present some of the best 
productions the cultural centre could sponsor. In order to do so, the government needs to be 
selective to justify public spending, but it may not be the best way to encourage different 
artists to engage in cultural exchange if the interests of the host country are based on the 
predilections of programmers or producers. From this approach, it is at least necessary for the 
overseas cultural centre to provide general information and local knowledge for Taiwanese 
artists who wish to engage in the community. As this dissertation was nearing completion in 
2015, there were several arts organisations spontaneously initiating forums and workshops to 
share their experiences of participating in the national showcases. This demonstrates how 
private initiative is ahead of government; nevertheless, I still consider it important for the 
MOC and the cultural centres to act beyond the grant provider and become the facilitator of 
cultural exchange between Taiwanese artists and the networks in their host countries. 
However, both the cultural centres and the artists need to be aware of the limits of the 
resources that government could provide. Although the Paris Cultural Centre has hosted the 
showcase in Avignon for several years, the current working model still has shortcomings. As 
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Pai (2014) argued, even though the showcase has gained exposure for Taiwanese theatres, it 
would be ideal to have an agent who has long-term local connections and knowledge to help 
promote Taiwanese theatre companies. Not every company would have the ability to follow 
up contacts with programmers after returning to Taiwan due to the heavy administrative load 
of the theatre. Therefore, given that connections to the curators and programmers may not be 
maintained by all the theatre companies after participating in the festivals, the engagements 
in such fringe festivals gradually became one-off events and do not necessarily bring the 
desired invitations or touring opportunities. Moreover, as the Ministry of Culture curates two 
national showcases each year at the OFF d’Avignon and Edinburgh Fringe Festival, this may 
be too frequent to present productions and can place unmanageable burdens on the theatres 
and cultural centres. Take the British Council’s showcase at the Edinburgh Fringe Festival as 
an example, which is organised every two years as it is considered a natural cycle of renewal 
to ensure that enough new works are coming through to make up a convincing programme 
(Mackey, 1998). If the function of a national showcase is international exposure, then the 
most important concern should remain quality, and whether there is enough time to attract 
enough good productions.  
Although there is no guaranteed reward, the artists and arts organisations may still 
wish to gain some experience of cultural exchange through participating in 
government-funded showcases. It would also be beneficial for showcasing participants to 
share their know-how with other companies. One of my interviewees expressed her 
frustration (Anonymous#5, personal communication, 28 September, 2013):  
 
I always hope the Ministry of Culture can host a press conference to share the fruit of 
the OFF d’Avignon with all the arts companies participating in it. But, the Ministry of 
Culture, well dare I say, they are rather lukewarm about it. The response I received was: 
‘we hope to see your final report about your achievements and your prospect of 
receiving invitations from curators then to consider it.’ But, in terms of contacting the 
curators, we could not report exciting news like: ‘yes, we are invited to somewhere right 
after the showcase.’ Yeah, we could not instantly achieve the goals the Ministry wants 
to see. They probably think hosting an [experience] sharing event is pointless. For the 
companies, it seems like you fight to go abroad for one month, then it ends in silence. 
Probably, it’s a shame. 
 
From my interviewee’s account, the MOC is more performance-driven, as the desired 
outcome of the project is based on whether there are invitations. When it comes to media 
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exposure, it is best to share exciting coverage with the public. For the arts organisations, 
completing the project and having some experience to share is crucial. In terms of nurturing 
the creative industries in Taiwan, all kinds of experience sharing, good or bad, can be 
beneficial for future participants. It is also valuable to consider cases that may not have been 
‘successful,’ in order to make strategic adjustments. Furthermore, to have invitations 
immediately after a showcase or event is exciting, but it is not always the reality. Whilst 
international events can take years to plan ahead of the actual opening, curators do not 
necessarily present certain programmes until there is a suitable opportunity or theme. The 
goal of achieving immediate invitations from programmers, venues, festivals, etc., seems a 
false and unprofessional expectation from government officials. As emphasised by Rawnsley 
(2013), to exercise soft power capital is a long-term process. If the showcase is considered a 
means of exercising Taiwan’s soft power, then it requires a longer investment to see a 
possible return.  
Furthermore, it is important for the artists to consider carefully their main objectives 
for participating in national showcases. It is certainly beneficial for the theatre companies to 
be fully prepared, especially if they are on their first tour overseas. As there are only limited 
resources and budget, it would be more efficient to invest in enhancing the overall 
professional skills for international cultural exchange, instead of providing grants for one-off 
events. It is also important to take advantage of the collective experience and expertise in 
Taiwan’s professional networks. Whilst, arguably, the overseas cultural centres should not be 
merely agencies for artists, both parties need to develop a more sustainable strategy for 
further international engagements. Surely a well-received showcase can create more 
opportunities for future international tours and invitations. Whilst these activities can be 
initiated in commercial channels and without government support, it is crucial to reaffirm 
constantly the policy objectives of a national showcase.  
 
6.3 Arts organisations’ motivation for participating in cultural diplomacy 
and their experience 
To cooperate with arts companies on official visits is also a common approach of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For instance, the Ju Percussion Group was invited by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to accompany President Ma’s official visit to Taiwan’s 
allies in Latin America in 2009. In the MOFA’s official reports, the Ju Percussion Group’s 
participation in the tour represented the cultural diplomacy that Ma would like to promote 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009). In this case, the cultural programmes complemented the 
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official visit and served as a supplement of traditional diplomacy. Also, many Taiwanese arts 
organisations take pride in fulfilling such a job and being proclaimed as ambassadors for 
Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. For example, in the foreword of Taipei Philharmonic 
Orchestra’s 25th anniversary celebration publication, the president Lai Wen-fu proudly stated: 
‘the TPO is enthusiastic in its support of Taiwan and spares no effort to promote its 
sophisticated culture to a global audience. The TPO always stands on the frontline of 
Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy’ (Yu, 2010). This shows the commitment that the orchestra has 
made to Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy, echoing the government’s objective, as announced in 
the 1998 White Paper for Culture, to nourish arts companies, and to broaden their 
international outreach (Council for Cultural Affairs, 1998). In addition, it is beneficial to 
organisations to gain an international reputation and to be recognised by domestic audiences 
after they return to Taiwan.  
The engagement of artists and privately founded arts companies flourished more after 
the ROC government started to subsidise artists touring abroad. After the CCA became the 
main government department in charge of cultural diplomacy, providing subsidies or 
encouraging artists’ residencies became part of the cultural policy (ibid.). It is either 
project-based funding or annually-funded to support core operations in these companies. 
Since the Taiwanese government began losing official diplomatic relationship and seats in 
international organisations, the discourse of ‘make Taiwan visible’ and ‘citizen diplomacy’ 
has also been adopted by arts organisations. The desire to ‘make us seen’ has been a principal 
slogan among Taiwanese since the 1970s’ diplomatic defeats. In terms of culture, it has 
always been the ‘dialogue’ that creates and articulates an ideal identity to the ‘significant 
others’ with the aim of breaking through the PRC diplomatic blockade and avoiding direct 
conflicts (Chang, 2006, p. 197). The ‘significant others,’ as I would argue, were countries and 
organisations that were able to appreciate Taiwanese culture, but did not necessarily have 
official diplomatic relations with Taiwan.  
The proactive attitude from arts organisations to engage in cultural diplomacy is 
worth analysing. In a recent study of cultural diplomacy, Melissa Nisbett (2015) took an arts 
administration approach. She demonstrated that the arts organisations in her research were 
more concerned with pragmatic objectives, such as developing partnerships and generating 
income, rather than achieving explicit political goals. Quite differently from my research on 
the arts organisations participating in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy, the political rhetoric can 
be more explicit. Interestingly, the notion of ‘let the world see Taiwan’ is also used in theatre 
companies’ fundraising campaigns for participation in arts festivals. Two examples could be 
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found from the advertisements of two theatre companies’ crowd-funding page prior to the 
Edinburgh Fringe Festival in 2014 (Jade & Artists Dance Troupe, 2014; Tjimur Dance, 2014). 
Despite government financial support of their involvement in the showcase, they needed to 
make up the deficit in their budget. The phrases quoted below are translated extracts from 
their crowd-funding projects: 
 
‘Send Egg Blessings to the Edinburgh Fringe Festival and let the world see Taiwan’ – 
the title for Jade and Artists Dance Troupe’s crowd-funding project for their trip to the 
Edinburgh Fringe Festival  
‘Kurakuraw Dance Glass Bead Edinburgh Fringe Festival Crowd-funding Project: Let 
the world see the new dance aesthetics of the Payuan in Taiwan’ – the title for Tjimur 
Dance Theatre’s crowdfunding project. 
 
Not only is the wording used as a catchphrase for marketing and public relations purpose, it 
also reveals another aspect of cultural diplomacy. Instead of adopting the political rhetoric of 
cultural diplomacy to lever government funding, as Nisbett (2015) found, arts organisations 
use these appeals to target members of the public. I would argue that the underlying 
assumptions of such wording were sufficiently powerful to attract public support for the 
fundraising campaign. In the case of Tjimur Dance Theatre’s campaign, which set the target 
at 250,000 New Taiwan Dollars, it received 260,400 on the crowdfunding website FlyingV 
between April and June 2014 (Tjimur Dance, 2014). Whilst people in Taiwan are usually 
unable to attend the actual performances overseas, the reward to the funders would be 
showing their gratification. Except for the material rewards sent by the arts companies, I 
suggest the main appeal is the ‘feel-good’ factor for the funders who support Taiwanese arts 
organisations’ oversea tours. By doing so, the campaign could be successful in terms of 
achieving the target funds, and generating a positive image of the company. Also, if the 
funders endorse the cause, it can reinforce their connection to the company, as both parties 
belong to the imagined community that supports the initiative to ‘make the world see 
Taiwan’.  
Thus, instead of letting the world see the companies on their own, the intention of the 
selected wording is to embed them in a larger context, i.e. Taiwan. They are presenting not 
only themselves, but also a part of Taiwanese culture. Therefore, the self-exposure was to 
make the company visible, and to represent the country as well. However, instead of 
representing the Republic of China, the identity has shifted to the land rather than the regime. 
This may be part of the transition of cultural identity formation.  
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Furthermore, some of the artists’ reasons for participating in the national showcases 
differ. Although the slogan ‘let the world see Taiwan’ was used in several companies’ 
fundraising campaigns to participate in fringe and OFF d’Avignon festivals, not all artists are 
in agreement. Participation in the showcase can have different meanings for the development 
of a company. Baboo Liao (Liao Jiun-cheng), theatre director of the Taiwanese theatre 
company Shakespeare’s Wild Sisters Group, has presented his work at the festival OFF 
d’Avignon on several occasions. The showcase at the festival OFF d’Avignon has been one 
of the longest running projects that the Paris Cultural Centre has organised since 2007 
(Council for Cultural Affairs, 2009). In the interview, Liao (3 July, 2014) shared his view on 
the company’s participation: 
 
I don’t think it really matters that much unless you have been selected in the IN festival. 
So I think it is an exaggeration to say ‘send this company to Edinburgh or Avignon.’ 
It’s merely a showcase. If there are four or five different shows in a venue on each day, 
you must minimise the technical requirements, so the audience are seeing the best you 
can present with minimal technical effort. So, I merely think it’s a platform leading to 
the international market. […] I just never see Edinburgh [fringe festivals] or [OFF] 
d’Avignon festival as the final destination. No, it’s not the destination; it’s just a starting 
point.     
 
As Liao (ibid.) mentioned, from a market perspective, the main purpose of joining a 
showcase for theatre companies is to be introduced to an audience. It is possible that there 
will be good revenue from the box office, or further tours or collaboration opportunities. 
Government subsidy could be considered either as a recognition for being part of Taiwanese 
culture, or merely a contribution to funding resources. Liao judged participation in the 
showcases from a pragmatic perspective and did not connect it to political imperatives.  
Compared with the exposure that might be gained from attending the national 
showcases, the financial challenges that arts organisations are seldom considered. Despite the 
public funding and the overall assistance provided by the cultural centres, a balanced book is 
not guaranteed for theatre companies. It is different from the Edinburgh International Festival 
or ‘IN’ Festival in Avignon, in which case the organisers cover most of the production costs. 
The theatre companies participating in a showcase need to be realistic about the situation. If 
their work receives good reviews or is attractive to venue owners or curators, it is easier to be 
invited to tour or to return to the venue. It is also what the Paris Cultural Centre anticipates 
from these showcases and the policy objectives to promote Taiwanese artists overseas. 
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Despite the Paris Cultural Centre’s assistance in public relations, the companies still need to 
manage their own advertisements and promotion. Ultimately, it is the theatre companies that 
must take the risk and be ready for the challenge. Cultural centres can play the role of 
bridge-builder, but this does not equate to acting as curator or commercial agent. Therefore, 
the companies could not rely on the cultural centres to take care of everything they need at a 
festival. As Liao (ibid.) mentioned: “[o]f course the more assistance the better, as with money. 
But, I think you can never just rely on others. Yeah, if you decide to do this, I think they 
[Paris Cultural Centre] are doing their best. The rest lies in us.”  
Liao emphasised the importance for the company to be independent. The experience 
of Shakespeare’s Wild Sisters Group at the OFF Festival demonstrated the model anticipated 
by the MOC and Paris Cultural Centre. The company joined the OFF Festival in 2009 and 
received critical acclaim. This was helpful for the company when applying for participation 
again in 2013, and the company adventurously presented a new work and premiered it at the 
OFF Festival. From Liao’s viewpoint, the work itself is the most important after all. The 
showcase on its own does not guarantee a positive reception from the media or generate a 
huge amount of revenue. Notwithstanding the effort made to promote and advertise, critics 
and curators are focusing on the work itself. It is the substance that matters. The companies 
can take this opportunity to show their works on an international stage with an international 
audience. This would widen a company’s horizon beyond Taiwan (Liao, personal 
communication, 3 July, 2014). This viewpoint was shared by another interviewee, who 
believed that showcases at either the Edinburgh Fringe Festival or OFF d’Avignon provided 
an opportunity for the artists to perform in a different environment in front of a different 
audience (Anonymous#5, personal communication, 28 September, 2013). Simply put, arts 
companies can try out works in a foreign market and develop their future creative output.  
What have arts companies gained from their experience in cultural relations 
programmes? I further examine whether such outcomes are evident. I suggest the practice of 
hosting a national showcase or being invited for overseas tours has several characteristics that 
Schneider (2003) illustrated as essential in a successful policy initiative. For example, the 
programmes can potentially communicate values, to cater to the interests of the host country 
or region, to offer pleasure, information or expertise in the spirit of exchange and mutual 
respect. Whilst the impact of cultural relations may take longer to emerge from the 
companies’ experience, their interaction with the audience, and the feedback received 
through the practice, may still provide a snapshot of the encounter with different cultures.   
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The atmosphere of intimacy between the artists and the audience can be found in their 
face-to-face interaction, as I learnt from my interviewees. Some more spontaneous cultural 
exchanges take place through the performance, even beyond the language barrier in 
non-Chinese speaking countries. The encounter between audience members can be affective. 
One of the artists I interviewed shared his experience (Anonymous#4, personal 
communication, 14 June, 2013): 
 
Some of the Taiwanese audience members are very kind. They worry for us and ask: 
‘Can the foreigners understand your work?’ I would say our foreign audience can 
understand it without a problem. One of the works we perform might relate to the 
Taiwanese religion, but it can also be rooted in folklore. Once, when we performed 
abroad, I met some elderly women saying their ancestors were comforted. They might 
not figure out where the rituals come from, and they don’t necessarily know the 
Mid-Summer Ghost Festival in Taiwan. But, as they see it, they can see love, war, death, 
comfort, and the changes in life. I think that’s universal.  
 
The experience mentioned above can be an example of mutual understanding. Also, when 
two cultures meet, their beliefs might communicate with each other. To the same artist’s 
surprise, the experience may extend to another dimension. He recalled a production in Spain 
where the theatre was located on an ancient battleground and the theatre company members 
experienced some unexplainable situations during rehearsals. In the end, local venue crews 
suggested having a blessing from a priest. After the company finished their Buddhist prayer, 
the Spanish priest invited them to say Catholic prayers with him. Whilst the priest prayed in 
Spanish, the company prayed in Mandarin. The cultural exchange experience was special to 
the artists and he recognised the power of shared spiritual empathy.  
To some extent, the shared human experience and emotion is the key to mutual 
understanding. From Baboo Liao’s (personal communication, 3 July, 2014) observation, 
foreign audiences are more open to sharing their emotions. Some patrons like to hug the 
theatre company members right after the show. After the performance of his work Absente: 
rendez-vous avec Sophie Calle, a psychiatrist approached him and said that Liao’s work 
visualised the unspoken grief of loss, whether that is losing something, a family member or a 
lover. The loss was portrayed in Mandarin with subtitles, but there can be empathy through 
the emotion generated. 
However, these experiences of cultural exchange are not always documented in arts 
organisations. Due to the small scale of administrative staff, neither the theatre companies nor 
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the overseas cultural centres have been able to carry out longitudinal research across years. 
Thus, it is difficult to trace the long-term trajectory of the overall reception of Taiwanese 
theatres in foreign countries. When it comes to recording audience feedback, guest books left 
in the front of house provide the audience with an opportunity to leave feedback 
(Anonymous#5, personal communication, 28 September, 2013; Liao, personal 
communication, 3 July, 2014). Instead of conducting a questionnaire, a guestbook enables a 
company to keep a record of audience feedback. However, this does not provide demographic 
data to understand the composition of audience members. It is also difficult to collect data to 
trace audience-purchasing patterns to adjust future marketing and advertising strategy. From 
the experience in the OFF d’Avignon, Liao observed that there are many tourists interested in 
performances, who have not seen before, or are attracted to a certain show because of 
on-street promotion resulting in impulse buying. From the perspective of arts administration, 
these observations can provide a reference, albeit limited, for understanding the audiences of 
productions and showcases. 
 
6.4 Corporate sponsorship in cultural relations 
After analysing the artists’ and arts companies’ motivations for participating in cultural 
diplomacy, I now turn to explore the reasons behind the corporate engagement in relevant 
activities. To sponsor arts and cultural activities can be beneficial in cultural relations 
programmes. Business sponsorship benefits external cultural policy indirectly as it 
strengthens the home base of the arts as well as directly contributes to the cost of cultural 
exports. In return, there is the publicity and the prestige of attending first-class events 
(Mitchell, 1986). Beyond the prestige that corporations can enjoy from participating in the 
events and ‘hobnobbing,’ it is also a great opportunity to build a brand image when opening 
in a foreign market. From the consumers’ perspective, according to Anholt (2007), this is 
illustrated when creating a country’s ‘competitive identity’ (see section 2.5). He also 
suggested that culture is self-evidently ‘not for sale,’ but established the essential base for a 
nation’s competitive identity. Furthermore, a country’s reputation does not merely influence 
consumer-purchasing choices; it also affects bigger decisions (ibid.). The image of a 
product’s nation of origin can be influential in all kinds of decision-making.  
The concept of ‘competitive identity’ envisions business and culture complementing 
each other when building a country’s brand identity overseas. To encourage more business 
sponsorship, the MOC initiated policy plans offering tax exemption for corporations. In 2010, 
the Law for the Development of the Cultural and Creative Industries came into force and 
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included incentives to encourage corporate sponsorship. This law also provided the legal 
basis for tax exemption on corporation expenses resulting from charity work. There are 
several reasons why the desired outcome did not materialise. First, corporate social 
responsibility is not yet widely adopted in Taiwan. It is, as defined by Carroll, Lipartito, Post 
and Werhane (2012, p. 7) ‘the idea that the corporation exists in society and has rights and 
responsibilities as a member (or citizen) of that society.’ Thus, I further discuss whether 
Taiwanese corporations would be equally committed to ‘make Taiwan visible’ and sponsor 
arts organisations overseas tours.  
From my fieldwork, I realised that arts organisations in Taiwan find it difficult to 
obtain sponsorship for domestic activities, let alone programmes abroad. Whilst the host 
usually covers the transportation and cargo cost for foreign artists when they are invited to 
Taiwan, one of my interviewees considered it unfair that Taiwanese do not have much 
bargaining power in cultural exchange (Anonymous#4, personal communication, 14 June, 
2013). However, bargaining depends on which party has more power. This viewpoint is 
debatable as there are multiple causes for the negotiation of invitation arrangements. 
Nonetheless, another interviewee further suggested that transportation cost is high because it 
is relatively expensive to travel to Europe from Taiwan (Liao, personal communication, 3 
July, 2014). Director Yu at the New York Cultural Center also identified the absence of 
corporate sponsorship in cultural exchange programmes. Despite available grants from the 
MOC or National Culture and Arts Foundation, which periodically open for applications, it 
remains a financial burden for artists and arts companies to travel abroad. For international 
cultural exchange programmes, related service providers can be the best partners to make the 
projects possible. As the arts companies often struggle to afford transportation fees, it can 
also be a great partnership for airlines to sponsor the artists. However, as there are only a few 
carriers based in Taiwan, potential supporters are limited. The carriers occasionally provide 
special offers, such as discounted tickets (Ping, personal communication, 17 June, 2013; S. 
Yu, personal communication, 12 December, 2013). It can be found that most of the 
transportation cost is covered by public grant as part of the essential expense of touring 
abroad. 
In reality, corporate sponsorship for cultural exchange is not widely practised in 
Taiwan. Dr Chen Chih-cheng, former director of the Paris Cultural Centre, stated that 
entrepreneurs have mostly established their enterprises in Taiwan within just a few decades. 
There are many first-generation business owners, and it is his observation that after the 
second generation succeeds in the business, the idea of corporate social responsibility begins. 
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However, it is not until the third generation that these corporations start to recognise the spirit 
of corporate responsibility (personal communication, 29 November, 2013). Dr Chen (ibid.) 
suggested that large-scale corporations would support arts and culture whether the 
government encourages them or not. However, most of the enterprises in Taiwan are 
small-scale companies, and there are few large corporations. From Dr Chen’s viewpoint, it is 
the overall structure of the industry and corporation scale that correlates to the behaviour of 
sponsorship in the arts.  
In recognition of the difficulties of obtaining corporate sponsorship, Taiwan’s 
National Culture and Arts Foundation (NCAF) aims to foster potential sponsorship between 
arts and corporations, and establish a platform to serve this purpose. However, corporations 
have not proved as enthusiastic as the NCAF had hoped. It commissioned research on 
corporate sponsorship in Taiwan, identifying that over half of the corporations sponsored at 
most one or no arts activities each year (Chen, Tsai, & Yu, 2000). For those who had 
supported the arts, the main motivation was to contribute to society and recognition of the 
benefit this had for the image of the business. Over 70 per cent of the surveyed companies 
did not have a regular budget for supporting arts and culture. The research also revealed that 
most of the interviewed corporations considered it government duty to improve arts and 
culture and the public sector should play a more active role. Despite the spontaneous support 
for the arts from some corporations, it is neither an obligation nor a responsibility of a 
corporation to fund arts activities. The research also found that most of the participating 
corporations did not consider tax exemption for sponsoring the arts sufficiently appealing. 
The research illustrated a certain mindset of corporate sponsorship in Taiwan and the lack of 
motivation for companies to do so. Despite the work of the NCAF since 2006, the successful 
partnerships between arts and business are mainly project-based rather than long-term. 
Regarding the development of corporate sponsorship, Director Ping Heng (personal 
communication, 17 June, 2013) of the National Theatre and Concert Hall observed that 
corporations prefer to select the programmes that match their own identity and image. 
Usually, the companies willing to support the arts prefer to choose the more renowned artists 
and organisations in Taiwan (Liao, personal communication, 3 July, 2014; Anonymous#4, 
personal communication, 14 June, 2013). Some arts organisations perform more frequently 
abroad than at home, so they are relatively unknown to the corporations. Furthermore, as 
sponsors do not target overseas markets but the domestic market, there is no promotional 
benefit in supporting cultural diplomacy events (Anonymous#4, personal communication, 14 
June, 2013). Thus, it is even more challenging for arts companies to seek sponsorship when 
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touring abroad, as corporations prefer the big names in the arts with established reputations 
and administration. These are more likely to gain trust from the sponsors. As my interviewee 
(ibid.) suggested, a new mechanism is required to encourage the corporations to support the 
arts.  
Tax exemption is one of the main benefits of supporting the arts. However, even if the 
large corporations intend to give support, setting up a private foundation is preferred in 
practice. Instead of looking for image-matching arts companies, its own foundation would 
have greater control over image and reputation. More importantly, the foundation can be a 
sub-organisation for the business to be legally exempt from tax. Other than setting up 
foundations, many entrepreneurs have established cultural organisations responding to their 
own interests, such as the Chimei Museum (Chi Mei Corporation) or Evergreen Symphony 
Orchestra (Evergreen group). With sufficient financial support from the corporation, their 
operations are influenced by government policy orientation to a lesser extent. Thus, the 
corporation may prioritise its own cultural establishments in philanthropic practice. As my 
interviewee (Anonymous#1, personal communication, 2 July, 2014) pointed out, the required 
initial funds to establish a private foundation are 30,000,000 New Taiwan Dollars 
(approximately 600,000 British Pounds in 2015), which is easily affordable for these 
corporations. They can help promote corporate identity and enjoy tax exemption. For the 
founder, it is easier to serve his or her own charitable interests and purposes. Few strong 
incentives exist for them to provide grants to other arts organisations. Consequently, it 
requires strategic planning from the arts organisations to establish corporate sponsorship.  
In terms of cultural diplomacy, the Taiwanese government and the quasi-autonomous 
non-governmental organisation (quango) are also eligible to receive donations from the 
private sector. The National Theatre and Concert Hall (NTCH) is one of the actors in cultural 
diplomacy (as illustrated in section 5.7). Although the NTCH became the first administrative 
corporation in 2004, and has more experience in fundraising, Director Ping Heng (personal 
communication, 17 June, 2013) revealed that its sponsorship is usually project-based. For 
corporations, sponsoring the NTCH is eligible for the same tax exemption as donating to the 
government. However, it was also Ping’s observation that companies and their foundations 
are more enthusiastic in supporting charitable works other than arts and culture.  
Despite the legal eligibility to receive donations, little financial support from the 
private sector flows into the MOC’s cultural diplomacy programme. The most recent and 
significant example was the Taiwanese tycoon Samuel Yin’s funding of the Spotlight Taiwan 
programme. In 2013, the MOC launched the Spotlight Taiwan programme with funds from 
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Yin (Yen-Liang). The Spotlight Taiwan programme aims to encourage and support 
partnerships with foreign universities and cultural organisations to promote Taiwanese 
culture. The programme is a four-year project with a four million US Dollars budget. Each 
year, one million US Dollars will be granted to successful proposals by universities or 
cultural organisations invited by the MOC. The funds can be used to host cultural and 
academic activities. This programme is a rare exception of philanthropy in arts and culture as 
the money is directly given to the government. Nonetheless, as the funds from Yin are only 
for four years, it requires further financial resources to maintain the partnership with the 
cultural organisations and academic institutions. One solution might be to establish a 
designated fund for the purpose of sustaining private sponsorship towards cultural diplomacy. 
Although the importance of sustainability in establishing foreign partnerships has been 
recognised (Anonymous#1, personal communication, 2 July, 2014), further legislation is 
needed to encourage more donations from other private actors.  
Additionally, financial flexibility for overseas cultural institutions might be helpful to 
establish partnerships with institutions and corporations in the host countries. During my 
fieldwork, I proposed the idea that the future Taiwan Academy or cultural centres could be 
transformed into Administration Corporations, which allows the institution more freedom for 
fundraising. This idea, according to my interviewee (Anonymous#1, personal communication, 
2 July, 2014), is unlikely to materialise as government income and expenses must be 
transparent. As cultural centres are set up overseas, it would be difficult to scrutinise the 
procedure.  
To sum up, there are several reasons for the absence of corporate sponsorship in 
Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy and relations practice. First, few motivations exist for 
businesses to sponsor art in cultural relations. Culturally, the idea of corporate social 
responsibility is still new in Taiwan, and arts and culture may not be the priority if 
corporations attempt to fulfil this obligation. It also depends on where the corporation’s target 
market is located, as the sponsorship must match its business interests and marketing purpose. 
Secondly, larger business brands may remain an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) 
supplier, or not seek to be identified as a Taiwanese brand (see section 5.8). Moreover, the 
scale and the reputation of arts organisations would also influence the potential for 
fundraising in the private sector. The current fundraising mechanism is not the best working 
model for arts and business, and it requires adjustments to increase sponsorship. It would be 
beneficial for the cultural organisations to form long-term partnerships with business for 
more cultural exchange opportunities. It is also crucial for the public-funded administrative 
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corporations, MOC and the cultural centres to re-think the current project-based fundraising 
model in order to form long-term partnerships. 
 
6.5 Collaboration with NGOs and private foundations 
In contrast to the absence of Taiwanese corporations in cultural diplomacy, 
Non-Governmental Organisations’ (NGO) international participation has played an important 
role in Taiwan’s public diplomacy, as the government has limited space to manoeuvre due to 
the political situation. Their engagement once again represents the importance of private 
actors in public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy. Actors from civil society who participate 
in public diplomacy can enjoy more credibility and trust among audiences when they are 
detached from the government and its political agenda (Rawnsley, 2014). In Taiwan’s 
cultural diplomacy, there are many cases of NGOs and private foundations participating in 
the process, and their relationships with the government vary. For instance, they can be 
recipients of MOFA subsidy for international exchange activities, and the MOC can also 
provide subsidy either annually for core operational expenses or on a project-basis. In this 
section, I discuss three different cases of their engagement. In addition to receiving 
government subsidy similar to the arts organisations’ international tours, the NGOs and 
private foundations can become partners of the MOC and further extend the reach of 
Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy.  
In the first case, Not-for-Profit Organisations (NPO) and NGOs in Taiwan are often 
partnered with government in cultural diplomacy with the advantage of professional networks. 
For instance, through the outsourcing process, the government can call for bids from these 
organisations to execute governmental projects. These organisations can have more flexibility 
and efficiency compared with the bureaucracy. Also, it might be easier to access their 
worldwide professional network. One example, the Taipei Book Fair Foundation (TBFF), 
was established in 2004, by a group of publishers in Taiwan unsatisfied with the then 
operational strategy of the Taipei Book Fair (Taipei Book Fair Foundation, 2014). The group 
of publishers began their lobbying and urged the Government Information Office (GIO) to set 
up a designated organisation for the Taipei Book Fair. Instead of establishing a new 
government department for the Taipei International Book Exhibition, eventually, it became a 
non-governmental organisation initiated by the private sector to continue hosting this event.  
As the foundation is an NGO, funding to fulfil projects can only be assigned through standard 
government procedures developed on the basis of the Government Procurement Law. 
Although the TBFF has hosted the Taipei International Book Exhibition every year since 
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2005, their partnership must be renewed annually. The TBFF not only hosts the Taipei 
International Book Exhibition, but also acts as a government partner. In terms of hosting and 
attending international book fairs, the TBFF receives funding from the GIO (now part of the 
MOC) and is responsible for hosting professional training and travel arrangements for 
attending book fairs in other countries. As the government encourages Taiwanese publishers 
to sell copyright for book translation, the TBFF is also responsible for organising the 
‘national pavilion’ in international book fairs, such as the Frankfurt Book Fair, or the 
Bologna Children's Book Fair. In short, this kind of partnership is outsourcing government 
projects to private foundations. The TBFF shares part of the work of the MOC and cultural 
centres in promoting Taiwanese books abroad.  
From an administrative perspective, there are advantages for outsourcing cultural 
diplomacy projects to NGOs. For instance, the management of manpower can be more 
flexible and adjustable for project execution. However, I suspect this practice does not 
necessarily benefit policymaking in the long term, if government officials have not obtained 
knowledge and experience of actual project implementation. Furthermore, under existing 
government regulation, the bidding needs to be carried out periodically (mostly annually). 
Without establishing a long-term contract, frequent bidding procedures simply for the sake of 
fulfilling regulations can be a waste of administrative resources.  
In the second case, the NGOs can be important actors in the cultural exchange 
between Taiwan and China. However, the partnership might be short-term and unstable. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the primary agents in Taiwan-China relations have been Taiwan’s 
private actors (Chu, 2011). This is also the case in the cross-Strait cultural relations. Without 
contested official status, it is more convenient for NGOs to engage in relevant projects. As 
previously mentioned, in 2011, the Quanta Arts Foundation of Taiwan was commissioned by 
the government to establish the website ‘Bravo.net’ with the aim of providing information for 
cross-Strait cultural relations. In order to enhance cross-Strait cultural relations, the Quanta 
Arts Foundation has already acted as a facilitator for relevant activities. Whilst the Taiwan 
government is unable to establish offices in mainland China, the Quanta Arts Foundation has 
its Beijing office and has provided legal consultation for arts companies (Wu, personal 
communication, 31 May, 2013). Through the project of Bravo.net, the Foundation collected 
administrative information for theatre companies that can be easily referenced. However, 
there was no further maintenance and update of the website contents after the project 
terminated in 2013. By the time of writing in 2015, the website was no longer active.      
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The case of Bravo.net serves as an example of the disadvantage of outsourcing a 
government project to NGOs. Although private foundations can be more flexible in realising 
government projects, the sustainability remains in question. As these partnerships are often 
on a project basis, once the contract ends, the government might need to seek new partners. 
In the case of Bravo.net, there was no subsequent maintenance or update of the website and 
the collected data are not accessible for the general public. In my opinion, the lack of 
sustainability can be both a waste of effort and money. The practice of outsourcing projects 
to NGOs can be convenient in terms of flexibility; however, there might be shortcomings in 
the long-term development of cultural diplomacy.   
The third case is through the NGOs; Taiwan’s overseas cultural centres can engage 
with the local cultural network in the host country. The case of the New York Cultural 
Center’s collaboration with the Asian Cultural Council (ACC) was significant. The 
collaboration not only showcased the Taiwanese artists, but it also represented mutuality. For 
the New York Cultural Center, it catered to the interests of the partner in the host country, 
and created opportunities for engaging with the local community.  
The collaboration between the ACC and the New York Cultural Center was the result 
of long-term cultural relations. I learnt from my interviewee, Cecily Cook, that as part of the 
Rockefeller Foundation, the ACC set up an endowment for Asian artists to visit the United 
States. Notable Taiwanese grantees included Lin Huai-min, the founder and artistic director 
of the Cloud Gate Dance Theatre in Taiwan. Besides the main office in New York, there are 
regional offices in Hong Kong, Taipei, Manila and Tokyo. When the ACC started its 50th 
anniversary celebrations, the New York Cultural Center proposed to collaborate and staged 
Dance Taipei in 2013. In the Dance Taipei programme, four Taiwanese dancers and 
choreographers who were recipients of the ACC grants showed their talents on stage. For 
both parties, it was a great opportunity to present their work. The performances not only 
invited the patrons of the ACC, but they were also open to the general public. With the aim of 
enhancing US-Asia cultural exchange, the ACC provides grants for artists, arts companies 
and academics from Asia who wish to visit the United States or vice versa. Taiwan has been 
included in its grant programme since 1953 and over 300 Taiwanese individuals and 
organisations have been grant recipients (Cook, personal communication, 16 December, 
2013). This event showcases the ACC’s work and the artists in Taiwan, and represents the 
US-Taiwan cultural connection. 
The collaboration between the ACC and the New York Cultural Center was at an 
opportune time and involved the right people. I learnt from my visit to the ACC that it had 
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been approached by the cultural centre and proposed the programme. Many Taiwanese 
contemporary dance artists who either receive their training or have residence in the United 
States, thus there are individual cultural links between both countries. As Schneider (2003) 
noted, this is important to successful cultural diplomacy initiatives, as it forms part of a 
long-term relationship and the cultivation of ties. Through this programme, the cultural link 
can be promoted. For the cultural centre, it was an opportunity to enhance its engagement 
with the local community.  
The scale and curating of this programme may be a unique opportunity; however, 
there are several key factors to examine in this collaboration. First, the ACC maintains a 
close relationship with its alumni. It follows the latest works or exhibitions of grantees and 
facilitates promotion. It is also beneficial for the artists to establish their reputation. From the 
perspective of the cultural centre, it requires knowledge of the artists in Taiwan with 
sufficient credibility to work with. The artists’ reputations are also enhanced through the 
grant-making process. Overall, it is based on mutual trust. Through the working process, the 
collaboration and partnership is renewed and reinforced.  
The case of the Dance Taipei presented by the ACC and the New York Cultural 
Center might not be easily replicated. Unlike some performance showcases or touring, this 
performance would not necessarily bring future invitations or business opportunities. 
However, it shows how many years it may take for organisations to establish cultural 
relations. As a private-funded foundation, the ACC has more freedom to make unconditional 
grants. As the overseas cultural centres are obliged to follow government fiscal restrictions, it 
would be very unlikely for the cultural centres to be able to distribute grants in the same way 
as the ACC. However, knowledge of existing cultural connections in the host country and 
attempts to facilitate them will be the task of current and future cultural attachés. Maintaining 
information on recipients of government grants for cultural exchange, either to or from 
Taiwan, should be a fundamental task for the government to trace carefully the long-term 
influences of cultural relations. 
 
6.6 Engaging individuals in cultural diplomacy 
In this section, how individuals participate in government policy implementation is examined. 
The importance of citizen diplomacy was recognised by Mueller and Rebstock (2012). The 
authors indicated that the result of citizen diplomacy could be profound. There are two types 
of citizen diplomacy. The first is spontaneous citizen diplomacy; those opportunities to affect 
others’ perceptions of the country lie in people’s daily activities. The second is intentional 
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citizen diplomacy, which means individuals deliberately choose to participate in programmes 
designed to build positive relationships (Mueller and Rebstock, 2012).  
I discuss first how the Taiwan government has engaged with young students through 
the Chinese Youth Goodwill Mission and the Youth Ambassadors scheme. The schemes, 
which can be considered as intentional citizen diplomacy, recruited college students to 
perform in foreign countries. Subsequently, I illustrate how enthusiastic overseas based 
Taiwanese proactively engage in government projects and collaborate with cultural centres, 
as well as discuss the case of overseas Taiwanese support of the Taiwan Gallery in the 
Queens Museum in New York. 
After the Republic of China (ROC) government lost its seat in the United Nations to 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1971, maintaining ‘friendship’ and links with 
foreign countries was still crucial for the government. As detailed by Chang Chuan-Yi (2009), 
as part of a public diplomacy strategy, the Chinese Youth Goodwill Mission members were 
selected by the China Youth National Salvation Corps every year from 1974 to 1999. After 
intensive choreography and rehearsals, the members were dispatched in groups to tour in 
different regions. The purposes of the project were twofold. The first was to enhance the 
collaboration with other higher education institutions, and, secondly, to foster relationships 
with the Chinese diaspora. The Chinese Youth Goodwill Mission carried out its mandate of 
cultural diplomacy through dance. Their performances presented traditional Chinese culture 
and established friendly links between the host country and the Republic of China. In the 
home country, it increased awareness of members from different universities and 
appreciation of culture in Taiwan. Chang Chuan-Yi (ibid.) illustrated how the scheme both 
served the purpose of cultural diplomacy and further contributed to the establishment of 
cultural identity. I suggest that the engagement of young students not only shaped cultural 
identity, but also made them aware of their power as individuals to contribute to public 
diplomacy.  
The conclusion of the Chinese Youth Goodwill Mission also reflected the changes in 
domestic politics. The scheme was inactive during the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
administration between 2000 and 2008. It was not until 2009 that the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs launched a new project called ‘International Youth Ambassadors Exchange 
Programme’. The mission of the project, as the MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015) 
stated, includes the strengthening of friendship with people in countries that recognise 
Taiwan. The aim is to promote the image of Taiwan’s ‘viable diplomacy’ and the ability to 
contribute to the international community. The programme is also expected to communicate 
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Taiwan’s soft power and introduce the college students to international affairs. Through this 
project, MOFA wishes to honour Taiwan’s role as the promoter of cultural exchange. In other 
words, this programme remains a government-sponsored activity aiming to facilitate public 
diplomacy. The impact of the International Youth Ambassadors Exchange Programme was 
recognised in Rawnsley’s (2014) study on Taiwan’s soft power and public diplomacy, as it 
has developed close personal relationships between the students engaged in the scheme and 
their counterparts in other countries. I agree that the strength of direct person-to-person 
communication is realised in the programme. For young students from Taiwan and its allies, 
the relationship can have profound influences on their views of each other’s country. 
Despite the significant impact the International Youth Ambassadors Exchange 
Programme can have, the programming of indigenous dance raised controversy over cultural 
appropriation in 2013. Performances are the core activities in both programmes of the 
Chinese Youth Goodwill Mission and International Youth Ambassadors Exchange Program. 
The Youth Ambassadors project also signalled a change in the type of cultural activity 
selected for presentation to foreign audiences. Compared with the previous Chinese Youth 
Goodwill Mission, which trained its members in traditional Chinese folk dance, the Youth 
Ambassadors rehearsed Taiwanese indigenous tribal dances and performed these abroad. 
This indicates a certain degree of openness to presentation of cultural diversity, which relates 
to internal cultural policy developments fostering multiculturalism. Unlike the Chinese Youth 
Goodwill Mission, which viewed overseas Chinese as their main audience (Chang, 2009), 
choosing Taiwanese indigenous tribal dances for non-Chinese audiences was an attempt to 
distinguish Taiwan from China. Nonetheless, the appropriation of indigenous culture and 
mismatched garments from different tribes and rituals were the main source of controversy. 
For instance, certain ornaments are only allowed on senior members in the tribe, or some 
colours are for funerals only (Kunaw, 2013). Former member of the International Youth 
Ambassadors Exchange Programme, Mr Yi-Chen Wu (2013) suggested that the project is 
implemented hastily each year and lacks adequate knowledge and research about ceremonies 
and rituals in different tribes in Taiwan, resulting in the mismatched outfits for performing 
aboriginal dances abroad. In addition, as Wu (ibid.) pointed out, the Youth Ambassadors 
consisted of mainly ethnic Han Chinese and did not have enough time to explore and research 
the indigenous culture in Taiwan. He further argued that the root cause of the controversy 
was the long-term neglect of indigenous culture in Taiwan’s cultural development. I would 
consider this as another example of how internal cultural policy can influence cultural 
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diplomacy. It also reveals the confusion that may arise when Taiwanese youngsters have to 
seek cultural identity whilst trying to differentiate themselves from mainland Chinese. 
As illustrated above, dance performances and cultural presentations in this 
programme constitute a more relaxed and entertaining format. Both the Chinese Youth 
Goodwill Mission and the Youth Ambassadors function in the realm of youth and public 
diplomacy, and the performances served as ‘icebreaker’ for their visits. Nonetheless, the 
hasty planning and touring are not an effective and accurate way to communicate Taiwanese 
culture. Arguably, as in the example of appropriation of indigenous culture in 2013, the 
presentation of traditions out of context merely creates and reinforces stereotypes.  
Furthermore, other important, albeit implicit, private actors in Taiwan’s cultural 
diplomacy are the Taiwanese diaspora. Maintaining the relationship with Taiwanese 
expatriates and emigrants is important in Taiwan’s foreign policy. Historically, the overseas 
Chinese supported the work for establishing the Republic of China. Overseas Chinese have 
been the target audience of the government’s foreign propaganda, even second or third 
generation, with the attempt to maintain their identity as Chinese and recognise the ROC 
government. In addition to propaganda, cultural and community centres and arts festivals are 
among the methods to engage the overseas Chinese community (Rawnsley, 2000). The 
Overseas Chinese Affairs Council (OCAC), formally established in 1932, is responsible for 
overseas Chinese guidance, immigration, educational guidance and cultural affairs. In 2015, 
there were 17 OCAC culture centres, including those in the United States, Canada, Brazil, the 
Philippines, and Australia (Overseas Community Affairs Council, 2014).   
However, it is my observation that the MOC in Taiwan has different views on 
engaging emigrants. When the Taiwan Academy opened its first branches in Houston and 
Los Angeles, the chosen locations were former cultural centres set up by the OCAC and their 
main function was to serve overseas Taiwanese. The MOC sketched another strategy for the 
Taiwan Academies. It would be transformed into a cultural hub with the main mission to 
serve non-Taiwanese visitors. The two tasks of working with Taiwanese emigrants and 
attempting to serve visitors from other backgrounds do not conflict. That said, the affairs 
related to overseas Chinese/Taiwanese are not the responsibilities of the MOC, and it may be 
difficult for two government departments to coordinate their efforts.  
The overseas Taiwanese remain active supporters of Taiwan’s cultural relations 
projects. With local connections in the host country, expatriates and emigrants can be 
potential volunteers for cultural exchange. Some of the expatriates in New York are artists 
and cultural professionals well-known to the cultural centre. They are also willing to help 
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promote Taiwanese culture. On certain occasions, the emigrants would sponsor or donate to 
individual artists for their stay in New York. 
Taiwanese expatriates or those with personal connections to Taiwan also assist in 
broadening the network of the MOC. For example, when the New York Cultural Center 
attempted to establish partnerships for the Spotlight Taiwan project, the proposals submitted 
were usually from schools with Taiwanese faculty members (Yu, personal communication, 
12, December, 2013). Taiwanese academics are usually more enthusiastic about the projects 
despite the goals of the grant not being directly linked to research output, but to host 
extracurricular seminars, conferences and film screenings. In addition, some non-Taiwanese 
teachers who studied Mandarin in Taiwan are willing to participate as well. If there are no 
faculty members with links to Taiwan, it is difficult for Taiwan’s cultural centres to establish 
new connections. Therefore, to launch a new project such as Spotlight Taiwan also relies on 
existing networks of overseas Taiwanese, or former recipients of Taiwan’s public diplomacy. 
Whilst the newly launched project aims to strengthen the partnership with foreign institutions, 
the intended effect is based on previous efforts of public and cultural diplomacy. 
The existing network of overseas Taiwanese also helped the New York Cultural 
Center to connect with organisations and to promote Taiwanese culture. Director Susan Yu 
(ibid.) of the New York Cultural Center mentioned the case of the Taiwan Gallery in the 
Queens Museum as an example. The museum is located in Queens, New York, where 
Taiwanese are a large part of the multi-ethnic community. The Queens Museum of Art 
underwent $73 million expansion and renovation, and the Taiwanese community, the MOC 
and the MOFA jointly contributed $250,000. In acknowledgement of this grant, part of the 
new gallery is named the ‘Taiwan Gallery.’ When the museum reopened as the Queens 
Museum in 2013, the Ministry of Culture and the Taipei Cultural Center in New York also 
funded the opening event, the sixth Queens International Biennial. Taiwanese independent 
curator Meiya Cheng collaborated with Hitomi Iwasaki, Director of Exhibitions at the 
Museum. In this biennial, the exhibition showcased a variety of Taiwanese contemporary 
artists in the Taiwan Gallery. As a legacy of this event, the Taiwanese American Arts Council 
(TAAC) was established in 2014 to carry forward the mission of the Taiwanese Art 
Endowment Fund, which made the Taiwan Gallery possible. Nevertheless, there is no 
permanent collection in the Taiwan Gallery, nor is there a dedicated space for the Taipei 
Cultural Center to use. In 2014, the newly established TAAC hosted a launch programme in 
the Queens Museum, the ‘TAAC Recognition-Taiwanese American Artist’ (Queens Museum, 
2014). The Taiwanese American Arts Council invited both Taiwan-based artists and 
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Taiwanese American artists to their exhibition and played a part in furthering Taiwan-US 
cultural relations.  
The Taiwan Gallery in the Queens Museum can be regarded as the result of the 
long-term relationship with the Taiwanese diaspora and the specific engagement of cultural 
centres in local communities. The two founders of the TAAC, Dr Lung-Fong Chen and 
Thomas Chen, are immigrants from Taiwan and both are successful professionals. Unlike 
public funding prioritising Taiwanese-based artists, the Council sponsors Taiwanese 
American artists. Both the TAAC and the artists can strengthen their existing connections in 
the United States. Furthermore, the Queens Museum has a significant role in the community 
in Queens, New York. Unlike the major museums, the Queens Museum is not on the 
Museum Mile in Manhattan. It is dedicated to presenting visual arts and educational 
programming, especially for the culturally and ethnically diverse residents of Queens. As a 
review by Holland Cotter (2013) in the New York Times illustrated:  
[t]he United Nations of voices we encounter on Manhattan’s streets is global but 
transient: Visitors from abroad come to town and they look, they shop, they leave. By 
contrast, the same range of accents we hear in Queens is global but local: People land 
from everywhere and stay, in one of the most ethnically diverse patches of residential 
real estate in the nation.  
The engagement of the TAAC or the Taipei Cultural Center with the Queens Museum may 
be a piece of the mosaic of multi-ethnicity in New York.  
Nonetheless, it could be argued that collaboration with arts organisations located in a 
residential area far from the city centre would not really raise the visibility of Taiwan. It may 
be considered that having an exhibition in world-famous museums with many international 
tourists would generate more visitors and expand the reach of Taiwanese art and culture. 
However, it is difficult to estimate whether it has more long-term influence on cultural 
relations. Gaining the naming rights of the Taiwan Gallery in the Queens Museum could be a 
start for future collaboration. The enthusiasm of the Taiwanese immigrants and expatriates 
can be beneficial for building local networks for cultural diplomacy. Additionally, as long as 
the Taiwanese diaspora still recognise Taiwan as their motherland and are willing to help 
promote Taiwanese culture through their existing local network, the benefits of cultural 
diplomacy are evident.  
From the collaboration between the New York Cultural Center and Asian Cultural 
Council, it can be seen that cultural relations take a long time to flourish. To collaborate with 
local organisations and to engage with the local community requires connections and 
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knowledge of cultural spheres in both host and home country. However, a knowledge base 
for either the cultural centres or artists and arts organisations is yet to be established in 
Taiwan. In terms of passing on experience or understanding and reflecting on the reality of 
cultural diplomacy, it will be necessary to establish a knowledge base for strategy-making. In 
this chapter, I examined how the government strategically engaged private actors. In the next 
chapter, I carry out a detailed discussion of my research findings and conclude the thesis. 
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Chapter 7: Discussions and Conclusions  
 
In this chapter, I discuss and evaluate the research findings and consequently conclude the 
thesis. I analyse a series of themes: the links between cultural policy and cultural diplomacy; 
challenges to the practice of cultural diplomacy; and the relationship between nation-building 
and cultural diplomacy. I revisit the research questions presented in the Introduction and 
provide my main conclusions.  
The discussion on research findings focuses on specific themes. First, I examine the 
problems of Taiwan’s strategy regarding its overseas cultural promotion. Secondly, I explore 
the links between Taiwan’s cultural identity and diplomacy. Thirdly, from the perspective of 
policymaking and implementation, I analyse the objectives of cultural diplomacy and its 
influence on cultural policymaking. Fourthly, the motivation and setbacks of the participation 
of the private sector are discussed. Finally, I conclude my thesis and make suggestions for 
future research. 
 
7.1 Discussion on issues of cultural diplomacy and policy implementation 
The link between cultural policy and cultural diplomacy in Taiwan, as examined in Chapter 5, 
has undergone several significant transitions. Historically, Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy role 
was to support conventional diplomacy. This was clear in the examined cases of Peking 
Opera in the 1930s. In that period, the main objective of cultural diplomacy was to support 
traditional diplomacy and create opportunities for networking and socialising. Nowadays, 
although this function remains important, others have been added following the establishment 
of the Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA) in 1981 as a government authority dedicated to 
cultural policy and affairs, and policy objectives having evolved not only in relation to 
changes in foreign affairs, but also in terms of internal cultural policy. Thus, in addition to 
supporting conventional diplomacy, the overall government strategies include grant-making 
and active promotion of cultural products as part of place-branding. The changes in policy 
goals are woven into official policy, such as the White Papers for culture in 1998 and 2004. 
Cultural diplomacy promoted the Republic of China (ROC) as the preserver of 
traditional Chinese culture, especially during the Cultural Revolution in mainland China 
(1966-1976). As analysed in Chapter 5, the intention of the KMT government to present the 
curated programme for the Peking Opera in the 1950s was to reassure audiences about the 
authenticity of Chinese culture presented in Taiwan and further reassure the legitimacy of the 
regime. Even though the claim of ‘legitimate representation of China’ subsided after the rise 
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in Taiwanese cultural identity awareness in the 1970s, the need for differentiation from the 
People’s Republic of China persisted in cultural diplomacy discourses. Relevant evidence can 
be found from the policy objective to establish the ‘subjectivity of Taiwanese culture’ during 
Tchen Yu-chiou’s term of office in the Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA) between 2000 and 
2004. Similar discourse can also be found in Minister Lung Ying-tai’s statement on the 
difference between the Taiwan Academy and the Confucius Institute (section 5.3) in 
opposition to China’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan. Although Tchen Yu-chiou and Lung 
Ying-tai served in different party administration and their views of Taiwanese culture differ, 
distinguishing Taiwan from China was an important message each sought to convey.  
The intention underlying the discourse of ‘let the world see Taiwan’ (or ‘make 
Taiwan visible’), which was also a slogan of arts companies (as discussed in Chapter 6), was 
the wish that international society acknowledged the existence of Taiwan and, at the same 
time, this recognition could be enacted through culture. However, achieving this goal would 
prove more difficult than expected. As Taylor (1997, p. 80) stated, ‘cultural diplomacy is 
very much an adjunct of conventional diplomacy. If the latter fails, the former suffers; but the 
former is considered worth trying in an attempt to lubricate the workings of the latter.’ It is 
arguable whether the cultural diplomacy would survive regardless of the obstacles the ROC 
faces in conventional diplomacy. Furthermore, the notion of soft power is also present in 
Taiwan’s cultural policy goals when promoting Taiwanese culture internationally. However, 
following Taylor’s (ibid.) argument, this goal is not easily achieved. As Wang and Lu (2008) 
argued, many in Taiwan consider soft power as ‘the weapon of the weak’ in the pursuit of 
security. When facing the complicated political relationship with China, the use of Taiwan’s 
soft power is rather an instrument for primarily pressing back against the PRC’s soft and hard 
power efforts to deny Taiwan statehood or to marginalise the country internationally (deLisle, 
2010). With its mismatched hard power resources, soft power serves as a second-best 
substitute in pursuing the security that Taiwan cannot achieve. I agree with deLisle’s 
viewpoint. In relation to the examples found in the research, cultural diplomacy is considered 
a means for Taiwan to exhibit its soft power. However, there remain pragmatic limitations 
that prevent the government from effectively achieving its goal. 
One of the examples comes from the restrictions of setting up overseas cultural 
centres. The analysis of regional planning in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy shows that the goal 
is to be recognised and to gain exposure in developed countries. This was particularly 
obvious when the CCA upgraded to the Ministry of Culture (MOC). Strategically, the new 
cultural centres are mostly in large global cities and in countries with no official diplomatic 
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relations with Taiwan. The negotiation of opening official cultural diplomacy cannot be 
separated from the existing diplomatic framework. One of the examples is the naming of 
cultural centres in different countries (see section 5.3). In the case of Taiwan, the names of 
cultural centres cannot be unified but need to be negotiated with individual countries. 
Although President Ma Ying-jeou proposed culture as an important asset in ‘viable 
diplomacy’ during his presidential campaign, I would argue that cultural diplomacy could not 
be the substitute proposed. On the contrary, the diplomatic deficiency restrains the impact of 
cultural diplomacy.   
Moreover, whilst the PRC spares no effort in its soft and hard power, the attempt to 
marginalise Taiwan also takes place on occasions of cultural relations; for example, the 
European Association for Chinese Studies (EACS) conference in Portugal in 2014. Despite 
the ‘softness’ that an education exchange occasion suggests, there remain sensitive issues 
when it comes to Taiwan. At the EACS, the ROC government protested the removal of the 
publication on the conference proceedings following a request from the PRC. This may have 
been a small disagreement, but such interventions by China can be considered a gesture of 
intimidation.   
In the internal strategy-making in Taiwan, the approach of prioritising culture can be 
a limitation in projecting Taiwan’s soft power. Rawnsley (2012) argued that the 
achievements in democracy could benefit Taiwan’s soft power capacity, but it is limited by 
the government’s prioritising of culture. It can be problematic to view culture as a premise of 
soft power, particularly when adequate evaluation is not in place. As Rawnsley (ibid.) 
pointed out, it is easy to measure outputs, but extremely difficult to measure impact. This 
equally applies to the indicators and factors in Taiwan’s plans of cultural diplomacy, such as 
the Global Outreach Action Plan. The government can measure output by using quantitative 
indicators, such as size of audience and events. However, the impact remains difficult to 
assess and evaluate. 
Furthermore, even if Taiwan’s democracy can benefit its soft power capacity, it is 
challenging to find a feasible method to advertise its achievements. In the 1990s, political 
advertisements published by the GIO featured the achievements of democratisation (Cheng, 
2007). However, as a young democracy emerging from martial law in less than 30 years, 
democracy in Taiwan still has room to mature. This is evidenced by the outbreaks of violence 
in Taiwan’s parliament (the Legislative Yuan), which have often featured in foreign media 
since the 1990s. The heated debates can sometimes turn into mass brawls. For instance, it 
was reported on the UK’s MailOnline in 2013 that the legislators exchanged punches and 
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threw water at each other before a vote on a national referendum to decide whether to finish 
building the fourth nuclear power plant on the island (Tomlinson, 2013). To some extent, this 
example also reflects the fact that government advertisements may fail to deliver the desired 
outcome as the audience has multiple sources of information. Messages that government 
advertising intends to promote are not necessarily received by the audience.    
Democracy in Taiwan might not be fully communicated through current policy 
implementation, or strategies of cross-Strait relations. For example, Chinese student 
exchange could be an opportunity to understand Taiwan’s soft power democracy. Taiwanese 
scholar Yun-Han Chu (2011) considered that Taiwan could serve as a Chinese model of 
social and political pluralism, and, most importantly, of media and individual freedom. 
Students witnessing party-politics and elections, whilst living in Taiwan, can gain a unique 
first-hand experience of the workings of democracy even if relatively young. However, the 
disputes over allowing Chinese students healthcare in Taiwan and restrictions on their length 
of stay and work allowances after graduation may undermine the effort to promote Taiwanese 
soft power. Moreover, the development of market-orientated strategies for exporting cultural 
products, especially when aiming for the mainland China market, also communicates 
Taiwan’s democracy through cultural relations. Issues of self-censorship in Taiwan’s theatre 
companies touring in mainland China have raised concerns about diminishing freedom of 
speech. Despite the potential of broadening the market of Taiwanese theatre, film, and 
popular music in China and generating considerable revenue, unresolved problems of 
Chinese censorship and controversy over the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement cannot be 
ignored. There remain difficulties regulating and normalising cross-Strait cultural 
communications and exports. To seek commercial success may benefit the industry itself; 
however, it may not have more impact on Taiwan’s soft power in the long term.   
My research findings indicate that the formation of cultural identity correlate with 
cultural diplomacy and vice versa. Through tracing the cultural policymaking process in 
domestic politics, the recognition of ‘others’ has been particularly important in cultural 
diplomacy. Therefore, to be seen by ‘others’ in the international community is crucial, 
especially in relation to the formation of Taiwan’s cultural identity. This connection was 
evident in Tchen’s term in office at the CCA (2000-2004). Her policy approach aimed at 
developing ‘Taiwanese subjectivity’ as a way of distinguishing Taiwan from China. Here, I 
consider the formation of cultural identity as a process of seeing ‘through others’ eyes.’ 
Tchen’s approach to promotion overseas was replaced when President Ma Ying-jeou (in 
office 2008-2016) attempted to brand Taiwanese culture within the wider context of Chinese 
 191 
culture (see section 4.2). However, with the tensions brought about by the Ma 
administration’s cross-Strait policies, I argue that the relations with the ‘China outside’ 
(mainland China) also affected the attitude of ‘China inside,’ which I refer to as the shared 
Chinese cultural elements. President Ma Ying-jeou’s cultural identity discourse was difficult 
to justify, as evidenced by annual research of Taiwanese/Chinese Identification Trend 
Distribution in Taiwan; the percentage of respondents that identified themselves as 
‘Taiwanese’ instead of ‘Chinese’ or ‘both Chinese and Taiwanese’ had risen steadily after 
2008. 
In terms of identity formation, the campaigns to generate more exposure for Taiwan – 
to become visible – remain a powerful motivation for Taiwanese to support cultural relations 
programmes. Issues related to soft power are closely linked to a nation’s 
domestically-contested self-perceptions or government-initiated constructs of identity 
(Melissen, 2011). In line with these arguments, the domestically contested self-perceptions 
can be part of the process of creating cultural distinctiveness. Societies seek to voice their 
stories to find their audience and to be heard. In the case of Taiwan, contested 
self-perceptions have long influenced domestic cultural politics. In the context of diplomatic 
isolation, distinguishing Taiwan and making the country visible is also an important part of 
national identity construction. The domestic audience gains a sense of participation in 
cultural diplomacy, acknowledges the arts companies’ international engagement and take 
pride in the work as part of Taiwanese culture. The connection between the arts companies 
and domestic audiences can be strengthened through fundraising projects. This sharing is an 
important element for cultural identity formation. Both the company and the audience are 
part of the imagined community in the sense proposed by Benedict Anderson (1991). In the 
fundraising campaigns (illustrated in Chapter 6), the arts organisations heading to the 
Edinburgh Fringe Festival used the phrase ‘let the world see Taiwan/the new dance aesthetics 
of the Payuan in Taiwan’ to strengthen the connection between the funder and the company. 
This fundraising appeal publicised the benefits the company tour could bring. The company 
was not only campaigning for itself, but also for Taiwan. In this respect, it can inspire the 
funder to support a company, and to help send them abroad. This generates a sense of pride.  
However, the imagined community can sometimes be challenged in cultural exchange 
projects. It can be seen from the cases of the Taiwan Pavilion at the Venice Biennial and the 
Flagship Production at the National Theatre (see section 5.7), that the engagement of foreign 
artists in cultural projects pertaining to the representation of Taiwan abroad has aroused 
debate and controversy. It is reasonable to argue that the ideology of nationalism still matters 
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when the government plans to promote Taiwan, especially in terms of resource allocation and 
the interpretation of culture. The disputes over interpretation of Taiwanese culture reveals 
that projecting ‘national’ culture remains the main objective of cultural diplomacy. In other 
words, rather than seeking mutual understanding with others, the self-presentation remains 
the main concern in the process.  
Nonetheless, the case of Flagship Production at the NTCH demonstrated the attempt 
to build mutuality, co-operation and exchange. The cultural identity of Taiwan remains an 
issue, whilst the dispute over Director Suzuki Tadashi’s interpretation of Taiwanese popular 
songs and his alleged cultural appropriation raised controversy among cultural professionals 
in Taiwan. This case revealed the anxiety of self-definition and concerns over how 
Taiwanese culture was interpreted by others. Moreover, I suggest that potential problems of 
cultural appropriation or misinterpretation are concerns as the cultural elements are 
incorporated into the production. How Taiwanese culture is understood and interpreted 
becomes an issue in a production intended to serve the purpose of cultural exchange. 
To a certain degree, this issue of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy mentioned above 
reflects a question that Rawnsley (2012) raised about the fundamental issue of Taiwan’s 
cultural diplomacy: who has the power to define Taiwan’s culture, and why? This question is 
not unique to Taiwan, especially when it comes to promoting a country’s culture overseas. If 
the government decides to promote the high arts by targeting the elite and opinion leaders, it 
remains questionable whether the cultural product would be appreciated by the middle or 
working classes. This might be a top-down process that is not fully democratic.  
I suggest two ways to analyse the disputes. First, does the government have the power 
to ‘define Taiwanese culture’? In the case of the Taiwan Pavilion of the 2013 Venice 
Biennial, the administration had the power to decide whom and which projects received 
public funding by allocating resources for curating a national pavilion. In this case, the 
curator Esther Lu had to contend with political correctness in her decision to showcase 
foreign artists’ work in the Taiwan Pavilion. However, the controversy raised by the choice 
of artists showed that disapproval of the administration’s decisions was possible. In the case 
of the Flagship Production at the NTCH, artists and cultural professionals were the first to 
express their opinion and question the decision. In my opinion, these controversies 
represented democracy in the process of cultural identity formation. If the government seeks 
to define ‘Taiwanese culture’ single-handedly, it can be difficult to gain support. It is unlikely 
for a single government official or institution to define Taiwan’s culture without being 
supported by fellow citizens. 
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Furthermore, the controversy surrounding foreign artists’ engagement in the Taiwan 
Pavilion was confusing and contradictory. It was in sharp contrast to the acclamation of 
Taiwanese companies when touring abroad. Although both approaches have a similar 
intention, to ‘let the world see Taiwan,’ being viewed by foreign audiences and being 
presented by foreign artists led to different reactions in Taiwan. This may be explained by the 
anxiety of losing the power of interpretation over cultural identity in the division of ‘self’ and 
‘other.’ The unsettled issues of cultural identity in Taiwan are embodied in different aspects 
of cultural diplomacy. The fundamental questions of who has the power to decide what 
Taiwanese culture is, which part is worth promoting, and who presents it, relate to 
controversies involving several cases of cultural promotion in the public sector. Whilst 
cultural diplomacy became an outlet of cultural identity, the collaboration with foreign artists 
also became a sensitive issue. Potential cultural appropriation and inappropriate resource 
allocation were the main concerns raised by Taiwanese artists. The government needed also 
to ensure that its promotion of a national image was not the sole objective of cultural 
diplomacy. 
The collaboration between famous artists and the NTCH remains an opportunity for 
cross-cultural production. This is an occasion to re-think and re-create a cultural identity. 
Cultural identity is not static, as argued by postmodernists. Quite the opposite, it can be fluid 
or reshaped over time (Preston, 1997). Through the two-way process in such cross-cultural 
production, the cultural elements can be revisited and developed further. This process may 
not only inspire artists, but also reflect their views on cultural identity. 
From the perspective of resource distribution, who is eligible for funding in cultural 
diplomacy is an issue of funding allocation. I discovered that most of the Taiwanese artists 
funded by the New York Cultural Center were ROC citizens and based in Taiwan. Although 
understandably the resources are reserved for Taiwanese artists who do not have existing 
connections to work internationally, this raises the question of whether ‘Taiwanese culture’ 
needs to be confined to ‘culture made in Taiwan.’ Considering the government’s aim is to 
showcase Taiwanese culture to a global audience, collaboration with Taiwanese artists based 
in countries with cultural centres may be an effective strategy worth more consideration. This 
can be developed, for example, by actively linking the different networks that the artists are 
familiar with, which could be beneficial to foster collaborations among cultural institutions 
and the cultural centres. Such new approaches may generate more opportunities to showcase 
Taiwan-based artists and expand professional networks. Moreover, in terms of increasing 
cultural influence internationally, to collaborate with foreign artists who have resided in 
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Taiwan would introduce another viewpoint of Taiwanese culture. I would suggest it can 
enhance mutual understanding between Taiwan and other countries, and have an impact 
beyond ‘let the world see Taiwan.’ 
In parallel to the issue of cultural identity in the domestic sphere, Taiwan faces 
another challenge: situating Taiwanese culture in a wider historical and geographical 
framework. From my fieldwork, I learnt that to ‘distinguish Taiwan’ either from China or 
neighbouring Asian countries was a serious concern, which was very visible when the New 
York Cultural Center promoted Taiwanese culture (see section 5.5). Often, when curating 
exhibitions in galleries or museums, professionals include Taiwan in an Asian context. 
However, to distinguish Taiwanese culture from that of other Asian countries is a challenge. 
The culture has been heavily defined by colonisation, so it is difficult to ignore the influence 
of China and Japan. If the government searches for a cultural product as a recognisable icon 
of Taiwanese culture and seeks to establish a new identity, a quick fix will not suffice. In the 
search for a ‘representative work’ to define the distinctive characteristics of Taiwanese 
culture, the government must avoid falling into the trap of subsidising established artists 
instead of new work and vice versa. The strategy should be more holistic and nurture both 
traditional and contemporary. 
Furthermore, when seeking to find a ‘representative work’ or a ‘representative 
cultural element’ of Taiwan to showcase, the government needs to be aware that this is not a 
one-way process. The findings also raise the question of who has the power to choose what is 
‘representative’ of a country, and according to what criteria the selection is made. From 
examining the strategy of hosting a showcase in the OFF d’Avignon since 2007, and the 
Edinburgh Fringe since 2014, it is questionable whether this fits the purpose of the festival. In 
2015, at the festival OFF d’Avignon, Olivier Py, the director of the Festival d'Avignon was 
reported to have shared his observation with the then Minister of Culture Hung Meng-chi that 
the Taiwan showcase emphasised too much tradition and national identity, therefore blurring 
the artistic expression (Yang, 2015). In my view, the biggest challenge is showcasing the art 
itself without the burden of presenting ‘Taiwan.’ Despite several arts organisations acting as 
the cultural diplomats of Taiwan, this does not mean that the artists who receive subsidy for 
cultural relations must be flag-bearers. The works of those who have a strong artistic agenda 
may not sit well with the representation of the nation. Under such circumstances, the 
government needs to re-think its cultural diplomacy strategy and develop policies beyond 
national self-presentation. 
 195 
In addition to projecting Taiwan’s national image, government supported 
participation in arts festivals also reflects shifts in international cultural policy and internal 
cultural policy. In 2002, the DPP government started to promote the cultural and creative 
industries, and it became an important part of domestic policy that was included in the 2004 
White Paper for Culture. In the Ma administration (2008-2016), overseas cultural activities, 
such as exhibitions, do not merely serve the function of propaganda or supplement diplomatic 
occasions, but are also hosted with the expectation of access to foreign cultural markets. 
Compared with the overseas cultural activities that the CCA and Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA) used to support, which emphasised mainly the performing and visual arts, cultural 
diplomacy and cultural export have extended to cultural products, such as popular music. I 
suggest that the Law for the Development of the Cultural and Creative Industries, passed in 
2010, and the Global Outreach Action Plan in 2013, reinforced this change of strategy. The 
Law for the Development of the Cultural and Creative Industries allows the MOC to 
coordinate with its overseas offices to assist relevant enterprises in establishing an 
international brand image, attending well-known international exhibitions and performances, 
competitions, expositions and arts festivals. In other words, it enables cultural products to 
gain more exposure with the aim of expanding the related international markets and 
promoting sales. Business and market are thus included in the MOC’s cultural diplomacy 
strategy.  
As far as developing creative industries is concerned, the broadening of overseas 
markets is essential and beneficial for the policy objectives of the MOC. In my opinion, the 
strategy is not entirely beneficial for the promotion of cultural products overseas. The 
government’s assistance has made it easier for cultural entrepreneurs, such as publishers, to 
participate in overseas business exhibitions and arts festivals (as illustrated in sections 5.5 
and 6.5). To promote the sales of cultural products is the expected outcome of the 
government subsidy, and, ultimately, to assist entrepreneurs. However, my research findings 
indicate that most of the grants provided for accessing overseas markets were on an annual 
and project basis. Arguably, it requires a more long-term strategy for grant giving. I also 
found that a long-term study of how the image of Taiwan is perceived in foreign countries is 
absent. The lack of research and analysis makes it impossible to frame and adjust a strategy 
based on the reception of Taiwan and difficult to trace the impact of policy implementation. 
Further to the lack of a long-term strategy, the use of quantifiable indicators in setting 
policy goals reveals a blind spot in Taiwan’s policy. As the findings presented in Chapter 5 
show, the issues of quantifiable indicators can be found in some government projects, e.g. the 
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Gourmet Taiwan Action Plan accounted for the number of attendees in its activities. By 
setting a quantifiable index, it is easy to rely on numbers and measurable factors to determine 
whether the targets are achieved. However, it remains unclear whether the policy objectives 
can be achieved through such numbers. For example, it takes more than simply calculating 
the audience numbers to understand the demographic characteristics of the audience. It is a 
flawed way of determining whether a policy goal has been achieved, as this does not reflect 
the actual situation. The efforts are likely to be futile without knowing who the attendees are 
and their qualitative feedback. The research findings indicate that it is most likely beyond the 
capacity of cultural centres to carry out qualitative research with their current resources.  
In terms of setting policy goals, the MOC is aware of the issue of quantitative 
indicators. In the evaluation of policy objectives, the Global Outreach Action Plan published 
in revealed that the evaluation methods of the MOC are almost all quantitative measures, 
such as the number of audience members, or the number of visitors to exhibitions and 
webpages. Moreover, the number of collaborative projects carried out by the Ministry and its 
sub-organisations is also an indicator of evaluation. These numbers, however, can only reflect 
a certain aspect of public engagement in the projects. In the interviews conducted with 
officials from the MOC, they admitted the absence of more detailed surveys or qualitative 
research to assess further the performance of these projects. This is partly due to the shortage 
of staff in overseas outposts. As for foreign collaborators, such as the Spotlight Taiwan 
partners in overseas universities, it is difficult to obtain follow-up surveys because of limited 
resources (Yu, personal communication, 12 December, 2013). Possible performance 
indicators might include media exposure and publication as alternatives to assess foreign 
public relations. Being reviewed by major publications, especially prestigious newspapers 
such as The New York Times or The Times of London, is considered a success by the cultural 
centres. This finding also reflects the difficulties of the government to evaluate the long-term 
effects of its own cultural diplomacy projects.  
However, much of the media exposure is often the result of public relations 
operations. The credibility of different media is taken into consideration when selecting 
media coverage in the research analysis. In terms of media types, the Taiwanese government 
especially values the opinion leaders or critics from reputable newspapers. Thus, the publicity 
generated from these cultural events may increase awareness of Taiwan. If the programme or 
artist could attract the attention of professional networks, especially curators and theatre 
producers, opportunities might also arise for the artists to be invited to tour or to perform in 
large festivals. In order to evaluate the policy action plan and reports, the number of 
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successful cases is considered an indicator of effective government implementation of policy. 
For instance, the New York Cultural Center has collaborated with the Joyce Theater to stage 
contemporary dance works from Taiwan. The performance of the box office in each 
production is also an indicator of the centre’s success. However, it remains debatable what it 
means for a cultural diplomacy project to be successful. To be defined as ‘successful,’ from 
my reading of the existing criteria, a project must be linked to a famous art institution, and all 
tickets must be sold and excellent reviews received from the critics. The standard may be too 
uniform for every project to achieve; nevertheless, it reveals another blind spot of 
policymaking – the interests of Taiwanese culture do not necessarily translate into tangible 
soft power outcomes, as Rawnsley (2014) argued. Although Rawnsley (ibid.) suggested that 
to understand the audience and to determine with whom one wishes to communicate is 
essential in such programmes. However, this is difficult to achieve due to practical 
constraints, such as limited manpower and budget. This might lead to a pessimistic outcome, 
as the government cannot better understand the audience of cultural diplomacy projects due 
to limited manpower and budget; thus, such resources cannot be invested properly. In the 
long-term, the government’s work might be in vain.  
There is yet to be an integrated policy in different government departments that 
coordinates activities in Taiwan. Indeed, this lack of coordination was one of the weaknesses 
identified by the MOC in the Global Outreach Action Plan. During the CCA era, cultural 
affairs in cultural exchange was categorised as a sub-division of the department. This 
demonstrated the rationale of placing cultural diplomacy within the realm of cultural policy. 
The difficulties of inter-departmental convergence have been recognised, and a structure of 
advisory committees is considered an effective way of achieving a degree of integration 
between internal and external cultural policies, as Mitchell (1986) suggested. In practice, 
cultural diplomacy programmes are carried out under the administration or public funding of 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Culture, and Science and Education. According to the 
multi-country study of cultural diplomacy conducted by Wyszomirski et al. (2003), it was 
common for a number of ministries, departments, subordinate agencies and third party agents 
(or non-governmental organisations) to be involved in terms of responsibilities and funding. 
This was similarly the case in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy, as language and scholarly 
exchange programmes are the responsibility of the Ministry of Education (MOE), whilst the 
development of cultural products and promotion of arts is overseen by the MOC. It was also 
recognised in the Ditchley Foundation report of 2012 that getting other policies right is vital 
to enabling individuals and civil society to engage in cultural diplomacy (Holmes, 2012). A 
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point made in the report is that only governments could have the overall vision to unify 
policies, such as visa regimes, intellectual property rights, tax policies, insurance programmes, 
etc. This level of integration is yet to be seen in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy. For example, as 
illustrated in section 6.4, current policies on tax exemption in Taiwan do not provide 
sufficient motivation for corporations.  
Given the problems of coordinating strategies across different departments in Taipei, 
it is important to explore how this issue affects the delivery of cultural diplomacy in the host 
countries. Diplomatic work abroad is usually under the control of the Representative Offices, 
which are the main bodies to sign agreements and treaties with foreign countries. A 
cross-departmental body to coordinate the affairs of cultural diplomacy is a solution. 
Wyszomirski et al. (2003) noted that countries such as Sweden and Australia employ a 
variety of interdepartmental task forces or councils to coordinate international cultural 
relations within government. Although the Taiwan Academy was designed as a 
cross-departmental platform for coordination, it faces obstacles regarding cross-ministerial 
communication, limited budget and constraints in personnel recruitment (Ministry of Culture, 
2013a). The issues that the Taiwan Academy faces reveal the weakness of Taiwan’s 
bureaucracy in promoting cultural diplomacy. First, an efficient mechanism for 
cross-departmental communication and coordination is absent. Secondly, issues with the 
recruitment of staff and budgeting are also drawbacks in its administration.  
This is disappointing and represents a missed opportunity; the Taiwan Academy could 
have been a new institution to integrate different targets in cultural diplomacy. In addition, 
the Taiwan Academy has the potential to employ an interdepartmental task force. I argue that 
the overall operation plan for the Taiwan Academy should look beyond the setting up of a 
‘salon,’ as former Minister Lung Ying-tai suggested, and be more ambitious. As illustrated 
above, the policy implementation of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy has constraints because of 
the inefficient cross-departmental design. The bureaucracy also limits the cultural centres 
from having more freedom in terms of personnel and budgeting management and allocation.  
The design for a cross-departmental body for cultural diplomacy could be an 
‘administrative corporation’ organisation, which already exists in Taiwan’s legislature. The 
‘administrative corporation’ structure was first adopted by the NTCH (now part of the 
National Performing Arts Centre, NPAC). With this structure, the Taiwan Academy can fulfil 
the role of a cultural organisation that serves a public function but operates at arm’s-length. 
The design is in reference to the ‘arm’s-length principle’ that originated in the UK for 
organisations such as the Arts Council England. The British Council also traditionally has 
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this kind of relationship with the government. It is sponsored by the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office whilst operating with a semi-independent status (Pamment, 2013). 
Following the example of the British Council or the NPAC in Taiwan, the Taiwan Academy 
should be more efficient and flexible in funding and employment decisions. Without the 
restriction of engaging only civil servants or contract employees, as for example the MOC, 
the Academy can recruit candidates with a wider range of expertise. With more freedom 
hiring and recruitment, the Taiwan Academy can collaborate with local staff and broaden 
their knowledge in the host countries. Therefore, it can be beneficial for enhancing cultural 
relations in the host countries. Financially, the ‘administrative corporation’ status allows the 
Taiwan Academy to receive corporate sponsorship as in the case of the NPAC. In addition, 
the MOC could consider establishing an endowment dedicated to cultural exchange to sustain 
the operations of the Taiwan Academy, as proposed in the Ma administration. The 
government could provide the initial funding to set up the endowment, and decrease the 
amount of funds in subsequent instalments.  
To achieve this potential under the current framework, I enquired about the possibility 
of establishing a new institution adopting the ‘arm’s-length principle’ when interviewing the 
MOC officials. One of my interviewees identified several restrictions that this proposal might 
face. First, it is not in the central government’s plan to have another administrative 
corporation institution (Anonymous#1, personal communication, 2 July, 2014). In addition, 
the auditing procedure was considered an issue. Due to the complexity of missions that the 
Taiwan Academy is expected to fulfil, there are strict fiscal regulations in its operation. As 
most of the funds are primarily for spending in foreign countries, the idea seemed less 
feasible under current government regulations. Nevertheless, since the Taiwan Academy is a 
government initiative in its infancy, it is worth pursuing the possibility of setting up new 
government regulations or modifying existing ones.  
However, the issues of cost efficiency remain a concern for the government. 
Considering the impact of the structure of cultural centres and current government fiscal 
regulations, a drastic transformation to enhance cultural diplomacy is unlikely to happen. 
Any structural decisions will also depend on where the MOC and the MOFA place cultural 
diplomacy in the development of their strategies, or if a more integrated approach could be 
adopted. I argue that if cultural diplomacy remains largely the facilitator of conventional 
diplomacy and a means to generate connections with countries that Taiwan does not have 
official diplomatic relations with, the government is likely to retain its control over cultural 
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diplomacy rather than establishing an arm’s-length cultural institution to realise the function 
of cultural diplomacy. 
Despite the bureaucratic restraints from the public sector, enthusiastic arts 
organisations and overseas Taiwanese have been motivated to participate in overseas cultural 
promotions. From artists participating in government-subsidised showcases to philanthropic 
donations, the interest of the private sector can be observed. However, there are also 
conditions that might prevent them actively joining the programmes. In terms of participating 
in an international tour, being invited by curators or self-registering in theatre festivals, this 
requires administrative skills in each arts organisation. In the case of Taiwanese artists, it 
would not be feasible for cultural centres to act as agents for individual artists, not to mention 
larger companies. The companies would require the development of more professional 
administration. Through participating in international activities and tours, the experience and 
expertise can be developed in each company. It is also a challenge for companies that are 
short on full-time administrative staff. In some cases, manpower can be hired on a 
project-basis, but not long-term. Flexibility is considered appropriate to enable organisations 
to adjust the personnel costs; however, the instability of staff numbers does not benefit the 
company to develop its administration. In the long term, it may not be the most efficient way 
for overall administration and development as some knowledge could not be passed on and 
updated regularly. 
The research findings have highlighted that the shortage of experienced 
administrative staff has more impact when a company aims to broaden its international 
engagements. Often, the particular skills required for international exchange, such as 
language competence and familiarity of overseas markets, also correlate with a higher wage, 
which obviously puts additional pressure on budgets. Alternative solutions include the 
company opting to hire project executives only covering the touring period, but there remains 
administrative work to be done before and after the actual tour. The follow-up contacts build 
upon the tour and the reimbursement for the expenses also takes time to process. In the end, 
appointed office staff who are accustomed to these processes would be better for the 
administrators across companies to maintain the capacity for international engagements.  
Among companies that wish to gain international experiences, sharing knowledge and 
experiences with other experienced companies could be helpful. The Cloud Gate Dance 
Theatre is arguably the busiest touring arts organisation in Taiwan, and shared its experiences 
of international tours in the MOC-organised conference in 2013. In addition to Cloud Gate 
Dance Theatre, four other ‘Taiwan Brand’ companies have also shared their experiences in 
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several cities in Taiwan. Besides the conferences, the NCAF also published articles 
discussing overseas networking and connections, and, in general, provide information for 
organisations wishing to step into foreign markets. Sharing knowledge between arts 
managers has become easier through social media and professional networks. The shared 
knowledge can help other companies to have a general idea of how to initiate an international 
tour, but this may not be possible because of the heavy workloads of companies.  
Having identified some difficulties in building capacities for the arts organisations, in 
Chapter 5, I presented how the government policies and cultural centres could provide 
assistance to artists when touring in the host countries. The cultural centres desire invitations 
or other collaborations between Taiwanese and overseas arts organisations. Whilst the 
government aims to promote Taiwanese culture globally, enhancing the infrastructure of the 
domestic cultural environment can have a long-term effect that lasts longer than grant-giving. 
Although opportunities for international tours can open the door for Taiwanese arts 
organisations, it can also be a huge challenge for the company to conduct follow-up work by 
itself. From analysing the implementation of cultural diplomacy programmes, I argue that 
changes in cultural diplomacy strategy are not able on their own to overcome existing 
shortcomings regarding cultural policy. On the contrary, unresolved problems in cultural 
policy and development can affect the export of culture and arts. The government’s role 
should be more than as a grant provider and support the development of arts companies who 
wish to participate in international cultural exchange. For instance, establishing a knowledge 
base for international development for government officials, cultural professionals and artists 
can be a precious resource for those who wish to expand further their expertise. Instead of 
promoting Taiwanese culture on a project-basis, a thoroughly planned development strategy 
is essential for long-term external cultural relations.   
In addition to administration capacity, financial risk is another main reason why 
artists are discouraged from engaging in international events. In cases of overseas invitations, 
where the host venue or festival can provide hospitality, it remains common for Taiwanese 
companies to seek additional financial support from the government, grant-providing 
foundations, or corporate sponsorship to cover the transportation cost. Public funding can be 
considered the most reliable source of income for arts organisations, as the MOC, following 
the example of the CCA, continues its grant-scheme. Nonetheless, it reveals an overlap of 
funding allocation. Although the NCAF was founded on similar principles to the National 
Endowment for the Arts in the United States, the MOC still directly distributes and allocates 
funding to the arts organisations. There are also a variety of project-based grants available. 
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Public funding provides a steady income for arts organisations and covers part of their 
operation cost. However, my research tracing the funding trends shows that it remains 
project-driven. The strategy on promoting cultural industries through policy initiatives 
remains heavily reliant on grants allocation. From the cases of promoting Taiwan’s 
independent music through participation in international festivals, it remains debatable 
whether the government should sponsor the activities regardless of the characteristics of the 
cultural product per se. It also raises the fundamental question of the government’s role in 
cultural products promotion; when different cultural genres require different professional 
knowledge in cultural promotion and exchange, it is impossible have a single working model.  
The analysis of the current funding distribution strategy of the MOC suggests that 
among the arts organisations, the largest and the smallest companies have the most resources 
for international cultural exchange. For instance, the ‘Taiwan Brand’ grants scheme focuses 
on large-scale performing arts companies who have more productions and performances each 
year. They also enjoy the advantage of having more knowledge and experience of grant 
applications. With more administrative knowledge, it is easier for them to produce relevant 
documents that fulfil the institutional procedures. The small companies could also benefit 
from the showcases at the Edinburgh Fringe Festival or the OFF d’Avignon. Nonetheless, the 
medium-sized arts organisations, which are not large enough to be eligible for part of the 
‘Taiwan Brand’ grant, nor small enough to present their works in showcases at fringe 
festivals, need to seek other forms of international engagements. To design a mechanism 
accessible for all arts organisations that wish to gain more international experience remains a 
challenge for governments to consider.  
Moreover, timing is a problem when applying for government grants. The grants from 
the MOC are often announced and granted on an annual basis, and need to be used within the 
fiscal year under the scrutiny of the benefactor. With such short notice for funding 
application and processing, it is often difficult for arts organisations to have long-term 
planning and financial arrangements. It is particularly unrealistic for overseas tours as the 
required preparation time is often longer than one year. Restrictions on funding add to the 
difficulties of companies’ operating with long-term arrangements. It is possible that the 
companies learn that they have not been awarded public funding when the tour approaches 
and do not have time to find alternative financing. As a result, the company could face a 
deficit. Thus, there is a potential financial risk. In the long-term, it also reduces the appeal to 
engage in international cultural exchange. An interviewee (Anonymous#5, personal 
communication, 28 September, 2013) observed that this undermines the artists’ enthusiasm 
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for international projects. Thus, an identifiable problem in the current government strategy is 
that despite the allocation of funding and encouragement from the MOC, the restrictions of 
such funding can act as a disincentive for artists.  
Also, it is questionable whether artists can receive government funding whilst 
remaining independent. This is an important question rarely raised in Taiwan. Nonetheless, to 
provide funding to encourage cultural exchange activities can ease some financial pressure 
for arts companies to carry out projects. If the arts organisations can be financially 
independent, the cultural exchange projects can proceed with more freedom. 
However, due to the high cost of travelling abroad and lack of large corporate 
sponsorship in cultural relations, it is inevitable that arts organisations will apply for 
government funding. Philanthropy from individuals in the fields of arts and culture in Taiwan 
is not as widely practised as in the United States or even the United Kingdom. There is a lack 
of motivation for private corporations to sponsor the arts in general, not to mention overseas 
cultural relations projects, which are not commonly referred to as branding opportunities. 
Taiwan’s industrial development has yet to develop an overseas brand management (see 
section 5.7). Furthermore, the ideas of corporate social responsibility and sponsorship have 
not been widely disseminated and practised in support of the arts by large corporations. 
Interestingly, contributions from passionate overseas Taiwanese and small donations can be 
found in occasional projects. Assistance from private individuals seeks to link Taiwanese arts 
with local cultural organisations in the host countries, such as the Queens Museum in New 
York. The engagement from overseas Taiwanese shows the energy of civil society and 
requires further long-term research to understand how this model can be sustained.    
In terms of new methods of fundraising, crowd-funding campaigns have emerged in 
recent years among some arts organisations. For supporting companies’ overseas tours, the 
crowd-funding sponsors act more like donors. Unlike some crowd-funding projects that 
propose their ideas online and look for initial funds for their start-up companies by providing 
the products as rewards, the crowd-funding projects for touring abroad tend to provide 
company souvenirs and promotion materials in return. The actual final products – their 
performances – take place abroad and cannot necessarily be enjoyed by the sponsors. This 
kind of crowd-funding campaign can be categorised as donation/reward. It is because people 
believe in the cause that they invest and rewards can be offered such as acknowledgements 
and free gifts. Except for the possible intangible return of ‘feeling good’ about helping, 
donors have a social or personal motivation and expect nothing in return (UK Crowdfunding, 
2015). Evidently, the ‘make Taiwan visible’ factor works in such campaigns, as it is easy to 
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instill a sense of identity to motivate donors to contribute to the cause. Crowd-funding creates 
a sense of community and vice versa. Its success shows the enthusiasm and support that 
individuals can provide in cultural relations. For the companies, it is also a great way to 
publicise their works to a domestic audience in Taiwan.  
With the rise of social media, crowd-funding campaigns that mainly operate on the 
Internet could further increase awareness of the company. The power of social media in 
politics has been recognised by Shirky (2011, p. 29), who remarked that ‘the networked 
population is gaining greater access to information’ and ‘an enhanced ability to undertake 
collective action.’ The collective action that brings the general public together is visible also 
in these crowdfunding projects. Examples include Jade and Artists Dance Troupe’s and 
Tjimur Dance Theatre’s crowdfunding campaigns to attend the Edinburgh Fringe Festival in 
2014. The crowd-funding platforms allow these companies to roll out their fundraising 
project in a very short time and the process is easy to monitor. Combined with social media, 
word can be spread quickly, an advantage when there is a limited budget for advertising. 
However, as the companies only receive the funds when they reach the fundraising target 
within the set schedule, there are also risks in raising funds through these platforms.  
The analysis of the deficiencies in policymaking illustrated the administrative 
difficulties of the government, which prevent a more efficient strategy-making and policy 
implementation. I also discussed the financial challenges that discourage artists and cultural 
professionals from engaging in cultural diplomacy projects. The lack of continuous financial 
support can be an obstacle for the organisations wanting to maintain stable numbers of 
administrative staff for overseas tours. From the perspective of policymaking, this problem is 
difficult to solve by providing more funding. In the next section, I conclude and present my 
contribution to knowledge in this field of research.  
 
7.2 Conclusions 
In this thesis, I examined the formation and the implementation of Taiwan’s cultural 
diplomacy strategy from the perspective of cultural policy. The main research question was 
whether Taiwan’s (the Republic of China) cultural diplomacy and cultural policy operate to 
fulfil the political objective of making the country internationally visible through policy 
implementation. Additional research questions concerned the policy practice in terms of 
several interrelated aspects. First, I analysed the importance of cultural diplomacy in 
Taiwan’s foreign affairs. Secondly, I traced how cultural diplomacy has been incorporated in 
Taiwan’s cultural policy. Thirdly, I investigated the crucial challenges faced by the 
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government when practising cultural diplomacy and the potential solutions. I also examined 
how private sector actors participate in the process and the difficulties they face. Finally, I 
questioned whether the strategy in place fulfils the policy goal. 
With the limited formal diplomacy available to Taiwan, it is questionable whether 
cultural diplomacy could help promote the country internationally by resorting to the use of 
soft power assets. From the empirical evidence collected in this research, I analysed several 
main challenges for Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy, including the long-term isolation in 
international affairs, the bureaucracy of the government structures, and existing issues in 
national and cultural identity. The research identified three main conclusions regarding 
Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy: cultural diplomacy complements traditional diplomacy, 
showcases cultural and creative industries and acts as an outlet in the cultural identity 
formation process. Each element is prioritised at different phases of policy development and 
practice, though they are not necessarily mutually exclusive.   
In all three aspects mentioned above, the ‘China factor’ has played a significant role 
in strategy-making and political discourse. The complicated political relations between the 
two countries influence heavily Taiwan’s cultural politics. Using Shelley Rigger’s (2011) 
term, both the ‘China inside’ and ‘the China outside’ have deeply influenced the cultural 
diplomacy strategy. First, in the external official diplomatic environment, the establishment 
of Confucius Institutes by China has been for the Taiwanese government an important 
element to consider and respond to. It was a significant challenge in the Ma administration to 
differentiate and promote the so-called ‘Chinese culture with Taiwanese characteristics.’ 
Secondly, as cultural diplomacy serves as an outlet to promote cultural identity, the existing 
issues of shared cultural heritage and language inevitably influence the strategy. That is to 
say, the anxiety to differentiate Taiwan from China is evident in policymaking. Thirdly, the 
similarities of language and demographics make China a potentially large market for 
Taiwan’s cultural exports.  
Despite the unresolved political problems, the cultural exchange between both sides 
of the Taiwan Strait recently reached a high point with the arrival of Chinese tourists and 
students in 2008. However, the political stalemate remains an obstacle that prevents further 
advancement in bilateral cultural relations. Both Taiwanese and Chinese governments refuse 
to recognise each other’s legal status, which makes negotiation and agreement on legal affairs 
for cultural exchange extremely difficult. In addition to the political recognition problems, 
censorship in China has become a major concern for promoting Taiwanese cultural products 
there. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to project Taiwan’s soft power, its democracy 
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and freedom of speech in China. In parallel, although universities in Taiwan have opened 
their doors to Chinese students, the restrictions placed on their healthcare and job prospects 
potentially undermine the effort to attract them to Taiwan and to appreciate its culture. At the 
same time, there are concerns over self-censorship when Taiwanese cultural professionals 
produce works targeting the Chinese market. Cases of omitting political and sexual materials 
in the cultural products have emerged in recent years (as I have argued in section 4.5). Whilst 
there are no clear rules on overcoming China’s censorship system and the two governments 
cannot negotiate on equal terms, the Chinese market remains attractive if uncertain for 
Taiwan’s cultural professionals. The political issues will still have impact on the cultural 
relations between Taiwan and China. 
The contested political status of Taiwan and its complicated relation with China make 
the country a unique case to examine in terms of cultural diplomacy and foreign affairs. 
However, Taiwan is not alone in wishing to exercise its soft power through cultural 
diplomacy. In practice, the changes in Taiwan’s bureaucracy have influenced the 
strategy-making of cultural diplomacy. Although cultural diplomacy can serve to 
complement conventional diplomacy, interestingly, the government department responsible 
in Taiwan operates mainly in the realm of cultural policy and less so foreign affairs. The 
research identified that, in terms of cultural diplomacy, performing arts and visual arts were 
the main cultural activities programmed by the CCA (the MOC after 2012) and presented in 
the overseas cultural centres. The programmes have extended to other cultural products, such 
as films and popular music. The MOC in Taiwan is the main government department that 
drafts and frames the overall cultural diplomacy strategy, and its reshuffling and 
re-organisation in 2012 has had an influence on the strategy-making and implementation. The 
MOC faces challenges from the integration of staff previously working in different 
departments and rapid expansion of numbers of outposts. This organisational change also 
reflects on the cultural diplomacy programmes. With staff from the GIO, the Ministry was 
still in the process of integration and adaptation at the time of writing. Whilst its work 
focuses mainly on propaganda and media relations, the former GIO staff require professional 
skills training and overall strategy planning to familiarise themselves with the new roles. For 
cultural attachés from the former GIO, knowledge of arts administration is crucial to engage 
with arts activities overseas. 
If we consider that one of the objectives of cultural diplomacy is to present a national 
image, the research showed that the target audiences of the Taiwanese government are 
generally not countries with which it has diplomatic relations. Concerning diplomatic allies, 
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public diplomacy and foreign aid were the main missions carried out. On the contrary, 
countries and cities with frequent cultural activities and which do not have diplomatic 
relations are prioritised for Taiwan to establish a cultural presence. This reflects the 
differentiation in diplomacy strategy. It also raises a question about the popular slogan ‘let 
the world see Taiwan.’ Which part does Taiwan want to be visible to the rest of the world, 
and why? The Taiwanese government’s geographical priorities combine diplomatic 
consideration (e.g. the United States as a priority of foreign affairs), enrichment of existing 
personal connections with cultural ministers (France) and the organisational change of 
cultural affairs authorities. In addition, several of the MOC outposts are established in 
capitals or large cities, where rich cultural activities take place and can provide more 
opportunities to engage in diplomatic circles. Furthermore, international cultural festivals (e.g. 
the Edinburgh Fringe Festivals and the festival OFF d’Avignon), fairs (e.g. the Frankfurt 
Book Fair) and international arts exhibitions (e.g. the Venice Biennial) are cultural activities 
that the Taiwanese government actively engages in to make Taiwanese culture visible. These 
cultural activities allow Taiwanese artists to present their works to a global audience and gain 
recognition from cultural professionals, such as curators, critics and the media. Through these 
cultural professionals, the Taiwanese artists can benefit from the global and local networks 
and become more visible. Nonetheless, when reviewing the government’s cultural diplomacy 
strategy, it is evident that the changes in the population are not being taken into account in 
policy developments regarding cultural diplomacy. This research revealed that, in spite of a 
considerable number of immigrant workers and marital immigrants from Southeast Asia, the 
Taiwanese government did not engage with their home countries in cultural relations until 
very recently.  
Another explanation of the elite-orientation of Taiwan’s cultural strategy is its role as 
a facilitator in diplomatic relations. As illustrated in Chapter 5, since Mei Lan-fang’s Peking 
Opera toured the United States in the 1930s, cultural activities have played a role in the 
Republic of China’s foreign affairs. These supplements of conventional diplomacy remain, 
especially considering that Taiwan neither has official diplomatic relations with most 
countries in the world, nor membership in international organisations. Cultural activities 
provide an opportunity for establishing connections with diplomatic circles, politicians and 
opinion leaders. Such a tendency can be found in the First Lady’s honorary presidency of arts 
organisations’ overseas tours. The cultural centres can take advantage of such opportunities 
to host receptions with cultural activities to connect with politicians. This helps maintain 
relationships, as the politicians do not necessarily set foot in Taiwan’s representative offices.  
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However, I argue that if Taiwan seeks more influence in terms of projecting its soft 
power, the challenge for the government is to broaden its audience to include the general 
public. In this respect, despite government initiatives, such as the Spotlight Taiwan 
programme, the target group remains the universities. In practice, most people who are 
attracted to these initiatives are already familiar with Taiwan. Although there have been 
advertisements for branding Taiwan, these publicity materials are mainly one-way 
communications and it is difficult to evaluate their effect. The empirical evidence collected in 
this research indicates that though cultural centres and theatre companies have sought 
audience feedback, it is either small-scale data collection (e.g. guestbooks) or not achievable 
due to limited staff numbers. In other words, a large-scale and continuous understanding of 
the audience is yet to be achieved. I argue that this constrains the government’s evaluation of 
its programming and the development of a long-term strategy. 
In terms of cultural diplomacy as a showcase of cultural and creative industries, 
Taiwan’s strategy has incorporated place branding. The promotion of Taiwan through film, 
publication and tourism is evident. The trend of incorporating cultural industries into cultural 
diplomacy as part of the promotion was connected to government polices on developing the 
creative and cultural industries. Among all the cultural activities involved in cultural 
diplomacy, the performing arts have had a long history, although different forms of 
government sponsorship reflect changes in domestic cultural policy. Subsidising the 
production of cultural industries has become a major government policy to encourage 
Taiwan’s cultural and creative industries. With the aim of promoting Taiwan’s film industry, 
the MOC subsidises film productions in Taiwan, and city municipalities also allocate 
resources to assist film shooting and post production. In addition to promoting tourism, the 
expected returns of these promotional programmes include publicity and job opportunities 
that might emerge during the production period. However, the difficulties that prevent 
products from being sold overseas do not always concern funding. Take China as an example, 
legislation, treaties, and agreements between governments are essential for facilitating 
exports. This requires more inter-governmental negotiation beyond grant-giving strategies to 
gain long-term benefit for the cultural industries.   
The promotion of art and cultural products overseas is an extension of domestic 
cultural policy. The former cannot succeed if the latter fails to address existing problems in 
policy practice. The close relationships between the Taiwanese government and artists are 
especially evident in showcases. Financial and administrational challenges exist in both the 
public sector and cultural organisations. Issues such as a lack of human resources, lack of 
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professional training and restrictions on budgets and subsidies are considered potential 
factors preventing cultural professionals from engaging in international cultural exchange. 
Furthermore, the shortage of foreign language staff in the public sector is a disadvantage for 
cultural promotion. To realise cultural diplomacy in Taiwan, certain hurdles must be 
overcome including a bureaucratic system with budget and recruitment limitations. This not 
only constrains the operation of the MOC and cultural centres, but also has an impact on the 
arts organisations receiving public funding. 
In its strategy for cultural exports, the government’s principal role is being a grant 
provider. Concerning further formalising of long-term relationships, signed treaties and 
agreements in bi-lateral or multi-lateral cultural relations are beneficial, but less part of the 
government’s agenda. I argue that it demonstrates the difficulties the Taiwanese government 
is facing in formalising cultural affairs agreements with other countries and international 
organisations. The role of the government in cultural diplomacy should be in developing and 
strengthening legislation regarding cultural export and relations. However, this is not a 
priority of the Taiwanese government, partly due to the ambiguous political status of Taiwan. 
Also, this obstacle to cultural diplomacy affects the planning needed for the development of 
activities in the overseas cultural centres. Most work plans proposed each year are 
project-based collaborations with local cultural organisations. Long-term and integrated 
collaborations are unlikely. Such deficiencies are obstacles to the establishment of a 
continuous cultural presence overseas. 
Although showcasing Taiwan’s cultural and creative industries enables Taiwanese 
professionals to gain more international experience, I suggest that the government is 
gradually developing the role of a market-orientated ‘cultural-agency.’ When subsidising arts 
companies to attend festivals, receiving subsequent invitations and touring opportunities are 
the key performance indicators for both the government and theatre companies. Other 
indicators include media exposure and reviews by established art critics. These raise 
awareness of Taiwan, but do not necessarily reflect the reality. As regards communication 
with other cultures, this occurs in multiple forms of cross-cultural activities. For artists and 
companies, the experience can be beneficial, but it does not necessarily guarantee financial 
success. It is debatable whether the government and the artists should be more 
market-orientated when developing a cultural diplomacy strategy. Although it can be part of 
cultural diplomacy to provide assistance in exporting cultural products, the government needs 
to reconsider its role and resource allocation. If the Taiwanese government cannot fulfil its 
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mission of governance and legislation, the financial and administrative support of cultural 
exports may be ultimately ineffective.  
Regarding cultural diplomacy as an outlet in the process of cultural identity formation, 
this dissertation concludes that the arts demonstrate different phases of cultural identity in 
Taiwan. The image of ‘guardian of traditional Chinese culture’, which used to be presented 
during the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement (see section 4.2) was challenged with the 
rise of Taiwanese cultural awareness in domestic politics. It is difficult to have a ‘settled’ 
Taiwanese cultural identity bearing in mind the complicated historical relations with China 
and Japan, and especially considering that the formation of identity operates in the long term 
and is ultimately not a fixed category. Cultural identity is in the making, and Taiwan 
gradually frames itself through gaining recognition in cultural relations.   
In discussion of the interaction between ‘self’ and ‘others’ in the process of cultural 
diplomacy, the research reveals that the slogan ‘let the world see Taiwan’ has, perhaps not 
coincidentally, appeared in both government official documents and arts organisations’ 
fundraising campaigns. The desire to be visible, as I suggest, was the result of the 
long-isolated international status of the Republic of China/Taiwan. The cultural products 
being exported overseas also reflect shifts in Taiwan’s cultural identity. As the mainstream 
culture of the majority Han Chinese in Taiwan is very similar to that in China, to distinguish 
Taiwan from China as an independent collection of cultures is an essential process of 
nationalism. The emphasis on presenting indigenous culture overseas is indicative of the shift 
in culture representation and interpretation. Nonetheless, without thorough understanding, 
cultural appropriation may occur if the indigenous culture is not properly presented and the 
differences between tribes in Taiwan are ignored. This can be seen in the controversy over 
misinterpretation of the indigenous people’s clothing at the International Youth Ambassadors 
Exchange Programme in 2013. This case also reveals the issues of domestic cultural policy 
that do not enhance understanding of indigenous communities.  
Furthermore, when using the ‘let the world see Taiwan’ as a slogan in fund-raising 
appeals, it is intriguing to see the artists or companies place the home country before 
themselves. The process of ‘to be seen’ and ‘seeing that happens’ has become an important 
element of community, gaining support, and further contributing to identity construction. 
From the research findings, it is evident that the encouragement of private actors to engage in 
public and cultural diplomacy is deeply rooted in government programmes such as the 
Chinese Goodwill Mission and the Youth Ambassadors. The motivation for supporting 
Taiwanese cultural promotion overseas is also found in overseas Taiwanese sponsorship (see 
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section 6.6). The enthusiasm of the Taiwanese American Arts Council in New York was 
notable in its sponsorship of Taiwanese artists.  
The enthusiasm from the private sector to promote Taiwanese culture is illustrative of 
the need for recognition and cultural identity. The urge to seek and re-think the cultural 
identity formation can also be found in the cases of cultural relations that raised controversies. 
The controversies surrounded the entitlement to present Taiwanese culture, and are an 
opportunity to revisit some fundamental questions. What exactly does ‘Taiwanese culture’ 
mean? Can it be defined as ‘Made by Taiwanese’ or ‘Made in Taiwan’? This idea is 
challenged when cultural collaboration and exchange is practised between artists from 
different cultures or residents in different countries. The anxiety of cultural appropriation – in 
which Taiwanese culture is not presented properly – can be seen in two foreign artists’ 
cultural collaboration projects (see section 5.7). These cases concerned the issue of 
entitlement to interpret and represent Taiwanese culture and further allocate resources.  
Demonstrating pride in one’s culture and recognition by others are important elements 
of Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy and nation-branding initiatives. Nonetheless, it should be 
noted that cultural diplomacy and cultural relations are not restricted to ‘self-presentation.’ 
However, mutual understanding as a goal of cultural relations is not widely found in policy 
documents in Taiwan, nor raising awareness of shared causes, such as climate change or 
humanitarian issues. Appreciating Taiwanese culture is part of the process of mutual 
understanding, and the objective beyond that is rather vague. Government goals are to gain a 
presence in foreign media or the cultural sphere and to promote further Taiwanese culture. In 
other words, the cultural communication with others is rather a one-way process without 
achieving mutuality in the long-term. In general, Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy focuses on 
self-presentation instead of seeking mutuality, thus weakening the outcome of 
communication. If the issues of cultural identity remain unsettled, Taiwan’s cultural 
diplomacy strategy will still prioritise the representation of Taiwanese culture instead of 
mutual understanding.    
Regarding misunderstanding in culture or cultural appropriation, I consider the role of 
‘cultural translator,’ which was suggested in the MOC Global Outreach Action Plan, should 
be evident at an institutional level. Under the current structure, this can be within the cultural 
centres and the MOC. The MOC can further re-design the training course for cultural attachés. 
If the collaboration between MOC and other academic institutions achieves understanding in 
cultural diplomacy, its knowledge base could be of benefit. Therefore, the importance of 
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providing appropriate training for the cultural attachés should be officially recognised as a 
necessary prerequisite. 
A crucial objective of this study was to understand whether cultural diplomacy could 
compensate for the disadvantages of Taiwan’s conventional diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy is 
a means to exercise soft power and further establish relationships. Simply carrying out 
cultural activities would not meet the objectives per se. Nor can cultural diplomacy be 
considered a simple solution to Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation. Moreover, I argue that the 
weaknesses of conventional diplomacy already had an impact on the strategy-making of 
cultural diplomacy. Due to the ambiguous political status, the Taiwanese government 
continues to find it difficult to negotiate and formalise cultural relations into treaties and 
agreements. Also, Taiwan is prevented from joining international cultural organisations, such 
as UNESCO. Despite the participation of public cultural institutions in professional networks, 
the impact is comparatively limited. 
An additional finding related to policy implementation aiming to justify public 
spending. The policy objectives are often evaluated using quantifiable indicators. Whether 
these outcomes reflect the policy goals is difficult to determine, especially when the 
indicators focus on numbers of attendees or events. The projection of soft power is not 
necessarily evidenced in the current market-driven policy orientation and the quantification 
of policy outcomes that does not truly identify change.  
The existing policy implementation has encouraged the general public to participate 
in cultural relations. The research also explained why corporations are less motivated to 
participate in cultural diplomacy. In terms of place-branding and the promoting of Taiwanese 
products, there is clearly a gap between what the policy is intended to achieve and the reality 
in Taiwan. Despite the enthusiasm among the general public, the concern is that this will not 
be sustainable in the long-term.  
In this study, alternative models were proposed to solve the bureaucratic difficulties in 
the practice of cultural diplomacy. One possibility is the adoption of the existing 
‘administrative corporation’ model developed by the National Performing Arts Centre, and 
the UK’s arm’s-length principle. If the MOC can incorporate the cultural centres and the 
Taiwan Academy into an arm’s-length system, it might fulfil its function with financial and 
administrative flexibility. However, the proposal may not be feasible under the current 
system. Without drastic change in the organisations, it is likely that future policy 
implementation will still be restricted. 
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7.3 Research contribution and issues for future research  
The research focused on a single case study of a country with limited hard power and its 
efforts to obtain soft power by means of cultural diplomacy. The research provides empirical 
evidence on how cultural resources can be used to establish relationships based on soft power 
without possessing much hard power assets. In the case of Taiwan, the use of soft power 
assets is limited by deficiencies of hard power. The theoretical background examining the 
concept of soft power provided the context to understand the relevant areas of public 
diplomacy and cultural diplomacy. First, the term ‘soft power’ is contentious and can be 
interpreted as having multiple meanings, especially when defining culture as one of the soft 
power resources of a country. The complexity of understanding ‘culture’ leaves room for 
interpretation when the government attempts to incorporate cultural diplomacy as part of the 
strategies to project soft power. Therefore, soft power has several operational definitions in 
policy implementation.  
The development of soft power promotion in Taiwan is similar to that of other 
countries in East Asia. As Melissen (2011) suggested, the issues related to soft power are 
closely linked to domestically-contested self-perceptions or government-initiated constructs 
of national identity. Despite the inconsistent interpretation of soft power, the concept has 
been widely used among policymakers. Identifying and promoting soft power can be 
considered part of national identity construction, but it cannot solve the long-existing 
problem of Taiwan’s sovereign status. President Ma Ying-jeou wished to include cultural 
diplomacy as part of his ‘pragmatic diplomacy’ strategy and to promote Taiwan’s soft power 
overseas. Although culture is one of the resources of a country’s soft power, it can hardly 
exist on its own without powerful foreign policies and clear political values. The 
cross-influence among the three sources needs to be addressed to foster the desired cultural 
diplomacy. However, instant changes in Taiwan’s sovereign status are unlikely in the near 
future. The ambiguity in Taiwan’s international status could remain, and, therefore, limit the 
impact that cultural diplomacy can create.  
While Taiwan is not admitted to decision-making international organisations, such as 
the United Nations, the use of cultural activities is considered an alternative way to create an 
international presence. However, whether the presence could turn into further resources 
remains uncertain. On the one hand, there is no research or surveys to trace the perceived 
image of Taiwan; on the other hand, the set programme goals mostly concentrate on 
quantifiable indicators that do not really evaluate change. Whether other sets of indicators 
could reveal a larger and more complex picture of Taiwan’s international presence remains 
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unknown, and could be explored in further studies. However, if the policymakers fail to 
realise that it depends on the receiver rather than the sender to control the perception of a 
country, policies aiming to boost and promote soft power can be ineffective. Also, it is 
unrealistic to evaluate the changes of a country’s soft power based on individual short-term 
cases, as the impact only emerges in the long run and is affected by a broad range of variables. 
Thus, although promoting Taiwan’s soft power has appeared in many relevant policy 
documents, it requires long-term observation and research to verify whether the policies have 
achieved the goal. 
Ultimately, Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy strategy needs to be modified. As 
demonstrated in the research findings, the current strategy focuses more on the sender’s side, 
and the evidence is lacking on how existing practice has been perceived. Currently, the 
government has little or no knowledge about how its use of soft power resources is being 
perceived or how the activities are affecting the perceptions of its foreign (and internal) 
audiences. Government thus lacks information to be able to plan, develop and implement an 
appropriate strategy. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that appreciation of culture will be 
translated into actions in favour of Taiwan.  
In the case of Taiwan, the government aims to promote culture as part of soft power 
despite the deficiency in its conventional diplomacy. This study concludes that the existing 
practice of cultural diplomacy does not serve as an appropriate channel for soft power assets 
to have influence in other countries. It would be unrealistic to promote its soft power without 
considering the shortcomings in hard power and foreign affairs, which resulted in 
disadvantages for Taiwan in the first place. Furthermore, external cultural policy is an 
extension of internal cultural policy. The existing issues in the domestic cultural politics also 
impact on the cultural diplomacy and vice versa. The three elements of Taiwan’s cultural 
diplomacy – as a complement to traditional diplomacy, the outlet in the process of cultural 
identity formation, and the showcase of cultural and creative industries – can interact with 
each other if the strategy is designed carefully. However, more needs to be done if 
government envisages developing cultural diplomacy from a one-way to two-way strategy. 
To accentuate mutual understanding, as I would recommend, is the way forward. 
My research also fills the knowledge gap in the existing literature on cultural 
diplomacy from the perspectives of arts administration and cultural policy implementation. 
As Nisbett (2015) stated, what cultural diplomacy means for arts organisations, managers, 
artists and audiences has not been widely studied. This research provides a detailed account 
on the artists’ engagement in cultural diplomacy. I found evidence that the arts organisations 
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and individual actors are highly motivated to participate in international cultural exchange. 
Interestingly, some of the artists proclaimed themselves cultural diplomats, whilst some 
considered exposure as a by-product. In the area of cultural policy studies, this research 
contributes a detailed case study of policy implementation in and reception of a country that 
is under researched.  
I discussed the formation of cultural diplomacy strategy from the perspective of 
policy implementation. I examined the reasons of policy formation and actual practice 
considering the historical and political background. Some follow-up research can be 
developed in cultural diplomacy projects. Initially, I had the intention of collecting data from 
the audiences of cultural diplomacy activities. However, this idea was soon abandoned due to 
time and resource constraints. It remains an unsolved problem for policy evaluation and for 
understanding how Taiwan’s national image is received after government initiatives. The 
analysis of public opinion is a major area for research relating to Taiwan’s cultural 
diplomacy. 
The development of this research project also coincided with particular changes that 
caused important adjustments. One was the upgrade of the MOC and the other the expansion 
of Taiwan’s overseas cultural centres in 2012. The preparatory period of opening new 
cultural centres was longer than expected. Despite the initial disappointment, the situation 
provided an opportunity to see the practical challenges of government administration. The 
subsequent work on Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy, and the operation in the new cultural 
centres can be topics for future research.    
I uncovered several interesting cases of private actors who spontaneously participated 
in cultural relations. In addition, several artists provided interesting accounts regarding the 
process of engagement in cross-cultural production supported by cultural diplomacy 
incentives. Their motivations and the actual process of cultural exchange are worth further 
exploration. The mutuality generated through cultural relations and how understanding and 
trust are enhanced are also important topics for future research.  
Furthermore, social media has drastically changed the way information is spread and 
opinions are expressed. At the early stage of this research, I considered analysing data from 
social media to understand the communication of Taiwan’s cultural image. The plan was later 
sidelined as it required substantially more resources to collect and process the data than what 
was evaluated as realistic within the required timeframe of this PhD research. Nevertheless, 
in the process of research, I discovered that social media was not the main channel that the 
MOC or the cultural centres chose to communicate with the public. It may have been 
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considered informal and only used by the younger generation. However, the situation started 
to change after the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan and the local election in 2014, when the 
government began to recognise the importance of communicating with social media users. 
The effects of the change may take some time to become visible, and I hope there will be 
opportunities to conduct further research on social media, public opinion, and cultural 
diplomacy in the context of Taiwan.   
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Appendix-1 
 
List of interviews 
 
No. Name Description Date of Interview Location 
1 Tchen Yu-chiou Former Chairperson of the Council for Cultural Affairs 28 May, 2013 Taipei 
2 Derjk Wu 
Personal Assistant to the 
Chief Executive Officer of 
Quanta Arts Foundation 
31 May, 2013 Taipei 
3 Chen Chih-Cheng Director of Taiwan’s Paris Cultural Centre  
29 November, 
2013 Paris 
4 Susan Yu Director of Taiwan’s New York Cultural Center 12 December, 2013 New York 
5 Ping Heng 
Artistic Director of National 
Chiang Kai-shek Cultural 
Centre (National Theatre 
and Concert Hall) 
17 June, 2013 Taipei 
6 Baboo Liao Jiun-Cheng 
Theatre director in 
Shakespeare's Wild Sisters 
Group 
03 July 2014 Taipei 
7 Cecily D. Cook 
Senior Programme Officer 
in Asian Cultural Council 
New York 
16 December, 2013 New York 
8 Anonymous#1 Official in Ministry of Culture 
02 July, 2014 
15 July, 2014 
 
Taipei 
9 Anonymous#2 Cultural Attaché of Taiwan 17 December, 2013 New York 
10 Anonymous#3 Cultural Attaché of Taiwan 13 December, 2013 New York 
11 Anonymous#4 Artist in a Taiwanese arts company  14 June, 2013 Taipei 
12 Anonymous#5 Arts Administrator in a Taiwanese theatre company 
28 September, 
2013 
Over 
Skype 
 
 242 
Appendix-2 
 
Taiwanese/Chinese Identification Trend Distribution in Taiwan 
(1992/06–2016/06)
 
 
